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PREFACE
In 1973-74, a group of law students at the University of
Maryland School of Law organized the Maryland International
Law Society; third-year student S. Jacob Scherr was elected its
President. Under the able guidance of Faculty Advisor James P.
Chandler and with the encouragement and support of the late
Dean William P. Cunningham, the Society soon became the focal
point for international activities in the Law School. Early
activities of the Society included participation in the Jessup
International Moot Court competition and the establishment of a
Speakers' Program at the Law School under which the student
body had an opportunity to hear talks by a number of leading
scholars.
Two years later, the Society began to engage in more
ambitious projects when David Simon, then a third-year student
and now an Associate at Bregman, Abell, Solter & Kay in
Washington, D.C., was elected to the Presidency. Two series
publications were launched in 1977: the first is the Occasional
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, under my
editorship, with the cooperation of Mr. Simon as Executive Editor
and of the staff of the Society. The second one is the International
Law Society Occa'sional Papers Series, which complements the
Law School's International Trade Law Journal. Both series have
been enthusiastically received by the academic and business
communities. Today, these series have received individual and
institutional orders and subscriptions not only from within the
United States, but also from the Federal Republic of Germany,
Denmark, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Republic of
China, France, Switzerland, Singapore and others. Courses at
some universities have adopted publications in these series as
required reading for their students.
In the "great" year of 1977 of the Society, in addition to the
activities outlined above, the Society organized the first international conference to be held at the Law School, on April 15-16,
1977: the Conference on Legal Aspects of United States Republic of China (ROC) Trade and Investment. The Conference
was designated a Regional Meeting of the American Society of
International Law and was attended by some one hundred
scholars, businesspersons, lawyers, government officials and
diplomats from here and abroad.
(iii)

Despite the disparity of size and population, the Republic of
China is among the top twelve trading partners of the United
States. At present, there are over 220 U.S. firms with direct
investments in Taiwan, accounting for over US$500 million in
investments. In 1976, US-ROC trade reached a record level of
almost US$5 billion. The International Law Society's Conference
was organized to present an overall review and projection of USROC trade and investment relations, with a special emphasis on
the role of the U.S. and ROC legal systems in those relations. The
Conference was divided into three sessions: (1) Trends and
prospects of US-ROC economic relations; (2) practical and legal
aspects of US-ROC trade and investment interactions; and (3) a
prospective look at US-ROC economic relations in light of the
changing nature of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of
China.
The Conference Proceedings, as reproduced here, in my view,
did produce a high-quality symposium aimed at both business and
academic groups, and at the lawyers within each group.
It is my great pleasure to serve as a Faculty Advisor to the
Society and co-editor of the Conference Proceedings. I am deeply
impressed by Mr. David Simon's leadership and administrative
skill in organizing the Conference and seeing the work of
publication through to its consummation. I should also like to
thank other members of the Society - particularly Joyce
Seunarine, William Helfand, Gilbert Genn and Arthur Websterwho helped organize the Conference and were of invaluable
assistance in preparing these Proceedings for publication. Dean
Michael J. Kelly afforded me the benefit of his excellent advice
and positive support throughout, and I am indebted to him.
Finally, I wish to express my sincere thanks to Assistant
Dean George Regan and his staff, LuAnn Young and Shirley A.
Selin, for their administrative support; and Judith Hall, Administrative Director of the American Society of International Law, for
her advice in organizing an international conference.

Hungdah Chiu
December 15, 1977

(iv)

FOREWORD
Any serious reflection concerning the Republic of China raises
some of the most perplexing issues facing the United States, and
the world, today. The issue of the legal status of Taiwan, for
example, has given rise to considerable controversy, and not just
in the international-legal literature. The political question of
United States relations with the Republic of China, of course, has
been with us for a considerable time, and - as of this writing remains unresolved. These issues are reflected in the many
paradoxes that characterize the Republic of China. It is a country
that is well along on the path from "developing" to "developed,"
while at the same time, it has few internal material resources. Or,
again, it is the second-largest trading nation in Southeast Asia,
yet has lost diplomatic recognition from many of its most
significant trading partners.
When we at the University of Maryland International Law
Society decided to stage a Regional Meeting of the American
Society of International Law on United States-Republic of China
relations, we considered what analytic tools were best suited for
laying bare some of the principal facets of that relationship.
Ultimately, we chose three principal frameworks: economics, law,
especially the ways in which the ROC's legal regime has aided its
development, and political-economic prognostication. In the
presentation of each of these, history and hopes played as much a
part as descriptions of the present; in none of them can a
consideration of the others be left out. The conference, then, was
divided into three sessions: trends and prospects of US-ROC
economic relations, practical and legal aspects of US-ROC trade
and investment, and the future of US-ROC economic relations.
The proceedings of the University of Maryland International
Law Society Conference on Legal Aspects of US-ROC Trade and
Investment speak for themselves. The panelists - Chinese,
American and European scholars and practitioners - were an
informed, passionately engaged group of men and women. The
audience was lively, its questions provocative. From the mass of
data presented at the first session, a picture of the ROC's
extraordinary economic vitality emerged. The second session
afforded a view of the ways in which the ROC's legal structure
has nurtured that vitality, frequently with a sense of experimentation, as in the case of the creation of Export Processing Zones. A
somewhat contrapuntal theme, the legal resolution of trade
(v)

disputes under the United States Trade Act of 1974, reminded us
that the economic progress of the ROC cannot be considered in
vacuo: the ROC is, indeed, a member of the community of nations,
and its actions must be considered as interactions, not merely
internal shufflings of resources. The third session wove these
economic and legal strands together in attempts to provide
answers to some of the short- and long-term questions presently
plaguing American and Chinese political and business leaders. A
paper on the West German trading experience with the Republic of
China provided further insight into the options available in USROC relations.
Throughout the conference, the strength of the ROC was
argued with great skill and force; the familiar story of the ROC's
economic rise unfolded in many guises. Equally important were
some of the novel ideas and even "heresies" that were aired: for
example, that the ROC should now turn from acting as "junior"
partner in trade with developed nations to acting as "senior"
partner and seek to expand its trade with less developed nations.
It was truly a pleasure for me to act as Chairman for the
conference whose proceedings are presented in this volume. I
would particularly like to thank Judith Hall, Administrative
Director of the American Society of International Law, for her
encouragement and cooperation throughout the planning stages.
The Asia Foundation, whose partial financial support was
instrumental throughout, also deserves a warm acknowledgment
for its contributions. I was gratified by the extent to which the
community of the University of Maryland School of Law
supported this first international conference at the Law School.
My sincerest thanks go to Dean Michael Kelly for his support, to
the faculty and student committees that assisted in preparations
for the conference, to all the participants, and most especially to
Professor Hungdah Chiu of the Law School faculty. As Faculty
Advisor to the International Law Society, Professor Chiu was
truly the guiding light behind the conference; his attention to
detail in the midst of an exceptionally demanding schedule was
extraordinary, and his patience and calm were a bedrock to rely
on whenever problems seemed insurmountable.
David Simon

(vi)

Left to right: David Simon, William Morell, Oliver Oldman, Hungdah Chiu, Jane
Brandt, Gaston Sigur.

Left to right: Chun Li, Hungdah Chiu, Oliver Oldman, Yung Wei.
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I.

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF US-ROC
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(10:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.)
April 15, 1977

The session opened at 10 a.m. with announcements made by
Jane Brandt, Secretary of the Conference. Dean Michael Kelly of
the University of Maryland School of Law extended greetings,
thanked the Conference Committee, and acknowledged the
contributions of Professors Chiu and Chandler in international
law to the University of Maryland. David Simon, Conference
Chairperson, extended greetings and turned the meeting over to
Dr. Chiu, Chairperson for the first session.
Dr. Chiu stated that U.S. trade relations with China date back
100 years, and includes the use of the Port of Baltimore for the
past century. Dr. Chiu then related some highlights of the history
of U.S. relations with the Republic of China (ROC).
Dr. Chiu pointed out that when the ROC was established in
1912, the United States was the first country to extend recognition. The United States and the ROC share the additional
common heritage of being the first democratic republics established on their respective continents. Since 1912, Dr. Chiu said,
the two countries have maintained close relations in all aspects of
international life. During the Second World War, both countries
fought side by side against the aggressor and both were among
the five major sponsoring powers that established the United
Nations in 1945.
In 1946, the United States and the ROC concluded a
friendship, commerce and navigation treaty which created the
basis for further development of economic and trade relations
between the two countries. In 1954, both countries concluded a
mutual defense treaty.
Mter making the above brief remarks, Dr. Chiu introduced
the first speaker, Dr. Yung Wei, to present his paper on "The
Republic of China in the 1970s." Dr. Wei stated that the Republic
of China is striving in the 1970s for future growth, equity and
security. He reviewed the economic growth and social progress of
the ROC from 1952 to 1972. In economic growth, the ROC has
experienced a rapid increase in national income, industrial
production, exports and imports. The accompanying social
development resulted in increases in literacy, nutritional intake
(1)
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and education at all levels. Dr. Wei stated that the ROC has
experienced increases in trade despite the severance of diplomatic
ties with many countries. However, the ROC, he said, wishes to
strengthen and renew its ties with other nations. Dr. Wei added
that the ROC regrets the current trend toward "normalization" of
US-People's Republic of China (PRC) relations. Dr. Wei said that
the present policy of the ROC is threefold: (1) The ROC will
remain in the democratic camp; (2) The ROC will not negotiate
with the Chinese Communists; (3) The ROC will not develop
nuclear weapons for defense.
[The following is the text of Dr. Yung Wei's paper.]

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE 1970s:
STRIVING FOR A FUTURE OF GROWTH,
EQUITY, AND SECURITY
YUNG WEI*
This paper presents a general survey of the social, economic
and political development in the Republic of China since 1970.
The basic approach is that of modernization research and
international-relations analysis. In the first part of the paper, the
pace of economic growth and social progress are reviewed. In the
second part of the paper, the problems and progress in the
distributi9n of income, land ownership, educational opportunities
and political participation are examined. Finally, in the last part
of the paper, the external environment of the Republic of China
and the question of security are discussed.
The rapid economic growth in Taiwan, Republic of China
(ROC), has been fully discussed by many social scientists in the
western world and does not need further elaboration. To sum up,
between the years 1952 and 1972, real national income has
increased 484.3 percent; industrial production, 1,700.6 percent;
export, 2,605.4 percent; and import, 1,373.7 percent. This rapid
* Chairman of Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission,
Executive Yuan (Cabinet), Taipei, ROC; Professor of Political Science, National
Taiwan University.
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economic growth has made the ROC, which has under its effective
control a territory comparable in size to Switzerland, one of the
major trading nations of the world. What needs to be stressed here
is that the rapid economic growth on Taiwan has been accompanied by notable progress in the areas of education, health,
communication and transportation.
As a result of accelerated growth, significant changes have
occurred in the Taiwanese economy (Table 1). Agricultural
production decreased from 35.51 percent of the total economy in
1951 to 15.66 percent in 1972. In the same period, industry
increased from 19.42 percent to 36.56 percent; and commerce, from
19.50 to 23.78 percent. A drastic increase of population, from 8.1
million in 1952 to 15.3 million in 1972, provided the needed
manpower for agriculture and industry; yet at the same time
enlarged the ratio of dependent population and prevented a more
substantive gain in per capita income. Rapid population growth
has quickened the pace of urbanization in Taiwan: Urban
population swelled from 47.6 percent of the total population of the
island in 1952 to 61.1 percent in 1972. This urbanization process
brought much needed labor to the various industrial and
commercial establishments in urban areas; at the same time,
however, it also created a heavy demand on housing, transportation and other public services and facilities in the bigger cities.
Along with the overall economic growth, substantive gains
were also shown on most social and cultural indicators. For
instance, the average life expectancy of the people of Taiwan
achieved an increment of more than ten years between 1952 and
1972; that of male from 56.5 to 66.8 and that of female from 60.7 to
72. Daily calorie intake increased from 2,078 to 2, 738; and daily
protein intake (in grams), from 49 to 74.6. The percentage of
school age children attending primary schools climbed from 84
percent to 98.13 percent; and the percentage of college age youth
enrolled in institutions of higher learning jumped from 1.4 percent
to 12.5 percent. All these figures testify to the dramatic improvement of the quality of life on Taiwan as a result of sustained
social and economic progress.
It must be pointed out, however, that starting from 1971, the
Republic of China has experienced a series of challenges to her
international position and economic development. The Nixon trip
to Mainland China and the withdrawal of the ROC from the
United Nations brought considerable difficulties to the diplomatic
front of the ROC, but a significant growth of trade continued after
1971. It was not until 1973, when the world economy was hit by

4
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Table 1
Social and Economic Indicators of Modernization on Taiwan
Year
Items
Per capita income (US $)
Population growth rate
Population in urban areas
Life expectancy
Male
Female
Infant mortality
Consumption of electricity
Motor vehicles per thousand
residents
Per capita mails
Per capita daily calorie intake
Per capita daily protein intake
Percentage of college age youths
(18-21) in college
Percentage of middle school age
youths (13-17) in middle school
Percentage of school age children
in primary schools
Illiteracy rate (of population
15 years old and older)
Television ownership per thousand
residents (sets)

1952

1972

110
3.8% (1953)
47.6%

395
2.0%
61.1%

56.5
60.7
3.7%
32 degrees

66.8
72.0
1.6%
236 degrees

0.3
7.7
2,078
49g

63.3
45.6
2,738
74.6g

1.4%

12.5%

12.5%

57.8%

84.0%

98.13%
34.7% (1965)

23.8%

1.4 (1963)

54.6

Data Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1973 (Taipei: Council for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Executive Yuan, 1974); and She Hui Fa Chan Chih
Piao {Indicators of Social Development) (Taipei: Council for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Executive Yuan, 1974).

serious inflation and a drastic increase of the price of oil, that
Taiwan's economy began experiencing the process of stagflation.
During the 1973-74 period, many of the problems inherent in the
ROC economy became apparent. Among the more obvious
problems were: a lack of large-scale firms and factories as well as
trading companies; inadequate basic supporting facilities such as
large seaports, power, transportation, and communication networks keeping up with Taiwan's rapid economic growth; labor
shortage and wage increase, which have cut down the competitiveness of the products of the ROC in the international market;
an outflow of farm population to urban centers, which reduced the
productivity of the rural areas and increased the price of farm
products.
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To cope with these problems, the government of the ROC
(GRC) shelved the Sixth Four-Year Plan, which no longer suited
the new economic situation, and devised a new Six-Year Plan for
economic development. The more important goals and measures
in the new Six-Year Plan include: (1) transforming Taiwan's
economy from labor intensive to capital and technology intensive;
(2) increasing and diversifying energy supplies by completing the
nuclear power plants, exploring for oil and gas, seeking multiple
sources of crude oil· importation, and expanding oil distilling
facilities; (3) promoting farm mechanization, improving the living
conditions in rural areas, and developing high-value farm
products for export; (4) completing the major construction projects
in transportation and communication, including the electrification of the railroad system, the north-south superhighway, the
international airport at Tao-yuan, the new Taichung and Suao
harbors, and the northern railroad; (5) completing the building of
the large steel factory and expanding the facilities for processing
aluminum and copper ores; and (6) establishing a large export
network, bringing in new technology and management methods,
and encouraging the export of more advanced industrial products
and high-precision instruments. In addition to these measures
dealing with economic development, the Six-Year Plan also
includes programs for social development such as family planning, public housing and urban renewal, pollution control, health
insurance, an antipoverty program, and a manpower plan. It also
calls for the establishment of an industrial park at Hsin-chu,
where National Tsing-hua University is located.
It is still too early to determine the effect of this new plan for
economic development. Judging by the performance of the Taiwan
economy in 1976, the Six-Year Plan has made moderate progress.
For example, according to the report made by the premier to the
Legislative Yuan in September 1976, the price increase of both
wholesale and retail goods during the period of January-June 1976
has been rather limited: the former registered an increase of 2.06
percent and the latter 3.43 percent in comparison with the
previous year. During the same period, exports increased to
US$7.1 billion, which is 38.8 percent higher than that of the same
months in 1975. Exports exceeded imports by US$125 million,
which compares quite favorably with· the trade deficit of US$277
million between January and June in 1975. The newest estimation
of real economic growth during 1976 is somewhere between 10 and
11 percent. Judging by these records, we may conclude that the

6
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economy of Taiwan has been able to achieve significant growth
with price stability in the past year.
It ought to be pointed out, however, that the increment of the
capability of the Taiwanese economy and society is not the only
concern of the GRC. While growth has been an important goal,
distribution or allocation of values also has been a primary
concern. The concern can be traced back to the teaching of Dr.
Sun Yat-sen, who advocated land reform as a prerequisite for
economic development and social justice. Moreover, this emphasis
on distribution by the GRC also reflects its determination in
building Taiwan into a model province having an appeal to the
people of Mainland China where the Chinese Communists preach
an egalitarian philosophy yet have not yet been able to deliver
anything more than one of the lowest living standards of the
world.
Owing to its conscientious efforts toward a more equal society,
the government of the Republic of China has achieved significant
progress toward equality in land ownership, income distribution,
educational opportunities and political participation. First, let us
examine the case of land ownership. It has often been asserted
that one of the major reasons for the Nationalist defeat on
Mainland China was the failure to carry out the land reform
program envisaged by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Since the Chinese
Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, a successful and peaceful land
reform has been realized on the island. Through a series of policy
measures such as the reduction of land rent, sale of public land to
the peasants, and ownership of the land by the former tenants,
the GRC has by and large achieved its goal of equalization of land
ownership on Taiwan.
The effectiveness of the land reform can be measured by the
ratio of tenant farmers, semi-self-tilling farmers, and self-tilling
farmers. In 1949, the ratio was 39 percent for the tenant farmers,
25 percent for semi-self-tilling farmers, and 36 percent for the selftilling farmers. After the land reform, the proportion became 10,
12, and 78 percent respectively in 1971. The effect of the
redistribution of land can be further illustrated by using a widely
used measurement of inequality, the Gini index. As the data in
Table 2 indicate, the Gini index for land distribution for Taiwan
in 1952 was 0.618. In 1960, the figure was reduced to 0.457, which
indicates a much lower level of inequality in land ownership in
Taiwan. In comparison to Columbia, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and the U.A.R., Taiwan has the highest equity in the
distribution of land in rural areas.

7
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Table 2
Gini Index of Land Concentration in Selected Countries*
Decline in
Gini Index, in
Percentage
Country

Year

Gini Index

Year

(C)

Colombia
India
Mexico
Philippines
Taiwan
U.A.R.

1960
1953-54
1930
1948
1952
1952

0.864
0.628
0.959
0.578
0.618
0.810

1969
196Q-61
1960
1960
1960
1964

(E)

(C) - (E)
(C)

0.818
0.589
0.694
0.534
0.457
0.674

5.32"
6.14
27.64
7.26
26.08
16.74

Gini Index

X

100

* In Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1974), p. 310.

Concomitant with the more equal distribution of land
ownership in Taiwan is the increase of educational opportunities
and a more equal distribution of those opportunities among
different sectors of the population in Taiwan. In 1946 when
Taiwan was restored to China, there were only four colleges, 215
middle schools, and 1,130 primary schools on the island. Since
then, a phenomenal growth has occurred at all levels of education.
The 1972 educational data showed that there were 81 universities
and colleges, 842 middle schools, and 2,193 primary schools on
Taiwan. The ratio of school-age children and youths in educational instftutions at various levels has also witnessed a dramatic
increase, with the colleges registering the highest rate of increase.
In addition to the numerical increase in educational opportunities, there are further indications that the opportunities for
education have increased substantially for the tenant farmers.
According to data released by the Land Institute of Taiwan, the
number of former tenant farmer's children attending primary
schools has increased 257 percent between 1948 and 1971; those
attending middle schools, 2,827 percent; and those enrolling in
colleges, 16,820 percent. These facts are made more significant
when one realizes that between 1952 and 1971, the population
employed in agricultural activities in Taiwan has increased only
128.45 percent.
In addition to land ownership, income distribution is another
important measurement of social and economic equality. Simon
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Kuznets, a leading economist, has theorized that inequality of
income distribution tends to be wide in the earlier phases of
growth and then to narrow in the later phases of growth. The
Taiwan experience does not conform to this theory. According to
data recently released by the Statistical Bureau, DGBAS, of the
GRC, the Gini index on income distribution in Taiwan has
declined from 0.36 in 1964 to 0.31 in 1975. This compares quite
favorably with the records on the Republic of Korea (0.40), India
(0.41), Thailand (0.48), and the Philippines (0.45). The same source
also reveals, however, that the rural population has a lower
income but a more equal distribution. The urban population, on
the other hand, has a higher income but a more uneven
distribution. In order to rectify the unequal distribution between
the urban and rural population, the government of the ROC has
made great efforts to raise the income of farmers, for example, by
setting guaranteed prices for farm products and by offering large
amount loans and grants to stimulate agricultural activities. The
government has also tried to reduce the size of the poor sector of
the population by launching a series of anti-poverty programs.
Reports recently- released by Bureau of Social Affairs of the
Taiwan Provincial Government show that through various
programs, the size of poorest section of the population has been
significantly reduced.
Now let us tum to the opportunities for political participation.
It should be said at the outset that several factors have
complicated the distribution of political power on Taiwan. First,
there is the existence of two major provincial groups among the
population of Taiwan: the Taiwanese, who constitute about 84.4
percent of the total population of Taiwan, and the Mainlanders,
who make up about 13.6 percent. The Taiwanese are further
divided into two subgroups: the Min-nan group, originally from
Fukien, and the Hakka group, originally from Kwangtung. The
former constitutes about 73.72 percent of the total population, and
the later constitutes 12.68 percent.
A second factor that has made distribution of political power
in Taiwan more complex was the transplantation of a national
elite from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1950. The third factor has
been the continuing claim of the GRC to be the government of all
China, thus having to maintain a national elite structure on the
island. Finally, the existence of a ·notable disparity in political
representation among different provincial groups also poses a
problem with respect to distribution of political power on the
island.
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During the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, from 1895 to 1945,
the Chinese on Taiwan had a very limited opportunity for
anything remotely related to political activities. The Japanese
monopolized all administrative positions, from the GovernorGeneral of the colonial government down to head master of
village schools. After the departure of 480,000 Japanese, their
political and occupational positions were largely taken over by the
Taiwanese, especially those in the smaller cities and villages.
Since 1951, provincial elections have been held in Taiwan. Many
Taiwanese found an avenue into politics by participating in
political activities at the provincial level. Today the overwhelming
majority of the provincial assemblymen and women are Taiwanese; and almost all the city mayors and county magistrates are
Taiwanese. The governorship of Taiwan is now occupied by Mr.
Hsieh Tung-ming, an elder Taiwanese statesman who commands
much respect among the local population.
Since 1969, the deadlock of political participation at the
national level has been broken. With the holding· of supplementary elections in 1969, 1972, and 1975, a sizable number of new
members has been added to the three branches of the representative bodies at the national level: the Legislative Yuan, the
National Assembly, and the Control Yuan. Looking to the future,
the GRC is committed to the enlargement of political participation
in Taiwan, particularly for the local Taiwanese and the young. As
many governments in Asia have altered their constitutional
government after the "Nixon shock," the determination of the
GRC to maintain a constitutional democracy under very trying
conditions deserves due credit.
Mter the examination of problems of growth and equity in the
Republic of China, we may now turn to problems of national
security. It goes without saying that since 1971 the ROC has
experienced increasing difficulties in its external relations. But it
is equally true that through various practical measures, the GRC
has effectively defeated the attempt of Mainland China to isolate
the ROC. In many places where official ties have been broken,
alternative mechanisms have been set up to carry out consular
and other intersystem relations. Trade between the ROC and
states with which the ROC has no formal ties often has increased
after the severance of relations. Canada, for instance, stands out
as a district example. It must be made perfectly clear that the
ROC takes no pride in having only semiofficial or paradiplomatic
relations with the majority of the states of the world. Efforts have
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been made to restore our ties with the nations of the world or at
least to elevate the level of existing relations.
Of all the diplomatic ties with countries of the world, those
between the. ROC and the United States are considered by the
people of Taiwan as the most important, for the United States has
been an ally for more than thirty years and has provided the ROC
with the generous economic assistance that made the Taiwan
"miracle" a reality. Trade between the ROC and the United States
exceeds 4.8 billion dollars and is crucial for the continuing growth
of Taiwan's economy. It is most disturbing, therefore, for the
government and the people of the Republic of China to see a longtime friend and ally moving toward the so-called "normalization"
with the Mainland. Today the ROC has an embassy in Washington, D.C. and the Chinese Communists have a Liaison Office
there. It is not a situation in which the people of the ROC feel
comfortable. But because the ROC treasures so much the close ties
built over many decades and considers these ties so important to
our security and prosperity, the situation is reluctantly tolerated.
With Mainland China in constant turmoil and its leaders
humiliated one after another in successive purges, it is very
difficult for the people of the ROC to understand why some people
in the United States· are so eager to push for further "normalization" with the Chinese Communists who are busy trying to put
their internal affairs back to normal. One may point to the Soviet
factor. It should be remembered, however, that the Russians
themselves have tried to control Mainland China through military
and economic aid, only to be chased out of China and to become
the primary target of Chinese Communist verbal assaults.
Without thousands of miles of common boundaries and a common
ideological base similar to that between the Soviet · Union and
Communist China, how can the United States develop any kind of
influence over the communist political system, which still
produces huge amounts of propaganda attacking the United
States?
·
Still others point out that only Japan is important to the
United States policy in Asia. As a frequent traveller to Japan, this
author can testify that not all the Japanese leaders and scholars
of international relations enjoy the "honor" of being the nation
singled out by the United States as the latter's only important ally
in Asia. Without the smaller trilateral relations between the
Republic of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, the larger
trilateral relations between Europe, United States and Japan may
soon become devoid of substantive meaning, for without South

CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

11

Korea and the Republic of China as its two fronts, Japan will
have to reassess its international relations and defense postures.
The Republic of China has adopted a very cautious and
straightforward policy to safeguard its security. The ROC
government has repeatedly declared that under no circumstance
will it enter into any negotiation with the Chinese Communists,
that the ROC will stay in the democratic camp, and that it will not
make nuclear weapons. It is a policy of principles, prudence and
pragmatism, for doing any of the three things could create
immediate danger in the ROC's external and internal environments. According to the assessments of most military specialists,
the ROC is fully able to defend herself against the Chinese
Communists. But logistic support in terms of advanced weaponry
from the United States is important. Furthermore, the likelihood
of a hot war in the Taiwan Straits is not high in the near future.
Nevertheless, the government and the people of the ROC do not
like to take chances. For this reason, substantial efforts have been
made to achieve self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the production
of weapons and weapon systems. To the extent that it will not
deter further economic growth, funds have been allocated to
further strengthen the ROC's defense capability and to develop
new military equipment.
In the final analysis, a country's security lies in the faith,
confidence and determination of its own people. The people of the
Republic of China believe that they have a model of development
and modernization that is much more effective and much more
humane than the one used by the Chinese Communists on
Mainland China. They believe that, given the opportunity of free
choice, the people of Mainland China will choose the system
successfully tried out in Taiwan. Thus, the security in the minds
of the people of the ROC grows out of their conviction of the
superiority of their model of modernization which has brought to
them prosperity, equality, and the maintenance of their cultural
heritage in an industrial society. It was with this conviction that
the people of the ROC have succeeded in weathering many storms
since 1971. They are determined to prove to the world that in an
international system beset with power politics, their course of
action will prove to be not only morally right but politically wise. 1
1. For a more elaborate treatment of the subject matter, see Yung Wei,
"Modernization Process in Taiwan: An Allocative Analysis," Asian Survey, Vol.
16, No. 3, pp. 249-69, (March, 1976); and Yung Wei, "Unification or Confrontation:
An Assessment of Future Relations between Mainland China and Taiwan," in Ray
E. Johnston, ed., The Politics of Division, Partition, and Unification (New York:
Praeger, 1976), pp. 67-79.
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Dr. Chiu thanked Dr. Wei for presenting the paper and then
invited Mr. M. T. Wu, Director of Chinese Investment and Trade
Office in New York City, to present his paper on "Investment and
Trade Climate in the ROC." Mr. Wu cited the factors contributing
to the ROC's growth and discussed investment incentives and
prospects of trade. He said the new emphasis now will be on
upgrading technology.
[The following is the text of Mr. M. T. Wu's paper.]

INVESTMENT AND TRADE CLIMATE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MEI-TSUN

Wu*

Taiwan is a roughly oval-shaped island, about 240 miles long
from north to south and 98 miles wide at its broadest point. Its
total area is 14,000 square miles, which is a little less than that of
Connecticut (10,577 square miles) combined with Maryland (5,099
square miles). Its population is approximately 16.5 million.
The achievement in economic development in the past two
decades is a record of which the Republic of China (ROC) can
justly be proud. Taiwan's living standard is presently one of the
highest in Asia, second only to Japan.
The factors which brought about this successful economic
development include the Land Reform Program carried out in the
early 1950s, the consecutive Four-Year Economic Development
Plans, the effective utilization of U. S. aid from 1950 to 1965, the
rapid expansion of international trade, and the annual inflow of
foreign and overseas Chinese capitals for industrial development.
I. INVESTMENT

To welcome foreign investment has been and will continue to
be the policy of the government of the Republic of China.
Promulgation of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment in
1960 marked a concrete advance in giving incentives to such
investment. Since this law came into force, the annual inflow of
foreign private capital has risen sharply. For the nine years from

*

Director, Chinese Investment and Trade Office, New York, New York.
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1952 through 1960, the total amount of foreign investment
approved was US$35.6 million, averaging less than US$4 million
per year. Since the promulgation of this statute, coupled with the
continuous improvement of the investment climate, not only has
the influx of foreign capital increased rapidly, but the formation
of domestic capital has also increased, at an even faster rate.
For the ten years between 1961 and 1970, approved foreign
investments averaged US$52.4 million per year, 13 times that of
the initial nine-year period. During the latest six years from 1970
to 1976, the average reached US$164.5 million per year, 41 times
that of the initial nine-year period.
The total amount of foreign investment approved in the past
25 years was US$1,547 million, of which 29% was from overseas
Chinese and 71% from foreign nationals. Of this 71%, direct
investment from the United States accounted for 31.8%; from
Japan, 16%; from Europe, 12.6%; and 10.6% from other areas.
Nearly half of the investments from Europe and other areas were
made by subsidiaries or affiliates of American corporations in
those areas. Hence, the United States is not only the ROC's
largest trading partner but also the biggest source of the foreign
investment capital that has gone into the ROC's industrial
development.

A. Foreign Sources of Investment Capital in
Support of Economic Development
In the process of Taiwan's economic development, domestic
capital has come mainly from the private sector, followed by the
government and public enterprises. Foreign capital is largely
composed of U.S. aid, loans from international institutions and
foreign private organizations, and investments by foreigners and
overseas Chinese. Common to almost all developing countries, the
supply of domestic capital at the initial stage of economic
development was very limited, and had to be supplemented by
foreign capital. Not until a country's economy has reached a
certain level of development will domestic capital play a
predominant role. The case is the same with Taiwan.
1. U.S. Aid

In the fifteen-year period between 1950 and 1965, the United
States injected into Taiwan's economy an average of US$100
million a year. These funds were used to import large quantities of
daily necessities, agricultural and industrial raw materials, and
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industrial plants and equipment. At the same time, the local
currency proceeds generated from the sale of U.S. aid commodities
were used for the financing of various social and educational
projects.
The U.S. aid during that period made up more than 90% of the
deficits in Taiwan's international balance of payments, and
provided one-third of its capital investments.

a. The Initial Phase. U.S. aid was the main source of
Taiwan's investment capital in this period because of the limited
supply of domestic capital resulting from low income, meager
savings and a lack of motivation and ability on the part of the
private sector to make investments. Although the ratio of fixed
investment to the GDP (gross domestic products) averaged only
16% from 1953 to 1960, Taiwan still had to rely heavily on U.S.
aid. The amount of U.S. aid to Taiwan ranged from US$80 million
to US$120 million per year in the ten years from mid-1950 to 1960.
It accounted for as much as 40% of Taiwan's gross domestic
capital formation. It was also instrumental in stimulating the
flow of domestic capital to economic development projects. In the
initial phase of Taiwan's economic development, therefore, U.S.
aid made immense contributions to increasing the commodity
supply, stabilizing the economy, and laying the foundation for
further economic progress in subsequent years.
b. The 1960s. The 1960s were years of rapid growth for
Taiwan's economy. Gross capital formation went up sharply and
reached 26% of the GDP in 1970. The share ofU.S. aid as a source
of investment capital declined and that of domestic capital
increased. Moreover, prior to its termination in 1965, U.S. aid had
not only been reduced but also shifted increasingly from grants to
loans.
c. The Termination of U.S. Aid. Since the termination
of U.S. aid in 1965, there has been a marked change in the sources
of investment capital, and the importance of domestic capital has
greatly increased. Furthermore, an increasing amount of investment capital has been obtained from abroad in the form of foreign
and overseas Chinese investment as well as loans from international financing institutions and private organizations.
The Taiwan public was once apprehensive that the termination of U.S. aid would be a blow to Taiwan's economic- growth. In
fact, however, the government of the Republic of China had
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realized long before the termination of U.S. aid that this source of
financing could not remain available indefinitely. Therefore,
timely efforts were made to improve the investment climate for a
self-sustaining economy.

2. Foreign Loans
Since the 1960s, Taiwan has secured foreign loans from
various international organizations and foreign countries. Up to
June 1976, the total amount of loans stands at US$2 billion from:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD or the World Bank)
2. International Development Association
3. Asian Development Bank
4. U.S. Export-Import Bank
1.

These loans are used mostly to help develop Taiwan's
infrastructure projects; a small portion is passed on as loans to
private industrial enterprises. For years, Taiwan has had a
reputation in the international money market for its consistent
ability to make repayments on schedule.

B. Investment Environment
When investors search for investment opportunities, first of
all, they look for places having political, social and economic
stability so as to ensure the security of their capital. These
requirements are abundantly met in the Republic of China.
There are a number of factors contributing to Taiwan's
investment environment.

1. Political and Social Stability
Political stability is one of the Republic of China's attractive
features. The government is doing everything possible to improve
the standard of living of the people through further development
of its economy, and at the same time to provide a more equitable
distribution of wealth.

2. Significant Economic Development
Economic policies adopted by the government of Republic of
China brought about significant results in economic development.
From 1951 to 1960, emphasis was placed primarily on development of agriculture and establishment of import-substituting light
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industries. From 1961 to 1970, stress was laid on industrialization,
along with diversification of agricultural production and promotion of agricultural and industrial exports. From 1971 to the
present, attention has been devoted to expansion of foreign trade,
promotion of agricultural modernization and industrial sophistication.

3. High Quality of Labor
Out of Republic of China's current population of about 16.5
million, the existing labor force totals over 6 million. In addition,
there is a potential labor force of over 3 million, consisting of such
people as students and housewives who may or may not work as
they wish. There is also a supply of 180,000 to 200,000 new
workers entering the labor market every year, mainly young
people reaching the age of 15 who wish to seek employment.
Workers in the Republic of China are intelligent, hardworking, well-disciplined and highly adaptable. No labor strike
has ever taken place, and the unions are encouraged to cooperate
with the management in promoting the welfare of their members.
In recent years, more emphasis has been put on vocational
and occupational training rather than academic studies. Furthermore, education in colleges and universities has lately become
more closely geared to the needs of economic development.

4. Improvement in Infrastructure
Because of Taiwan's rapid economic development, the
existing facilities, though improved from year to year, are
inadequate to meet the ever-increasing demands of. growing
industry and expanding trade. To improve the situation, the
government is implementing the following projects.
A modern freeway, linking the principal cities of Keelung,
Taipei and Kaohsiung now under construction and to be
completed in 1978. This new freeway, together with the existing
highway network, will provide fast door-to-door transportation.
A new railroad connecting the relatively less developed
eastern part of the island to the more developed western part, for
the purpose of accelerating the development of the eastern coast
area.
Electrification of the existing railway trunkline on the west
coast for more efficient rail service.
Construction of a new international harbor near Taichung in
central Taiwan.
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Building of a new harbor in the north to serve as an auxiliary
to the congested Keelung harbor.
Opening up a new modem international airport near Taipei.

5. Electricity and Water Supply
Public water and electricity are supplied almost everywhere in
Taiwan. The rates for such public utilities are relatively low.

6. Industrial Districts
In order to facilitate the acquisition of land by investors for
industrial purpose, the government of the Republic of China has
designated land at about 80 sites throughout Taiwan as industrial
districts. These sites are all easily accessible by rail and highway,
and are located in areas with adequate labor supply. Such new
sites are constantly being designated. At the present, Taiwan has
40 developed industrial estates.
7. Export Processing Zones

There are three export processing zones, namely, the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone, the Nantze Export Processing Zone
and the Taichung Export Processing Zone, established in Taiwan
for the purpose of facilitating investments in industrial production
for export.
In addition to the industrial park facilities such as roads,
water and power supply, and sewage systems, the export
processing zones contain ready-built standard factory buildings
which can be purchased on installment payments. Investors may
also construct their own factory buildings in the zones. Land in
such zones is owned by the government and leased to export
manufacturers according to the provisions of the land law.
In addition to the public utilities generally provided in an
industrial estate, the export processing zones have extra facilities
such as the services provided by the Export Processing Zone
Administration, branch offices of customs, tax collection offices,
banks, post offices, business offices of the telecommunications
administration, service stations of the Taiwan Power Company,
airline business offices, and service stations of the public
employment center.
By locating plants in export processing zones, manufacturers
can be exempted from payment of import duties, commodity taxes
and business taxes. Furthermore, the procedures concerning
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imports and exports, settlement of foreign exchange, customs
inspection and investment application are all handled within the
zones, with minimal time and effort.
C. Investment Incentives
Substantial investment incentives are incorporated in the
investment laws of the Republic of China. The Statute for
Investment by Foreign Nationals, promulgated in July 1954, was
enacted specifically for enhancing the inflow of foreign capital
and protecting the interests of foreign investors. Its major features
are:
1. The right to repatriate capital as well as dividends and
interest is guaranteed.
The foreign investor may each year apply for foreign
exchange settlement against 15% of the total amount of his
invested principal two years after the completion of the investment project.
He may also apply for foreign exchange settlement yearly
against dividend and interest income from his investment.
2, Protection against government expropriation or requisition is also guaranteed.
As long as the foreign investor continuously holds more than
51% of the total capital of the invested enterprise, the enterprise
shall not be subject to government requisition or expropriation for
20 years after commencement of business.
If the investor holds and maintains less than 51% of the total'
capital of the invested enterprise, he shall be reasonably
compensated if the government, for reasons of defense needs,
requisitions or expropriates the enterprise.

3. The enterprise invested in by foreign nationals shall be
accorded the same treatment as is accorded to the same type of
enterprise operated by Chinese nationals. In other words, there is
no discrimination between enterprises invested in by foreign
nationals and those invested in by Chinese nationals.
4. Full ownership by foreign nationals is permitted under the
statute. Only when the enterprise is local-market oriented or poses
a threat to established local producers will the domestic capital
participation be deemed in order. However, the extent of such
participation is negotiable.
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The Statute for Encouragement of Investment was first
promulgated in 1960 and has since been amended several times.
Among the incentives granted by the statute, potential investors
are perhaps concerned most with the exemption of import duty
and income tax.

1. Import Duty
Exemption of deferred payment of import duty is made
available to foreign and domestic investors alike for importation
of capital equipment. The benefit is offered in three alternative
forms:
a. For the setting up or expansion of an encouraged
industry, customs duty on imported capital equipment is completely waived under specific categories and criteria as prescribed
by the government.
b. A new investment or an investment in an existing
enterprise belonging to one of the nine essential industries with
production wholly for export is entitled for a five-year deferment
for payment of import duty on capital equipment. The nine
essential industries are (1) basic metals, (2) electrical manufacturing, (3) electronics, (4) machinery manufacturing, (5) shipbuilding,
(6) chemicals, (7) textile dying and finishing, (8) mining and (9)
organic fertilizers.
c. For an investment not belonging to any of the industries
under government encouragement and not exporting all of its
products, import duty on capital equipment may be paid by
installments if the amount of duty involved exceeds NT$500,000
(equivalent to US$13,200).

2. Income Tax Benefits
Regarding income tax benefits, the recently amended Statute
for Encouragement of Investment offers the following:

a. Profit-Seeking Enterprise (Corporate) Income
Tax. The normal rate for all profit-seeking enterprises is levied
at 35% of net profit. For productive enterprises, the rate is lowered
to 30%. To encourage the setting up of new capital-intensive or
technology-intensive industries, the rate is further reduced to not
more than 22%.
All newly established productive enterprises eligible for
government encouragement are given the choice of either a five
year tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets.
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For expansion of existing government-encouraged productive
enterprises, the investor may enjoy either a four year tax holiday
or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets with respect to the new
investment.

b. Withholding Tax. The standard rate of consolidated
personal income tax for local residents starts at 6% and progresses
up to 60% when the consolidated personal income exceeds NT$2
million (equivalent to US$52,600). For nonresidents, a withholding tax of 35% is· levied on the amount payable or distributable.
For nonresident foreign investors whose investment has been
approved by the Chinese government, the withholding tax is
reduced to 20% on dividends distributed. However, if the taxpayer
is required to declare and pay income tax on his income from
Chinese sources to his home government, then the withholding
tax rate is further reduced to 15%.
c. Special Encouragement for Reinvestment. Reinvestment with undistributed earnings for expansion of production
facilities is specially encouraged. The withholding tax on share
dividends can be deferred until the transfer of the shares obtained
through reinvestment. This measure has been most effective in
the development of industry in the Republic of China and is also
most welcome by all investors, both foreign and domestic.

3. Other Tax Benefits
a. Deed tax is reduced by 50% when acquiring fixed assets
for productive use.
b. House tax is also reduced by 50% for buildings used for
productive purposes.
c. For stimulating exports, export transactions are exempted
from business tax. Stamp tax for export invoices is reduced by
75%.

D. Investment Opportunities
The Republic of China is a developing country engaged in
industrialization. Investment opportunities in the ROC cover a
wide range. Local demands for new. products, raw materials and
intermediates are steadily on the increase. These growing
demands justify the setting up of new ventures for local
production. The demands range from basic metals, machinery,
electronic and electric products to petrochemicals. It is not feasible
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to itemize them here. In a word, all investment projects conducive
to further development of industry and commerce are welcome.
For the inducement of technology transfer to promote
industrial development, the Statute for Technical Cooperation was
promulgated in 1962, providing guidelines for the payment of
expenses and royalties for technical expertise.
Technical know-how and patent rights can also be used to
invest at 15% and 20% of total equity, respectively.
Needless to say, the study of investment opportunities
constitutes an important prelude to investment promotion. The
Industrial Development and Investment Center of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs of the Republic of China has compiled a booklet
entitled "Industrial Investment Opportunities in Taiwan, Republic of China" in which there are enumerated more than 120
branches respectively under 10 major industries for reference of
prospective investors.
There are, of course, numerous other investment opportunities
stemming from the continued development process. In many
cases, certain industries viewed yesterday as not feasible do
become feasible in the course of economic development.
E. Investment Services
Because overseas Chinese and foreign investors are frequently unfamiliar with Chinese investment laws and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and with the required investment
procedures, the government of the Republic of China has
established the Industrial Development and Investment Center
(IDIC) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs to provide all
necessary services to overseas investors.
Another governmental body, the Investment Commission, is
primarily a screening body that handles all investment applications. The commission, composed of ten members of viceministerial level from various government organizations, also
issues duty-free or tax-holiday certificates and import licenses,
and serves the investors in a number of other ways as a one-step
service agency.
The Export Processing Zone Administration provides services
for investors and screens investment applications intended for the
export processing zones. All relevant government agencies,
including customs and banks, have branches in the zones for the
convenience of the investors located in the zones.
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American investors who are interested in obtaining detailed
information on making investments in the Republic of China are
welcome to contact any of the following agencies:
Chinese Investment & Trade Office
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
Tel: 212-752-2340
Trade Representative Office
Consulate General of the Republic of China
222 North Dearborn Street
Chicago, Ill. 60601
Tel: 312-332-2535
Office of Trade Representative
Consulate General of the Republic of China
Suite 1060
3660 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Tel: 213-380-3644

F. Future Prospects
Over the 24 years since 1953, six Four-Year Plans have been
launched by the government of the Republic of China. Under
these plans, Taiwan has experienced a sustained and rapid
economic growth. The worldwide economic recession drastically
altered the basic economic conditions of the Republic of China, to
such an extent that the Sixth Four-Year Plan was no longer
practicaL At the same time, ten major construction projects have
been vigorously pushed forward and their completion will
automatically have a profound impact on the economic development in the Republic of China. Because of these facts, the Chinese
Government decided to drop the Sixth Four-Year Plan, which was
in its third year of implementation in 1975, and replaced it with a
new Six-Year Plan starting from 1976. Initially, the plan will
focus on the implementation of the on-going projects. In a later
stage, it will spell out the guidelines and programs to be pursued
after the completion of the ten major projects in order to usher the
economy into a higher stage of development.
The new Six-Year Plan envisions an average annual rate of
growth of 7.5% in terms of gross domestic product, and stresses
the need for modernization of the economic structure through the
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development of heavy and chemical industries, such as petrochemicals, steel, electrical and nonelectrical machinery, and
precision products, as well as sophisticated labor-intensive
industries. These undertakings will require massive inputs of
capital and know-how. For the Six-Year Plan period, an estimated
US$36.6 billion is needed for investment. Most of this amount will
come from domestic savings. The remainder, amounting to
US$330 million a year or 5.4% of the total, will have to come from
external sources, ideally together with the latest managerial and
technological know-how which are also essential to the modernization of the ROC economy. Foreign capital will therefore
continue to play a very important role in the years ahead.
To encourage the inflow of foreign capital, the ROC government will continue to provide incentives and to improve investment climate including such infrastructural facilities as electric
power and transportation.
In attracting the inflow of foreign investment capital, the
following areas deserve priority consideration:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Where investment creates greater value-added through the
introduction of modern methods of production.
Where the investment significantly improves the quality
of local products or reduces their manufacturing costs.
Where the investment is made for significant importsubstitution.
Where the investment has a strong linkage effect; and
finally,
Where the investment contributes significantly to the
expansion of exports.
II. FOREIGN TRADE

The major force behind the rapid economic growth in the
Republic of China has been the expansion of international trade.
Of all the sectors of the economy of the Republic of China, foreign
trade has shown the most dramatic growth. While total trade was
still in the neighborhood of one-third of a billion US dollars
throughout the 1950s, it amounted, in 1976, to as much as
US$15.67 billion, 8.08 billion for exports and 7.59 billion for
imports. The Republic of China has enjoyed a consistent trade
surplus since 1974.
In the decade between 1964 and 1973, the Republic of China's
export increased from US$860 million to US$8.3 billion.
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From 1970 to 1974, the Republic of China had enjoyed a
steadily growing trade surplus. On the basis of customs clearance,
the Republic of China's total imports in 1974 amounted to US$7
billion and total exports US$5.64 billion. The substantial deficit
registered in 1974 was largely due to the worldwide recession and
sharply increased cost of such essential imports as crude oil,
grains and industrial raw materials.
The Republic of China's progress in industrialization in recent
years could be reflected in export and import compositions;
industrial products now account for almost 85% of the total
exports, while in 1952, they made up only 8%.
In 1974, textile products remained as Republic of China's top
dollar earner. The second major export item was electrical
machinery and appliances. Machinery and metal products came
next. The other principal export items were plywood, lumber
products, and plastics and plastic products.
The Republic of China, with its economy characterized as a
typical island economy, has to import large quantities of raw
materials and capital goods to sustain a steady economic growth.
Machinery and tools, most of these imported to meet the needs of
the ten on-going construction projects, topped the import list of
1974, followed by basic metals, electrical machinery and supplies,
crude oil, chemical products and transportation equipment.

A. Recovery from the Recession
The big recession of the free world economy that came in 1974
also hit the Republic of China hard. The Republic of China's
difficulty is that its trade pattern is similar to that of a developed
country although the Republic of China is still a developing
nation.
Like all other petroleum-importing countries, both trade and
the balance of payment of the Republic of China suffered severe
blows in the year of 1974. On January 26 of that year, the
government of the Republic of China lifted all subsidies on grain
imports, etc. Prices jumped from 25% to 60% in the ensuing weeks
but have held that line ever since.
Since May 1974, the government of the Republic of China has
taken various steps to stimulate the export trade. Among the
important steps are the Fourteen-point Fiscal and Economic
Program launched on November 14, 1974 and the Ten-point
Financial and Economic Plan announced on December 9, 1974.
Through adjustment in taxation and reforms in economic
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regulations, these remedial steps helped set the stage for a slow
but steady revival of export trade.
However, it must be pointed out that the huge trade deficit of
US$1.33 billion in 1974 was largely the result of policy implementation. In order to stabilize prices in the country, the government
had to purposely suspend or curtail the export of many essential
commodities to ensure an adequate supply for domestic market.
On the other hand, for facilitating rural reconstruction and
expediting the ongoing infrastructure projects, the importation of
agricultural and industrial raw materials and capital equipment
was substantially increased.
The export slump also led to a decline of the economic
activities of the Republic of China as a whole. Therefore, there
appeared on the economic scene typical signs of recession: sharp
drop of purchasing power, rise of unemployment, accumulation of
inventories, the simultaneous increase of interest rates and
commodity prices.
Fortunately, the steps for countering the recession paid off.
The economy of the Republic of China started to pick up from
1975. In February 1975, both trade and the balance of payments of
the Republic of China began to climb and by May of that year, the
Republic of China successfully left the recession behind.
In 1975, the Republic of China exported US$5.31 billion in
goods and services, but imported US$5.95 billion, thereby
suffering a small deficit of US$640 million. In 1974, the figure was
US$1.33 billion.

B. The 1976 Trade Performance
The Republic of China's foreign trade volume in 1976 totaled
US$15.67 billion, representing an increase of US$4,409.5 million
or 39.2% over 1975. According to customs statistics, in 1976,
exports totaled US$8,080 million, up 52.2%, against imports,
US$7,590 million, up 27%, resulting in a surplus of US$490.
million. During 1976, the Republic of China registered trade
surpluses with 13 of 20 major trade partners and deficits with
seven others. A breakdown of the 13 countries and areas with
which the nation registered surpluses is given in Table 1. A
breakdown of the seven countries and areas with which the nation
suffered trade deficits is given in Table 2.

26

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Table 1. 1976 Trade Surpluses
Exports

Country
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Imports
1,802
100.6
56
38
253.7
55.1
5.5
31.2
181
34.6
199
54.1
58.3

3,010
607.6
312.1
207.2
416.1
159.3
61.7
76.8
223.9
56.1
220.1
61.4
63.3

U.S. A.
Hong Kong
Canada
Singapore
West Germany
The Netherlands
Panama
Philippines
Australia
Belgium
Indonesia
Italy
France

Surpluses
1,208
507
256.1
169.2
162.4
104.2
56.2
45.6
42.9
21.5
21.1
7.3
5

Unit: US$1 million.

Table 2. 1976 Trade Deficits
Country
1. Japan

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
Thailand
Korea
United Kingdom

Exports
1,090.3
108
124.7
53.5
75.7
72.8
159.2

Imports
2,442,4
682.3
410.6
105.5
90.3
83.5
165.8

Surpluses
1,352.1
574.3
285.9
52
14.6
10.7
6.6

Unit: US$1 million.

The Republic of China's two-way trade with other areas
totaled US$1,659.7 million with a surplus of US$179.3 million in
1976.
An Analysis of foreign trade of the Republic of China in 1976
is as follows:

1. Export Composition
With the transformation of the economic structure, the
composition of the Republic of China's exports and imports has
shown a marked change. Agricultural products such as rice and
sugar accounted for an overwhelming 86% of the total exports in
1952. In 1976, the main exports were textiles, electronics, electrical
appliances, machinery and metal products.
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In 1976, industrial products were still the leading export of the
Republic of China, accounting for 87.7% of the total export. The
export of processed agricultural products was the next, being 7.4%
of the total export, and the agricultural products accounted for
only 4.9% of the total.
Industrial products exported from the Republic of China in
1976 included 53 sets of complete machinery plants, of which 10
sets were for manufacturing PVC products, 13 for paper making,
and three for cement manufacture.
Industrial goods exported from the Republic of China with
higher export volumes in 1976 were: Textile products, worth
US$2,475.8 million, accounting for 30.6% of the nation's total
exports and representing an increase of 53% over the previous
year. Exports of electrical machinery amounted to US$1,269.6
million, accounting for 15.7% ofthe export total, up 71.3%. Plastics
and plastic products amounted to US$571.8 million, representing
7.1% of the export total, up 55.1%. Machinery and total products
were worth US$566.8 million, 7% of total exports, up 53. 7%.
Wooden products and furniture valued at US$534.8 million, 6.6%
of the total, up 61.8%. Exports of transportation equipment totaled
US$194.3 million, 2% of the total, up 65.6%. Exports of refined
petroleum products totaled US$122.4 million, 1.5% of the total, up
125.4%.

2. Import Composition
In the early 1950s, textiles, agricultural products, and fertilizer
made up over half of total imports of the Republic of China, while
in 1976, agricultural and industrial raw materials constituted 63%
of total imports of the Republic of China, while capital goods
made up 30.7% and consumer goods 6.3%.
To meet the domestic production and construction requirements, machine tools have been imported in large quantities in
recent years. In 1976, the import value of major manufacturing
equipment totaled US$4,614.9 million, topping all other items.
This amount was 60.8% of total import value. Next were major
primary products. The import value of this item was US$1,860.8
million or 24.5% of the total import value. Machine tools and crude
petroleum came next with total import value at US$1,187.8 million
and US$1,050.9 million, respectively. Still next in the descending
order of their values were electrical machinery and apparatus,
chemicals, basic metals and transportation equipment.
For such agricultural and forestry items as soybean, corn,
wheat, lumber and raw cotton, their import values either
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increased or decreased much depending on the price fluctuations
in the world market and the level of the stockpiled inventories
carried over from 1975.
C. Trade with the United States
Close friendship and strengthened bilateral economic ties
have fostered rapid growth in the trade volumes between the
United States and the Republic of China in recent years. In 1964,
the two-way trade volume was only US$220 million. After
approaching the US$1 billion mark in 1970, it hit a record high of
US$3,716 million in 1974. In spite of the world recession, the total
trade between the two countries in 1975 still reached US$3,474
million, or 30.9% of the aggregate value of the Republic of China's
foreign trade.
The United States retained its position as the largest market
for the Republic of China's products, taking US$3,010.7 million or
37.3% of the Republic of China's total exports for the year. The
Republic of China's imports from the United States in 1976
amounted to US$1,802.3 million, or 23.3% of the total imports.
The Republic of China is now the eleventh largest supplier
and the fifteenth largest customer of the United States. And the
Republic of China is the largest trade partner of the United States
in the Far East after Japan.
During the last few years, the Republic of China's leading
exports to the United States were:
1. Electrical and electronic products, including TV sets and

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

radios
Textile products
Manufactured products
Plastic articles
Plywood and rattan products
Metal products
Machinery

The Republic of China's imports from the United States were:
1. Agricultural products

2.
3.
4.
5.

Electronic parts
Machinery
Cotton goods
Iron and steel
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6. Transportation equipment
7. Chemicals
In this overall picture of the trade relations between the
Republic of China and the United States, however, there is one
problem which has been causing careful reflection and thoughtful
scrutiny in both the Republic of China and the United States. The
problem is one of imbalance.
The Republic of China has in recent years taken a series of
steps to enhance the reciprocity of trade and is doing its utmost to
improve its trade relations with the United States.
One of the most important remedial measures the Republic of
China instituted in 1973 was a "Buy American" program. A
special trade mission was sent to the United States from Taiwan
in that year. The mission, after scouting the various industrial
and agricultural centers, signed a series of long-term contracts to
buy US$750 million worth of American products, including 5.5
million metric tons of grain, over the next three years.
Again in 1976, another grain purchase mission from Taiwan
successfully concluded negotiations and signed an agreement
with nine American suppliers for the supply of soybeans, wheat,
corn and barley totaling 10.2 metric tons for the next five years
starting July 1, 1976 and worth US$1.5 billion at current prices.
On the other hand, the government of the United States has
also taken steps to further United States trade with the Republic
of China. For the express purpose of promoting the sale of
American goods in Taiwan, the United States Trade Center, the
third in Asia and fourteenth in the world, was officially dedicated
on March 18, 1974.
The trade between the United States and the Republic of
China is bound to keep rising for the following reasons:
1. The plants and equipment needed in the development of
capital- and technology-intensive industries in Taiwan will most
probably have to be purchased from a few highly industrialized
nations, and the United States is surely among them. Such
sophisticated plants and equipment can not as yet be produced in
Taiwan locally, nor could they be readily imported from other
countries. For such items as nuclear power generators, aircraft
and computers, Taiwan will have to rely on countries like the
United States.
2. As the standard of living rises rapidly in Taiwan, the
demand for luxury goods in all aspects of daily living from home
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decoration to recreational facilities will certainly increase rapidly.
This can be a growing and attractive market for the U.S. products,
especially consumer durables.
3. For the same reason, the Republic of China will need more
American agricultural products. The United States, as the leading
food grower and cotton exporter in the world, will be the first
country the Republic of China will tum to for these commodities.
4. Another certainty in US-ROC trade is the latter's growing
dependence on the United States for industrial know-how. The
modernization of the economic structure and infrastructural
facilities in Taiwan calls for large outlays of capital. Advanced
technology in such areas as electronics and petrochemical
industries will be a crucial factor in the next stage of the
industrial development in Taiwan. Thus, the Republic of China
will become a good customer of the American industrial equipment and technology.
D. Trade Environment in Taiwan

1. Foreign Trade Administration
a. The International Trade Commission acts on the
following matters:
1. Approval of and amendment to trade regulations;
2. Approval of measures for import of essential and staple
commodities;
3. Approval and planning of the use of funds for the
promotion of exports;
4. Approval of regulations governing essential imports and
exports not involving exchange settlement;
5. Approval of regulations governing imports and exports by
processing industries;
6. Approval of export program and promotional measures;
7. Approval of and amendment to the classification of
import and export commodities;
8. Other important matters related to trade.

b. Board of Foreign Trade. The functions of the Board
of Foreign Trade are:
1. Screening of applications for export of agricultural,

forestry, livestock, mining and industrial products and
issuance of export licenses;
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2. Screening of applications for import of various kinds of
commodities and issuance of import licenses;
3. Screening and supervision of imports approved for
overseas and foreign investment projects;
4. Formulation of an "Annual Import and Export Program";
5. Studying and making recommendations for improvement
in packaging and quality of export products;
6. Studying and making recommendations regarding export
standards and inspection;
7. Regulation of the trading activities of traders (importers
and exporters), local agents of foreign suppliers and other
exporters/importers (e.g., manufacturing plants);
8. Research and development relating to international trade;
9. Other matters relating to international trade.
c. Semi-official or Private Organizations for Export

Promotion.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

China External Trade Development Council
China Productivity Center
Taiwan Handicraft Promotion Center
Chinese Display Center
Chinese Products Promotion Center

d. Government Trading Agencies.
Central Trust of China
2. Taiwan Supply Bureau

1.

e. Overseas Agencies concerned with Trade Promotion.
1.

Economic Offices and Trade Missions:

Office of Economic Counselor
Embassy of the Republic of China
4301 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Suite 420
Washington, D.C. 20008 U.S.A.
Office of Economic Counselor
Embassy of the Republic of China
83, 2-Ka, Myong-dong, Chung-Ku
Seoul, Korea

Office of Economic Counselor
Embassy of the Republic of China
No. 503/504 Maghrabi New Building
New Street
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Bureau de Conseiller Economique
Ambassade de la Republique de
China
Imm. S.M.G.L. BLD-11, AV. BARTHE
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
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Office of Commercial Attache
Consulate-General of the
Republic of China
Suite 605, The Trust Bank Center
56, Eloff Street, Johannesburg
Republic of South Mrica

Office of Trade Representative
Consulate General of the
Republic of China in Los Angeles
3660 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1060
Los Angeles, California 90010
U.S.A.

Office of Commercial Attache
Embassy of the Republic of China
Between the First and Second Circle
of Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan
P.O. Box 2719 Amman, Jordan

Trade Representative
Chinese Consulate-General
222 N. Dearborn Street
Chicago Ill., 60601 U.S.A.

Oficina del Agregado Comercial
Embajada de Ia Republica de China
Edificio Pan America
2 Piso, 6 Av., 11-43, Zona 1,
Guatemala City, Guatemata, C.A.

Chinese Investment & Trade Office
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022 U.S.A.

Oficina del Agreg ado Comercial
Embajada de Ia Republica de China
Edificio Corecol.
Calle 71 No. 11-10 5° Piso
Bogota, Colombia

2. Overseas Representatives of China External Trade Development Council:
CETDC Representative's Office in
San Francisco
604 Commercial St., San Francisco,
Calif. 94111, U.S.A.
Officina Comercial de Taiwan
Av. R. S. PENA 636, 8
Buenos Air~s. Argentina
CETDC Representative's Office in
Indonesia
C/0 Chinese Chamber of Commerce
to Jakarta, P.O. Box 2922, Jakarta,
Indonesia
CETDC - Officio Di Rappresentanza
in Italy
Via Fabio Filzi, 2, 20124, Milan, Italy
CETDC Representative's Office in
Singapore
Rm. 310, Industrial & Commercial
Bank Bldg., No. 2,
Shenton Way, Singapore

CETDC Correspondent in Chicago
9302 N. Tripp
Skokie, Ill. 60076 U.S.A.
CETDC Correspondent in Melbourne
P.O. Box 4823, Melbourne, Vic. 3001
Australia
Far Eastern Trading Co., Ltd.
P.O. Box 349, Place Bonaventure
Montreal 114, P.Q., Canada
CETDC Branch Office in New York
14th Floor New York Merchandise Mart
41 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10010, U.S.A.
CETDC Representative's Office in West
Africa
P.O. Box 20872, Abidjan, Ivory Coast
CETDC Representative's Office in
Korea
C/0 Embassy of the Republic of China
Seoul, Korea
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3. Others:
Far East Trade Service, Inc.
Switzerland Office
Seefeld Strasse 35 (3 Stock)
8034 Zurich 8, Switzerland

Trade Mission of the Republic
of China
Room 310, Industrial & Commercial
Bank Bldg., No. 2, Shenton Way
Singapore 1

Far East Trade Service, Inc.
Suceursale en Belgique
World Trade Center 1
16 E Etage, Boulevand Encile
Jacqmain 162, 1000 Bruxelles
Belgique

Tokyo Office, Association of East Asian
Relations (Economic Department)
2-4th Floor, Heiwado Booki Honsha
Bldg., No.8, 1-Chome, Higashi Azabu
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan

Far East Trade Service Center
West Germany Office
Alfred-Brehm-Platz 19
6 Frankfurt/main
West Germany

Pacific Economic and Cultural Center,
Manila Office (Economic Division)
8th Fir., B.F. Homes Building, Aduana
St.
Intramuros, Manila, Philippines

Far East Trade Service, Inc.
Toronto Branch Office
2 Bloor Street, East, Suite 2624
Toronto, Ontario, M4W lAS
Canada

Economic Section, Office of Representative China Airlines Ltd.
lOth Fl., Shell House, 140 Wireless Road
Bangkok, Thailand

A.S.P.E.C.T.
17, Ave. Matignon (Time-Life Bid.)
75008 Paris, France
Majestic Trading Company Ltd.
5th Gl., Bewlay House
2 Swallow Place
London WlR 7AA
England

Oficina Comercial Del
Lejano Oriente
Huerfanos 886-0ficina 714,
Santiago, Chile
East Asia Trade Centre Fiji, Ltd.
4th Fl., Air Pacific House,
CNR. McArthur & Butt Streets,
Suva, Fiji

Investment Liaison Office
415 Central Building Pedder Street
Hong Kong

Oficina Comercial de Taiwan
Av. Pte. Roque Saenz Pena 636
Piso 8, Buenos Airos
Republica Argentina

Centro Commerciale per L'estremo
Oriente
Via-Fabio Fizi 2-20124 Milan, Italy

Far East Trading Co., Pty. Ltd.
Suite G, 5th Fl. 582 St. Kilda Rd.
Melbourne, Vic., 3004 Australia

Chinese Chamber of Commerce to
Djakarta
JL Banyumas No.4
P.O. Box 2922
Jakarta, Indonesia

Taiwan Trade Office
5, Argyokastron St.
Strovolos, Nicosia
Cyprus
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2. Control Over International Trade
a. General Description. With a view to promoting the
wholesome growth of domestic productive enterprises and as a
necessary measure in economic development, the Board of Foreign
Trade is exercising certain control over the nation's international
trade. Thus, exports of goods which are either living necessities
not produced in adequate quantities locally or commodities needed
for national defense have been put under a ban or under
restrictions; and so are the imports of weapons, narcotics, precious
stones and goods which can be supplied locally.
The control is subject to adjustment in accordance with the
developments in the particular fields of production at home and
also with the changes in the international market. Hence, there
have been constant changes and modifications in the classification of import or export commodities.
According to the provisions of the Regulations for Classification and Control of Imports and Exports, imports and exports are
classified as follows:
1. Permissible imports

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Permissible exports
Controlled imports
Controlled exports
Prohibited imports
Prohibited exports

b.

Various Restrictions on Imports.

i. Restrictions on Procurement Area. For political, diplomatic
and economic reasons, restrictions have been placed on sources of
import of certain commodities. At present, areas designated as the
sources of their supply are:
Free world countries and areas other than Hong Kong
and Macao;
2. Areas other than Hong Kong, Macao, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia;
3. Areas other than Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan;
4. Europe and America;
5. Europe, America, New Zealand and Australia;
1.
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6. North America;
7. Countries specified. (Commodities to be imported from
specified countries are mostly Chinese medicines, e.g.,
medicines from South Korea, Japan, etc. Details are shown
in the Commodity Classification Table.)

ii. Eligibility of Applicants. Certain commodities, while
being permissible imports, are not to be imported by traders. For
these imports, BOFT has limited the eligibility for application to
the following:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Industrial plants
Processing plants for export
Public trading agencies
Tobacco & Win~ Monopoly Bureau
Public enterprises

The above provisions show that sometimes there are not only
restrictions in regard to applicants but also on area of procurement. For example, waste paper can be imported only by paper
manufacturing plants and must be procured from free world
countries and areas other than Hong Kong and Macao. This dual
restrictive measure is .adopted in accordance with the actual
necessity.

c. General Provisions for Import and Export Applications
i. "Permissible" imports. Applications for import or items
on the "Permissible" list may be submitted by traders directly to
the responsible departments of BOFr. They may also be
submitted to the responsible department of a government bank if
the bank has been authorized for import licensing for the
particular commodities provided, however, that there is a record of
such imports in the past.
However, if the article to be imported is not specified in the
"Permissible" list and there is no record of such import in the past
(e.g., an item to be imported for the first time, as discussed in
Section 3), applications may be made only after the importation of
that item is considered and approved by the Committee on
Commodity Classification.

ii. "Controlled" imports. Applications for import of items
on the "Controlled" list may not be made by traders. Only
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industrial plants and direct end-users may apply for import of
such items according to existing regulations.

iii. "Prohibited" imports. Import of commodities under this
category is prohibited mainly for security, health or economic
reasons. Neither traders nor manufacturers nor productive
enterprises are permitted to apply for such imports.
iv. "Controlled" exports. Export of such products is not
absolutely prohibited; approval for export of such products should
be based on the regulations for Application for Export by
Productive Enterprises which provide:
1. that the export may not affect the people's livelihood or

economic development needs;
2. that for strategic goods, there should be no possibility of
their being transhipped for supply to the communists;
3. that all applications for export of "Controlled" items
should be submitted to the 1st and 2nd Departments of
BOFI' for approval.

v. "Permissible" exports. For export of "Permissible" items,
the exporter may file an "Application for Export License" directly
with one of the authorized licensing banks.
vi. "Prohibited" exports. Application may not be made for
export of goods of this category.

3. Procedures for Application
for Export
Unless otherwise provided for by the Board of Foreign Trade, to
apply for a license for export of goods on the "Permissible" list, an
exporter manufacturer/trader registered with and approved by
BOFI' may file an "Application for Export Permit" directly with
one of the licensing banks appointed by the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank of China.
An export manufacturer or trader may collect his foreign
exchange earnings through export transactions by one of the
following methods:
1. Letter of Credit (L/C);
2. Advance settlement of Export Foreign Exchange (T /T);
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3. On collection basis:
a. Document Against Payment (DIP)
b. Document Against Acceptance (D/A);
4. Export sales on consignment basis;
5. Payment made by installment or in other ways.

4. Export Loans
There are two kinds of export loans, viz., industrial export
loans and general export loans.
1. Industrial export loans are conducted by the International
Commercial Bank of China to help finance export capital goods
and important industrial products in keeping with the government policy of promoting export;
2. All appointed foreign exchange banks may engage in the
activity of extending general export loans for the purpose of
promoting foreign trade.

5. Import Financing
For the import of necessary consumer goods and important
raw materials for industrial production, if the importer is unable
to obtain the consent of the foreign supplier to import on D/A
basis, he may submit application to the BOFT for issuing the
import license thus enabling him to apply for financing at the
appointed bank.
6. Foreign Exchange
The government of the Republic of China permits unlimited
conversion from authorized currencies into New Taiwan Dollars.
But this function and foreign currency financing of imports and
exports is limited to appointed foreign exchange banks.
7. Air and Sea Connections with

the Outside World
a. Shipping. The shipping industry in Taiwan has kept
pace with the demand from the rapid growth of foreign trade and
other sectors of the national economy. Shipping companies
operate liner services all over the world. The opening of new
routes are always under planning. New ships including containers, refrigerator-ships and super tankers have been obtained for
special purposes.
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At the end of 1975, the Republic of China had a merchant fleet
of 168 ships, totaling 2.1 million DWT. If Chinese vessels flying
foreign flags of convenience were counted, the Republic of China's
fleet would be one of the biggest in the world.
Foreign shipping lines serving ports in Taiwan include the
American President Lines, the Barber Blue Sea Line, the United
States Lines, the Sealand Service Inc., etc.

b. Airlines. Taiwan is on the main route between Tokyo
and Hong Kong, the most heavily traveled air line in Asia. Apart
from domestic airlines, there are twelve international airlines
serving Taiwan. Foreign airlines serving Taiwan include the
Cathay Pacific Airway, Japan Asia Airway, Korean Air Lines,
Northwest Orient Airlines, Pan American World Airways,
Philippine Air Lines, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways, etc.
c. Harbors and Airports
i. Harbors. There are three international harbors in Taiwan, located at Keelung in the North, Kaoshiung in the South and
Hualien in the East. With the expansion of international trade and
ever-increasing demands for navigation services, harbor authorities have taken steps to increase facilities such as warehouses,
loading-unloading equipment, container wharves, terminals and
expanded entrances.
With a view to easing the congestion at Keelung and
Kaohsiung and to stimulate the development of business and
industry in central Taiwan, a decision was made in 1969 to build
an international port at Taichung. The project will be carried out
in three phases. Full completion is scheduled for 1982, when the
new harbor will have an annual cargo handling capacity of 12
million tons.
At the same time, the Suao Harbor, originally a fishing port
which serves as an auxiliary for Keelung, will be expanded into
an international seaport in eight years. When it is completed in
June 1979, cargoes bound for and originating from Suao and its
surrounding areas are expected initially to reach 2 million tons.
ii. Airports. There are two international airports in Taiwan, at Taipei and Kaohsiung. A third, eventually to replace the
Taipei International Airport, is being built at Taoyuan in
northern Taiwan.
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E. Future Trade Prospects
The worst and longest recession since the 1930s has now
bottomed out. While the world trade is making an upturn, the
Republic of China will certainly grasp every opportunity to
explore sales outlets for its products in the foreign markets, for it
is only through export that the Republic of China can induce an
acceleration of economic growth and impart renewed vigor to its
national economy.
The Republic of China is about to enter a new era of
technological expansion. Despite the phenomenal increase of her
industrial capacity and trade volume over the past years, the fact
remains that the progress has been more quantitative expansion
than qualitative improvement. In other words, the expansion of
industrial capacity was much more impressive than the advance
of industrial capability. The result of this is that the Republic of
China continues to depend on simple industrial products for
export.
However, both the government and the people of the Republic
of China are keenly aware that the time to rely on labor-intensive
and low-technology industries as the foreign exchange earners is
definitely over. The new emphasis is on upgrading industrial
technology. Progress is being made in this regard, particularly in
the machinery and the petrochemical industries. Certainly,
however, the technical level in the Republic of China is still way
below that of the advanced countries.
The Republic of China can not, of course, afford to remain in
this stage very long. For one thing, the market for simple
industrial products is limited, and for many items, already
saturated. Furthermore, the rising wage scale in the Republic of
China is beginning to reduce her competitiveness in simple
industrial products while new competitors continue to arise from
among other developing countries.
To maintain the high growth rate of the Republic of China's
foreign trade, it is absolutely necessary for her to upgrade the
quality of its products, selling them at higher prices, rather than
exporting them in greater quantities; and the Republic of China
has to develop more sophisticated products in order to make labor
more valuable. Only then can the Republic of China solve the
problems of limited labor supply, rising wages and growing
competition from other developing nations and keep foreign trade
expanding. Therefore, in the Republic of China, upgrading of
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industrial technology will be the first priority within the next 10 to
20 years.
As I have said before, the economy of the Republic of China is
in a period of rapid expansion. It will not be long before the
Republic of China could attain the status of a developed country.
With rising income will come greater purchasing power and a
keener desire for the things that make life more pleasant. Under
such circumstances, the Republic of China will become a very
large open market in Asia and also one of the most effective
suppliers of industrial products in international markets in the
years ahead.

Dr. Chiu thanked Mr. Wu for preparing such an excellent
paper for the conference and then invited Ms. Norma Schroder, a
Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University, to present her paper on
"The American Economic Stake in Taiwan." Ms. Schroder
compared the current status of Taiwan with respect to import and
export trade with the ·u.S. and Japan. She stated that Taiwan is
attempting to reduce its dependency on Japan and that the ROC
wishes the U.S. and Europe to have the largest share in capital
goods, despite certain advantages of using the Japanese. She
characterized the U.S. growth in direct investment as accelerating
faster than elsewhere in the world.
[The following is Ms. Norma Schroder's paper.]

AMERICA'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN TAIWAN
NORMA SCHRODER*
Whether directly involved in the business of foreign trading or
not, most members of the U.S. business community are at least
dimly aware that U.S. economic interdependence with the Far
East and Taiwan has increased dramatically since the early
*Department of Economics, Stanford University.
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1960s. The fuzziness of their perception of the Asian trade
situation may be attributed to the fact that the bulk of published
international business reporting remains devoted to U.S.European affairs. Thus, this audience, as well as the broader
audience of all American voters, would surely be surprised to learn
the true degree of U.S.-Far Eastern trade interdependence. As of
1973, Taiwan was the seventh largest source of U.S. imports more important than France. It was the fifteenth largest
purchaser of U.S. exports, outranking countries such as Switzerland and Israel. The most recent assessment, 1976, places Taiwan
thirteenth in two-way trade with the U.S. It is widely reported that
multinational corporations regard developing countries as attractive investment sites, but seldom has Taiwan been able to attract
new U.S. direct investment at the rate of 28% per annum, which is
more than double the average rate for all developing countries.
These figures are bound to grab the attention of the general
business audience, and although they are suggestive, they are not
adequate to relate the magnitude of America's economic stake in
Taiwan. Before embarking on that exigesis, it is helpful to review
the question, "What is America's stake in participating in world
trade at all?" The answer is, of course, that the U.S. can increase
its level of consumption by specializing in the productions of those
goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage - cereals and
sophisticated manufactures - and can trade some of these for
foreign-made consumer goods. Thus, the U.S. gains from trade,
but the American stake in this worldwide exchange is, in the
following sense, less than that of virtually any other free world
nation. Because it has such a huge domestic economy, the U.S.
level of economic activity and consumption is comparatively less
subject to the vagaries of world supply and demand than that of
many of our allies. When one examines the list of those
commodities of which at least 10% of the value of total U.S. supply
originated abroad in 1971, one sees that the list consists
predominantly of raw materials and consumer goods - generally
non-strategic items in nonessential amounts. Our sole fear of
unhealthy dependence, a newly emerged one, is the case of crude
oil. Accordingly, the U.S. has embraced a policy of "importsubstitution."
Just as imports seem insignificant in relation to domestic
supply, so too do export markets for U.S. output seem piddling in
relation to the domestic market. Historically, the U.S. has had one
of the lowest exports to GNP ratio's in the world - in the past, 3

42

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

or 4%, recently a bit higher. However, for some classes of U.S.
producers the foreign buyer is of somewhat greater significance;
in excess of 10% of the output of chemicals, equipment and grain
are exported.
U.S. IMPORTS

Having placed the U.S. stake in the international economy in
perspective, let us return to the examination of the American
stake in the Far East and Taiwan in terms of imports, exports and
direct investment. Between 1960 and 1973 the annual growth rate
of U.S. imports from East and South Asia (excluding Japan) was
16%. This is a couple of points faster than from the developing
nations group as a whole and faster than the world average. Over
that period our imports from Taiwan have grown at an
extraordinary 39% per annum. Back in the early 1960s, when
Taiwan's major export earner was sugar, the island was of
marginal import supply significance to the United States. As
stated above, by 1973 Taiwan was the seventh largest source of
U.S. imports, outranking France. This rapid trade expansion by
Taiwan is not solely with the United States, but with other
trading partners as well: Japan, Asia and the EEC. Beginning in
1967, the U.S. became Taiwan's largest foreign market, overshadowing Japan ever since. As of 1975, America absorbed 34% of
Taiwan's exports, while Japan took only 13%. In recent years the
U.S. share has been slipping as Taiwan has begun to develop its
European markets.
Obviously, Taiwan now makes commodities it did not make
before; commodities which the United States and the rest of the
world are eager to buy - namely, textiles and electrical goods.
Looking at the 1974 composition of Taiwan's exports, one is struck
by the fact that sugar, the first-ranked export earner in 1965, by
1974 had been demoted to fourth place, dwindling to 5.5% of total
export value. In 1962 industrial products were 51% of exports; by
1972 they had risen to 83%. Thus, the importance of all
agricultural products, both raw and processed, declined precipitously from a 49% share to 17% of exportables in just one decade.
This steady economic shift in the composition of Taiwan's exports
was stalled and even reversed a bit in 1975 when the price of
sugar shot up, misleadingly magnifying the importance of that
commodity. What underlies this realignment in the composition of
exports are Taiwan's take-off into economic growth and the
accompanying changes in the domestic structure of production
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and employment indicative of the transformation of an agrarian
economy into a predominantly industrial one.
Taiwan's development is self-generated; Taiwan no longer
receives U.S. economic or military aid (a minor exception: there
are benefits from residual economic funds that generate 50 million
dollars a year, i.e., old low-interest loans from the 1950s, and from
purchases of weapons on credit); and the foreign debt is less than
5% of the gross national product. The remarkable Taiwanese
achievement is, precisely put, that these people have propelled the
growth of their real GNP at a rate of 10.7% per annum between
1963-73 (Background Notes, Department of State, May 1974): In
1972 the World Bank ranked Taiwan's per capita income as Asia's
third highest after Japan and Fiji (Far Eastern Economic Review,
Yearbook 1975). The extent of the Taiwanese economy's structural
transformation is revealed in the following figures: between 1963
and 1974 the percentage of agriculture in GNP shrank from 22%
down to 12%, while the contribution of industry swelled from 25%
to 33%; the service sector remained constant at 24%.
U.S. EXPORTS

Computations based on annual trade data appearing in the
U.S. Commerce Department's Overseas Business Reports indicate
that over 1960-73 the growth of the U.S. share in foreign markets
has not kept pace with imports.
The computations reveal that between 1960 and 1973 the
growth of the East and South Asia market for U.S. exports
(10.73%) was below the world pace (11.83%). But the growth rate of
the Taiwan market (12.39%) is above the world market average,
although it trails the growth of the Japan market (14.43% per
annum).
In 1973, Taiwan was the fifteenth largest purchaser of U.S.
exports, outranking Switzerland and Israel. By 1974, it had
jumped to tenth place among our export markets, and it has been
forecast to rise to sixth place in a relatively few years. ROC
Ministry of Finance statistics for 1975 show that Japan was
Taiwan's largest supplier, 31.83%, followed by the U.S. at 27%.
Between 1964 and 1972 Japan had been increasingly edging the
U.S. out of the largest share of the Taiwanese market. In 1964 the
disparity in market shares was at its starkest: 44% versus 24%.
Since 1972, however, Taiwan has had increasing success in
reducing its dependence on Japan by taking its shopping list to
Europe.
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In contrast to the very pronounced shifts in the commodity
composition of Taiwan's exports over the period 1960 to 1973, the
evolution of the general commodity composition of Taiwan's
purchases from abroad has been very gradual. As in the past, the
largest import category in 1975 was agricultural and industrial
raw materials, accounting for more than 60% of the total import
bill. Capital equipment amounted to about 33% of the total, while
consumer goods accounted for about 6%. Between 1972 and 1973,
when imports of agricultural and industrial raw materials, on
which Taiwan's resource-scarce processing economy depends, rose
eightfold in absolute value (from $212 million to $1.6 billion), they
declined only 8% as a share to total imports. Consumer goods
dwindled from 9.3% to 6%. Not surprisingly for an industrializing
economy, the greatest gain in share of imports was registered by
the capital goods category. It gained almost a third, rising from
22% to 32% of the total value of imports.
The major import sources of these capital goods are Japan
and the United States. In 1975 these two nations held virtually
equal shares in the Taiwanese machinery and tools market, but
that outcome was probably the result of the severity of the
recession in Japan. In 1974, a year of more normal market shares,
Japan enjoyed sales of $700 million, whereas the U.S. registered
sales of only $550 million.
For some years Taiwan has been incurring increasingly
severe trade deficits with Japan, a situation which has focused the
Taiwanese authorities' attention on the idea of trying to reduce
reliance on Japan. To sustain industrialization, the ROC has
planned a shift from light and labor-intensive industries such as
textiles to capital- and technology-intensive industries such as
petrochemicals, precision machinery and heavy industries. This
means substantial sales opportunities for capital goods producing
nations. The stated preference of the ROC authorities is that the
U.S. and Europe should win the largest share of these new sales.
However, several factors point to the continued strength of Japan
in the capital goods market. Because Japanese suppliers have
been ~~le to offer local Chinese firms comparatively inexpensive
products'; there has been little inclination to "buy American" or to
"buy European." The Japanese supply high-quality goods while
offering lower freight costs, shorter delivery schedules, and in
many cases easier payment terms. Furthermore, as many
manufacturers are currently using production equipment originally purchased in Japan, reliance on Japanese suppliers for
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parts and consulting services, at least for the meantime, is
unavoidable.
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT

East and South Asia comprise a region in which the net
capital flow component of U.S. direct investment grew more
quickly, over the period 1960 to 1974, than anywhere else in the
world. This particular measure is used here, rather than total
direct investment, because this was the only type of data available
on Taiwan.
Computations based on Commerce Department data appearing annually in its Survey of Current Business show that between
1960 and 1973, U.S. venture capital was attracted to the East and
South Asia region at a growth rate of 32.22% per annum, which is
more than twice the average for all developing countries, 13.69%,
during this period. In Taiwan the growth rate of new U.S.
investment has been 28.21% per annum.
Venture capital is sent where its owners expect to find rapid
growth in sales and profits. Indications are that U.S. capital is
being deployed to Asia at such a rapid rate because that is where
it gets the best of both. A recent Department of Commerce survey
of sales by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations, covering the years 1966 through 1972, shows that the Asian
region has enjoyed much more rapid market growth than, for
example, Latin America, and a total of more than 200% in sales
growth over the period for these majority-owned subsidiaries.
Next, consider the sales record of a subset of U.S. multinationals - the manufacturing subsidiaries, that is, excluding those
engaged in such operations as trading, petroleum, mining and
smelting, and finance. Between 1966 and 1972, U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in East Asia have outperformed those located
elsewhere. A sales index based on Commerce Department sources
shows that the Far East outstrips Africa, Latin America and the
world average. But this performance is heavily influenced by
Japan, which did significantly better than the rest of the Far
East. In 1972, a solid 60% of sales in the Far East were controlled
by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries located in Japan. Sales
growth by non-Japanese Asian manufacturing subsidiaries conforms to the world average 15.2%, and is only slightly better
than that achieved by subsidiaries in other developing economies,
14.0%. Within the manufacturing category, U.S. subsidiaries in
non-Japanese Asia engaged in the manufacture of machinery had
a sales field day. During the period 1966 to 1972, their sales
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increased at the rate of 44.5% per annum, nearly double the rate
anywhere else.
The Far East (including Japan) continues to be the world's
most profitable region for U.S. investment in manufacturing.
Business Asia, a Hong Kong weekly, using Commerce Department data, reports that the average 1973 rate of return on U.S.
direct investment in manufacturing in Asia was 22.8%, and
Australia 19.7%. In stark contrast, Latin America offered a return
of only 13.3%, a rate below the world average of 15.9%. As usual,
the high return from Middle East oil operations made this region
the leader in overall profitability. In 1974-75, as world inflation
surged and recession set in, profit rates sank in all areas except
the oil regions. The rate of return on U.S. investment in
manufacturing in Asia in those abnormal years plummeted to 14%
from the lofty 22% figure.
·
Unfortunately, there are no accessible published sales and
profit data on U.S. multinationals located in Taiwan. However,
since 90% of the foreign capital in Taiwan is devoted to
manufacturing, it seems reasonable to accept the average sales
and profit statistics on all Asian multinational manufacturers
presented above as suggestive of the Taiwanese profit rates.
In the latter half of the 1960s, these sales and profits lures
drew U.S. investments into the Far East at an increasingly rapid
pace, especially in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines (the
U.S. share of total invested stock in this area reached about 40%
in 1969). But as the 1970s opened, Japan's investments in this
area began to increase sharply; investment stock at the close of
1975 increased 10.8-fold compared with the 1969 year-end. By the
end of 1973, Japan's investment share topped all investor
countries including the U.S., in Thailand and South Korea. And
by the 1974 year-end, Japan's share was the highest also in
Indonesia. Japan's share in Asian investment stock rose conspicuously from 13.6% at the close of 1969 to 33.6% at the 1975 year-end.
In contrast, the share of U.S. investments in Asia declined from
38.5% to 25.2%. However, the U.S. share of investment in the light
industry countries - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore - did not fall so precipitously as it did in the primary
product countries Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. In the former group it slid from 39% to 31%, whereas in
the primary products group it dove from 38% to 21% in just six
years. Accordingly, Japan's gains were far more dramatic in the
primary group, up from 13% to 33%, than in the light group, from
16% up to 26%. Of these eight Asian nations, Indonesia,. with its
opportunities for petroleum extraction, has taken the lion's share
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of foreign capital - $4.8 billion as of 1975. Taiwan with $1.3
billion was a close third to Singapore's second place with $1.4
billion.
Having assessed the general Far Eastern direct investment
situation, we turn to an explicit examination of the available
Taiwanese data. At the end of September 1976, the total amount of
overseas Chinese and foreign investments reached $1.5 billion, of
which $488 million under 280 projects came from the U.S.,
accounting for more than 32% of the total inflow of foreign private
capital. During the recession years 1974-75 the U.S. was adding
but little new investment. In 1974, the U.S. held $428 million (only
$50 million less than the 1976 figure) or an overwhelming 46% of
the total stock in 1974. The source of America's importance as a
foreign investor in Taiwan can be traced to the nature of the
annual new capital flows in 1974 through 1976. In 1974, Japan
and the U.S. committed equal shares of the flow of new
investment; in 1975, the U.S. took the lead again, 42% versus 24%
of the new flow. But in 1976, Japan put up 30% compared to our
21% of the inflow.
Although U.S. direct investment commitments to Taiwan
have faltered, other items in our capital account dealings with
ROC remain prominent. Loans from U.S. banks remain strong.
The U.S. Eximbank alone has, in fact, extended more than $1
billion in loans to Taiwan and guaranteed another $700 million of
private bank loans. This clearly makes Taiwan the country with
the third largest Eximbank exposure worldwide, (only Brazil and
Spain have more). As of the end of March 1977, $1.54 billion of
loans had been granted to state-run enterprises like Taiwan Power
Co., China Steel Corp., Chinese Petroleum Corp., and Taiwan
Railway Administration. 1 The largest recipient was Taiwan
Power Co., with a large portion of the funds going to Taiwan's
ambitious nuclear power development program. And as Minister
Sum of the ROC remarked in his address to the USA-ROC
Economic Council, this Eximbank credit will bring American
firms $2.5 billion worth of business. (Eximbank lo.ans are granted
for 60% of the purchase price.)

1. During discussion at the conference, Marvin Solomon, Senior Counsel to the
Export-Import Bank, supplied these figures to replace the already out-of-date
published ones I had presented orally.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps the reader is feeling more befuddled than informed
after this heavy onslaught of statistics. As one last exercise, tally
up America's economic stake in Taiwan- nearly $500 million in
direct investments; enjoyment of one of the highest rates of
profitability and sales growth in the world; all the goods
exchanged with our thirteenth-ranked trading partner; $1.54
billion in loans outstanding and the $2.5 billion in sales which
they generate - in this author's opinion, a very substantial stake
indeed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Background Notes, "Taiwan," Department of State, October, 1974.
Bank of Japan, Economic Research Department, Tokyo, Special Paper No. 66,
December 1976.
Business Asia Weekly Reports, Hong Kong, January 31, 1975. February 17, 1975.
July 9, 1976. October 15, 1976.
Economic News Overseas Weekly, Taipei, January 1, 1977.
Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1975 Yearbook, Hong Kong.
Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1976 Yearbook, Hong Kong.
Fei., W.H., "The Rqle of Foreign Investment in Taiwan's Future Economic
Development," Industry of Free China, July 1976.
Mathieson, J.A., "Taiwan's International Trade and Economic Structure,"
Industry of Free China, July 1976.
Overseas Business Reports, U.S. Department of Commerce, "United States Foreign
Trade 1960-1966," August 1967.
- - "United States Foreign Trade 1961-1967," May 1968.
- - "United States Foreign Trade 1965-1971," April 1972.
- - "United States Foreign Trade 1968-1974," April 1975.
Sun, Y.S., "A Strengthening of Sino-American Economic Cooperation," Industry of
Free China, December 1976.
Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, "U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad in 1975," August 1976.
- - "Sales by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Companies, 1975,"
February 1977.
- - "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1974," September 1975.
- - "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1973," October 1974.
- - "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1972," September 1973.
Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Taipei, 1976.

Dr. Chiu thanked Ms. Norma Schroder for presenting her
paper and then invited the discussants to comment on the papers
presented. The first discussant was Mr. Martin Pilachowski, Vice-
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President of Maryland National Bank, who discussed the
economic relations between the Port of Baltimore and Taiwan,
giving a banker's view of the ROC. Mr. Pilachowski cited the ROC
government's determination to succeed through internal development and through participation in the international market, and
the ROC government's ability to implement its ongoing economic
evolution.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Pilachowski's statement.]

COMMENTS
MARTIN PILACHOWSKI

I won't go into some of the numbers that have been very ably
presented by my predecessors, other than to say that I do agree
with them. The progress that has been made is certainly
substantial. I had a somewhat unique opportunity to see it on two
levels, first during the sixties as a naval officer in Kao-hsiung,
and later in my banking career travelling extensively through
Asia.
I think it's important to look behind the progress and try to
get a feel for the motivating factors that have generated the
ROC's significant progress. I think the ROC is to be commended,
and I think the ability of the country to come to the international
marketplace is a very strong indication of just how soundly and
how well they run their affairs internally and internationally.
The financial institutions in Taiwan bear a very heavy
burden because of the lack of the substantial capital markets that
one sees in other areas. To say the least, they have handled this
role in a very commendable fashion. Looking at the structure, all
the financial institutions are under control of one format under
the Ministry of Finance with an ongoing relationship with the
Central Bank of China, which is the lender of last resort. There is
progress being made in areas that would be considered weaknesses based on the short-term money market operations which
would expand the ability of both the investor and business to take
advantage of varying opportunities for taking and replacing
funds.
In looking at how we as a bank invest in the financial
community in the ROC, it has traditionally been an ongoing
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source of profits for U.S. banking institutions as well as European
and other Asian institutions to provide not only for the
infrastructure or developmental financing but also trade financing. On a more local level, trade between the Republic of China
and the Baltimore area is probably a lot more significant than
most people would realize in looking at the total tonnage that
passes through the Port of Baltimore. We have been doing
business there for quite some time. While I can't give you the exact
figures, it is substantial, and it is constantly growing. For those of
you involved in the Baltimore business community, our local
involvement will continue to expand with some additional
shipping lines coming into the Port, which I think bodes well for
future prospects of two-way world trade. Since there was mention
made of the relationship between the ROC and the attitudes
revolving around the American businessman's approach to the
PRC, I think all we need to do in this area is look at the numbers
that are involved. Two-way trade with the Republic of China, as
was mentioned, has now exceeded $4 billion; certainly, the trade
volume with the PRC in no way approaches this volume. I think
that the attitude of current business, as bankers see it, is that the
numbers are the key in a sense, and that we should continue to do
things in this vein.
In summary, I again feel that the driving forces have been the
government's determination to succeed in both internal development as well as implementing the practice and putting their
products in the international marketplace. They have done a
commendable job. Certainly the stability of the ROC economy is
one of the most enviable in all of Asia. The exchange rate of the
NT dollar has remained significantly stable over the last twenty
years or so, varying only slightly, again attributable to the
government's ability to implement ongoing economic ·thought
processes which have kept the country headed in the right
direction. Thank you very much.

Dr. Chiu thanked Mr. Pilachowski for his comments,
especially his remarks on Baltimore's trade and financial
relations with the ROC. He then introduced the second discussant, Professor J. S. Prybyla, to speak. Dr. Chiu said that
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Professor Prybyla is a prolific writer and also a person of wide
experience. He recently visited both the People's Republic of
China (1974) and the ROC (1976) to observe their respective
economic development, and is Professor of Economics at Pennsylvania State University.
Professor Prybyla praised Mr. Wu's presentation as a
synthesis of the crux of the situation. He cited the ROC's
"textbook transition" from dependency to economic independence.
He said Mr. Wu's guide should be followed by those responsible for
economic decisions, and that insufficiently informed decisions as
to future U.S. relations with the ROC could be destructive. Dr.
Prybyla commented that while Mr. Wu's presentation is positive
on the investment and trade climate of the ROC, it does not reveal
the difficulties and frustrations that investors face, e.g., frustrations arising from difficulties with workers and bureaucracies.
[The following is the summary of Professor Prybyla's statement.]

COMMENTS

J. S.

PRYBYLA

I

Allow me, first of all, to congratulate Mr. Wu on his
informative, well organized, and lucid presentation of the basic
elements which constitute the investment and foreign trade
climate of the Republic of China. The paper represents, in my
view, a good synthesis of the fundamental facts of the situation
and is a helpful guide for potential investors and traders.
Mr. Wu performs a distinct service in stressing (i) the
significant achievements of the Republic of China in economic
growth over the last quarter century; (ii) the successful creation of
a model of development that combines private initiative with
constructive governmental intervention, and the profit motive
with equity in the distribution of land, income and opportunity;
and (iii) an almost textbook perfect transition of a once dependent
economy to self-sustained growth. Not the least of the paper's
merits is to remind us of the close commercial relationship
between Taiwan and the United States and of the important stake
which this country has in the continued viability and prosperity
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of the Republic of China. Such reminders are especially important
at this time when crucial political decisions affecting our
diplomatic and legal relations with the ROC are under active
consideration in Washington. Mr. Wu's guide to investment in and
trade with the ROC merits attention by our policy makers and by
those whose involvement in trade and investment with Taiwan
puts them in a position to bear influence on decision-making
councils of our nation. As other papers at this conference make
clear (I have in mind, in particular, the analyses by N. Shroder, Y.
L. Wu and K. C. Yeh as well as the instructive German case study
by R. Heuser), nothing could be more disruptive to the economy
and society of Taiwan as well as damaging to our own economic
interests and international credibility than an insufficiently
informed decision concerning our future relations with the
Republic of China. In this setting, Mr. Wu's essay is most timely
and sobering.
II

My reservations about the paper are of two kinds. The first
concerns a methodological point which, I think, is important both
as a matter of substance and from the standpoint of the paper's
persuasiveness or - if I may use the word - "saleability" to
informed American opinion. The second concerns updating and
elaboration of some of the facts mentioned by Mr. Wu.
As is to be expected, the paper draws a very positive
picture of the investment and trade climate in the ROC, and
concludes on an optimistic note. If there are shadows on the
economic landscape, as there surely are, and if future prospects
are fraught with dangers and uncertainty, they are hardly to be
detected in the presentation. Now, we all know that there exist
difficulties with which foreign investors in Taiwan must cope and
of which they should be made aware in fairness to all concerned.
While the argument of a favorable investment and trade climate is
basically accurate, it is not the whole story. Failure to spell out,
openly and clearly, some of the more important problems, and
frustrations which foreign investors and traders are likely to
encounter in their dealings with Chinese managements, workers,
and government bureaucracies can only contribute to later
disillusionment and discouragement. I think the paper's value
would have been much enhanced had the author enumerated some
of the major negatives and suggested ways and means of dealing
with them. In this regard the paper weakens, through omission,
1.

CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

53

its own strong case. I have seen analyses of this kind from the pen
of researchers in the Republic of China, so the subject is clearly
not taboo.
2. (a) The author correctly points to the crucial changes
currently taking place in the structure of the ROC economy. The
pivotal change concerns the transition to a more capital- and
technology-intensive economy and the preoccupation with upgrading the quality of output, especially exportable output. In this
connection it would be useful, I think, to mention some of the
measures currently under active consideration by the government
of the ROC aimed at revising the present Statute for Encouragement of Investment in a way that would generate the appropriate
investment from foreign and domestic sources. I am thinking in
particular of discussions concerning the possibility of extending
the five-year tax holiday by one to three years to encourage
investment in the priority industries; proposed tax incentives to
large trading companies as a means of expanding the export
trade; the proposed revision of tax incentives to firms undergoing
mergers; suggested .exemptions from import duty to be given to
productive enterprises for the import of equipment not produced
domestically; and the exemption from withholding and consolidated income tax of one year savings deposits, post office savings
deposits, and trust funds. These, plus the proposed revision of the
Statute for Technical Cooperation, are important measures
designed to stimulate domestic and foreign private investments in
the years to come when the present stimulus provided by
expenditures on the ten major projects declines with the projects'
completion.
(b) Mr. Wu addresses himself briefly to the problem of
imbalance in Taiwan's trade with the United States. This is a
sensitive issue in this country and will certainly require thoughtful corrective measures by both partners. It would have been
desirable, I believe, to have dealt more fully with this subject in
the paper, for a continuation of the present lopsided exchanges
could easily lead to a deterioration in the climate of US-ROC
trade.
(c) Finally, I would have liked to hear more about the
progress being made in the development of the twelve new
industrial parks and the implementation of the Hsinchu Scientific
and Industrial Park Project, which appears to be a most
interesting pilot experiment in providing an appropriate environment for the development of technologically advanced industries.
I would be especially interested in the author's views on the
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ability of Taiwan's social structure to absorb rapidly high-level
technology.
I understand, of course, that time and space limitations
militate against the inclusion of all these various issues in the
paper. I am quite simply raising them as a possible subject of our
discussions.

Dr. Chiu thanked Professor J. S. Prybyla for presenting such
constructive comments on Mr. Wu's paper; he then announced a
fifteen minute break for this session, after which the floor would
be open for discussion. He also informed the participants that the
third discussant, Professor James P. Chandler, had just arrived
and would present his comments at the discussion period.
This session adjourned at 11:20 a.m. and resumed at 11:30
a.m.
Dr. Chiu called the session into order and announced that the
floor was now open for discussion.
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.]

DISCUSSION
VALERIE WATTS JAMES: I have a question for Mr. Wu. I am
Assistant Professor of International Law and Political Science at
Morgan State University. Mr. Wu made reference to the fact that
there are no strikes in Taiwan, or very few strikes. He also
mentioned the unions. What positions do unions play insofar as
the economy of the ROC is concerned?
DR. CHIU: Dr. Wei will be more competent to answer that
question.
DR. WEI: There are labor unions in Taiwan, and their way of
getting what they want is not to strike, but to put pressure upon
the government, and through the government to put pressure
upon the factories. For instance, when the pay of some local
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factory financed by foreign investors is too low in the opinion of
the workers, then the workers have several ways of getting what
they want. In the first place, they can make their wage demand to
the owner of the factory directly. In most factories there is
someone called the officer of labor relations, so usually this
worker or representative of the workers goes to that officer and
says, "It's too low, we have to increase the pay." If they cannot
find satisfactory answers from the factory, then they can go to the
provincial or City Bureau of Social Affairs. There is a branch in
that Bureau which can serve as an intermediary between the
workers' group and the factory. So this is the way to get things
done. Maybe this is in the traditional Chinese cultural context and
is not by direct confrontation. It's by some kind of behind-thescenes maneuver that the workers are able to get what they want.
That's as much as I can say. I do not know the detailed legal
arrangements as to how the workers actually resolve differences
between themselves and the factory owners.
DR. HEUSER: I would like to ask Dr. Wei another question. Dr.
Wei emphasized in his quite articulate overall presentation of the
present circumstances in Taiwan, that Taiwan will remain a
democratic land. It seems to me that people in western countries
are wondering why despite the facts that in Taiwan there are
economic improvement and political stability, as well as a
growing living standard, nevertheless the country is still in a
situation of emergency and martial law. People in western
countries are interested to hear something from the people who
are in government in Taiwan why this is so, because for us it is
not easy to understand, viewing the facts I have just mentioned.
DR. WEI: As to this question, again I will answer not in the
legal sense; I think Dr. Chiu can add to my answer in that regard.
I will give you essentially a political assessment of the situation.
Taiwan has martial law, but no curfew. There are cases in which
there are constant curfews in some countries, such as in South
Korea and the Philippines, and there are nations in which curfew
is the martial law. We have martial law, but no curfew. The
martial law has been declared more for preparation for the
possible emergence of a critical situation. In other words, at least
formally speaking, we are still in continuous conflict with
Mainland China, and if you review the developments after 1971
after we withdrew from the U.N., then I think we have a pretty
good record in protecting civil rights, particularly in the areas of
private citizens. South Korea, to my knowledge, has nine times
declared national emergencies, and the Philippines has suspended
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its democracy by proclaiming martial law for the whole country,
and Thailand has a coup and student revolt. What we did, we not
only resisted any change in the form of government, we initiated
two supplementary national elections, adding more than fifty new
members to the national Yuan, to the Control Yuan, and to the
National Assembly. People have asked this question of martial
law again and again. We are aware of this problem, and we are
concerned with this problem, but again, my answer here is that it
is more for preparation for a possible emergency situation rather
than actually applying every facet of law to restricting the
.freedom of the people of Taiwan.
DR. CHIU: With respect to the question of martial law, I just
want to remind you that there is a de facto martial law curfew in
all United States cities. So I warn you not to go out after the
conference is over in the evening (laughter). But martial law here ·
is enforced not by the government but by the gangsters in this
country.
QuESTION [to Prof. Prybyla; speaker unidentified]: What is the
viability of economic expansion in the ROC?
PROF. PRYBYLA: There are some problems. I'll mention some
of the less innocuous factors. I think there is serious question
among some Chinese as to viability in some labor projects. There
is some question in the people's minds as to the educational
qualifications of the labor leaders in the Republic of China. There
is, I think, a certain growing restlessness, too, in the labor force,
in regard to wage structures, wage levels, consumer aspirations
and so on, which may not be as ea,ily dealt with by legal
injunctions. . . there are problems, I think, in management, the
quality of management in Chinese firms. So these are some. And
also, I am not as optimistic about the future international climate
for investment in Taiwan as some of the speakers. I do tend to
share Mr. Wu's and Mr. Wei's fears that some shift in our
relations with China may very adversely affect the climate of
investment. I am not sure whether Ms. Schroder mentioned this I think she did- but much of the foreign investment, especially
American investment in Taiwan, is rather short-term in terms of
equity. This may be in part because of the concentration of
investment in light industry. But it is symptomatic that the
United States investor has confidence in the future of Taiwan, but
it is not very long-tenn.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: How much investment in
Taiwan is short-term?

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

57

DR. WEI: I agree with Ms. Schroder that a more extensive
answer to this question should be based upon a careful review of
data. But I can base an answer on my own experience up here as
an Eisenhower Fellow visiting the U.S. While I was in New York I
met with four major bank executives, including the J.P. Morgan
Bank & Trust Co., I asked a question, "Before you loan the money
to the ROC, with whom do you check? Do you check with the U.S.
Department of Commerce or Export-Import Bank?" And I got an
answer from the J. P. Morgan vice-president for foreign investment. He told me that we rely on our own experts; we make our
own assessments, because the amount of money is too large to be
insured by anybody, so we'd better be sure what we're doing. So
they invested in a loan for building six nuclear power plants, and
this is a very large amount of borrowing. Of course we Chinese in
Taiwan are more careful, you may say more prudent, in borrowing
money. In our economic situation, we could have borrowed much
more. If we follow, say, the example of Korea, we would have at
least doubled or tripled our borrowing from international markets.
But we want to maintain our good record and to maintain a
relatively low portion of our economy which is based upon
borrowing money. So this much I can say. The kind of projects
which involve large amounts of money are on long-term loans, not
short-term loans. I know less about the investment part, but I do
know about the loan part.
Ms. SEUNARINE: This question is for Mr. Pilachowski. I would
like you to comment on whether Maryland National Bank finds
any special allure in the Republic of China as compared to other
eastern countries for investment.
MR. PILACHOWSKI: We find it a great deal more attractive
than some other countries. We are primarily a bank concerned
with the financing of trade, again connected with the Port of
Baltimore. The Republic of China offers us as an institution an
opportunity to do both the medium-term lending that Dr. Wei was
referring to and short-term lending. If you look at other countries,
their demand for short-term funds is not as strong, and also we
view them as being less stable for varying reasons. Other
developing Asian countries have been mentioned - I do not mean
that we do not do business with those places also. But our desire to
increase our business is dependent upon more immediate evidence
of stability in those countries than is presently seen vis-a-vis what
we see in the Republic of China. It's a very favorable atmosphere
for us. The only more favorable atmosphere is that of Japan.
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QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: I want to comment on Dr.
Heuser's remark about national emergency in Taiwan. Actually,
the United States has been in a national emergency since 1917.
Indeed, that's how the President regulates foreign activity. My
question is, what do you see as the ultimate situation in the
Republic of China - what will it be in the year 2000?
DR. CHIU: I think I will call Dr. Wei to answer that question,
as a scholar, not as a government official (laughter).
DR. WEI: Thank you very much, Hungdah. You have just
saved my case. Let me put it this way. Let me give you three
pitfalls which we try not to fall into. I have met so many people in
the United States while representing the ROC in Taiwan in
varying capacities, first as Director of the Institute of International Relations, and now as Chairman of the Research,
Development and Evaluation Commission. There are several
traps which we can fall into if we are not careful. One is that
Taiwan can continue trading (after the U.S. has normalized its
relations with the PRC); and that Taiwan is now economically so
good that it does not need formal ties with the U.S. So to the
person who asks, "Do you think Taiwan's economy is good?" One
may say, "Yes, it is good." "Do you think Taiwan's economy can
withstand any shock?" One may say, "I think maybe yes." "Then
why should you worry about diplomatic ties with the U.S.? We
think you can stand any shock." This is one pitfall. Another
question asked is, "You people have been very successful in
dealing with unfavorable money situations since 1971. You have
been able to even increase trade with countries with which you
have no ties -is that correct?" One would say, "Yes." "And you
have developed substantive ties with many countries (without
diplomatic ties with the ROC)." One would say, "That's correct."
Then they say, "Why should you worry about ties with the U.S.A.?
You have developed a whole bunch of substantive ties. You can
keep up the same thing." This is another pitfall. The third pitfall
is this: "Is Taiwan secure?" Now, the instinctive response is, "Yes,
Taiwan is secure." "Well, can you be secure in the near future?
Can you defend yourself against Mainland China?" We are more
likely to answer, "Yes, we will be able to defend against Mainland
China." "Then, why should you worry about a defense treaty?"
These three pitfalls I have encountered again and again. I got so
tired of it that whenever I had anything to do in the U.S.A., I
would say first, let me tell you three things. Then we are in
business.
My honest evaluation as a person trained in development,
international law, and political science is this: There is no
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substitute for formal ties. Without formal ties, your existence at
best is something of a para-social, political, and economic entity,
something which is less than that of a state. In this regard, we
recently had a meeting at St. Louis of the International Studies
Association on the legal status of divided states. What we have is
a situation in which there is a zero-sum game in the chapter of
recognition and the conventional international law. That is, the
winner gets all. Until 1971, the ROC was a beneficiary of
conventional international law in which we received the recognition of the majority of the states of the world. After 1971 we were
the victim of conventional international law in which a diminishing number of states recognized the ROC. How can we resolve this
question? The resolution is not going to come from us; it is for the
international jurists to deal with this question. Under international law, there are three types of international personalities:
states, belligerents, and insurgents. Where do you find divided
states? Are they belligerents? Are they insurgents? They are more
than that. The experience of the ROC has been that we try very
hard to be a good member of the international community. We
behave as a state. We adhere to all the regulations and codes of
behavior which are worthy of any entity that is a state. We are out
of the W.H.O. (World Health Organization), we are out of the
I.C.A.O. (International Civil Aviation Organization), we are out of
many international organizations, but we still adhere to the rules
of behavior, with the hope that the international community will
treat us as a political system worthy of the recognition of the
world community. We are trying very hard to increase diplomatic
ties with other countries. We are not satisfied with substantive ties
- ties that are maintained only in the absence of diplomatic/formal ties.
CoMMENT, MR. CLOUGH: American companies investing
directly in the ROC, e.g., EXXON, do not invest lightly in
countries like Taiwan without some confidence in the future.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: I would like to ask Dr. Wei
about the extent of political participation in Taiwan. You have
indicated in your discussion that most of the political power is in
the hands of the Taiwanese Chinese . . . . What had been the
experience of minority groups in light of the fact that you have
varying political power groups in Taiwan?
DR. WEI: The ruling party is the Chinese Nationalist Party
(Kuomingtang, K.M.T.). For those who have done research on
Taiwan's political process, it has become apparent that the
process of political representation on Taiwan is far more complex
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than has been described by western scholars. In order to win
election in Taiwan, one generally must gain nomination by the
ruling party. In some cases nomination by the ruling party as a
candidate amounts to election. In selecting candidates to run for
positions, the ruling party is very careful. They want to get a
person who is respected, who has the means to run in the election
and win. So in this case, in local areas if you seek out a Mainland
Chinese to run in a predominantly Taiwanese area, you are not
going to win. So by necessity, the party has to select a Taiwanese
Chinese candidate: So because the Mainland Chinese are mostly
living in the cities and only a few in the countryside, the
proportion of Mainland Chinese who have won seats in the
Taiwan Provincial Assembly is less than their overall percentage
in the whole population, a situation which can be compared with
the United States in some ways. What I can say here is that it is a
deliberate effort made by the government of the ROC as well as a
natural process of gradual emergence of the majority influence.
The Constitution of the Republic of China does have certain
guarantees for minority groups to be represented in the National
Assembly and other representative organizations. The Aborigines
in Taiwan have guaranteed seats, as well as women. According
to our constitution, women must have 10 percent of the seats in all
levels of legislative bodies, which I understand is not the case in
many countries.
DR. CHIU: I want to call to your attention that in China there
are some small minorities. They have representatives in the
National Assembly. The Aborigines in Taiwan, for example,
number only 200,000, and in order to be seated in the National
Assembly you need 400,000. But they are guaranteed one seat. For
instance, in the United States, if you have about 12 percent Black,
if you use the Chinese formula, Blacks would be guaranteed at
least 12 to 15 percent or 20 percent in the U.S. Congress.
[Dr. Chiu then invited Professor James P. Chandler - the
third discussant - for this session to speak.]
PROF. CHANDLER: Dr. Chiu, I appreciate the invitation to
come. I had other commitments in St. Louis which prevented me
from leaving there until this morning. As I listened to the panel
and I looked at the panel, I noted that except for the Chairman,
they were economists and bankers and not international lawyers.
But that is what I am- I am a professor of international law. The
last question that was discussed by Dr. Wei, I should say, the
second to the last question he discussed in response to a question
concerning the future of the ROC in the year 2000, is of interest to
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me. I have only two comments which I want to make in
connection with that. First of all, in my travels in the Republic of
China in Taiwan I have found a delightful and beautiful country,
and I have found there an extremely hospitable and happy and
contented people. This is significant, I think, in terms of our
conceptions of international law, particularly as it relates to
rights of self-determination. I think at bottom the question
becomes whether or not the current evolution of relations between
the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world
will result in great harm to the existing state of the Republic of
China. I think, under conventional ideas of international law, the
right of a desirable people, in a desirable territory, to determine for
themselves the type of government, the type of state, and the type
of allegiance they will have, is a basic and a fundamental human
right, and one that ought to be respected by the people in the
Republic of China as well as the people in the People's Republic of
China. So it is that principle of contemporary international law
which should be of overriding importance here, and I think the
current emphasis on the importance of individual rights at the
national level in this country and its probable evolution in terms
of its influence upon other states is undoubtedly to have an impact
as yet unforeseeable upon the future prospects of the Republic of
China. I want to commend Dr. Chiu for sponsoring this very fine
conference and to thank all of you for coming.
DR. CHIU: Thank you, Professor Chandler. You mentioned
that you are an international lawyer. But I want to advise the
audience that Professor Chandler is also a computer scientist. He
is now putting out a book called Computers and the Law, to be
published by the West Publishing Company, which is one of the
leading law publishers. We can entertain one more question.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: This concerns investment on
Taiwan. Taiwan is apparently self-sufficient in generating
capital. In the area of capital, does it really matter very much to
the Taiwan people what kind of investments are made?
MR. PILACHOWSKI: That is a very good and also a very
difficult question. In regard to the statement that only five percent
of private capital comes from outside sources, I personally believe
that it is probably a bit optimistic to say that this part of outside
capital is of the least importance. The types of projects the
government is looking toward - and this is my personal view are going to need substantially more input from outside, not only
in dollars but in the technology necessary to continue to expand.
If you look at their trading partners in the area - Korea, Hong
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Kong, Japan - the basic products are pretty much the same.
What flight of capital would do to the economy of Taiwan is,
again, very difficult to estimate. Obviously it would end the
expansion of technical capabilities. In case of flight of capital, it
would certainly hurt the economy of Taiwan; it's very difficult to
put a dollar value on the actual economic impact that would result
from the flight of capital.
DR. WEI: I have a comment. Foreign investment has not only
an economic meaning but also a political meaning for Taiwan,
particularly investment by important, established companies in
Taiwan. It imparts a feeling of security to overseas Chinese
investors. Also the fact that a foreign company is willing to invest
in Taiwan gives some assurance to local people and indicates
something about an objective evaluation of Taiwan. In that light,
foreign investment, although not very large in percentage terms,
has a meaning. Capital flight is a wise decision if the country
falls. If you transfer your capital out of the country and the
country does not fall, you have had it. This actually occurred with
a few people in Taiwan. There were a few people in Taiwan in
1971 or 1972 who tried to get their capital out of Taiwan- but the
problem is, Taiwan is a very favorable investment market. It has
a good stable government, stable social environment, and
relatively reasonable wages. Consider, for example, a textile
factory owner with, say, 20 million NT, which is a small, but not
too small, establishment in Taiwan: when he converts that money
into U.S. dollars, it amounts to $500,000. He can only open one or
two restaurants in the United States, that's all. What can he do
with that? Therefore, when someone thinks of transferring to the
United States, he only finds that his competition with the same
factory is earning more money. So the final analysis is still the
question of profits and the favorable environment, and that, I
think, is probably a more crucial factor in determining whether
capital will stay in Taiwan.
PROF. PRYBYLA: That's like jumping over the Grand Canyon
and finding yourself short (laughter). I think that, seriously,
whatever the religion one is practicing at the moment, it is the
kind of capital that I don't think Taiwan is at present capable of
generating. They are moving to a very high-powered, very
sophisticated skill-intensive technology.
MR. Hsu: I just want to stress one point. We talk about
capital. Capital actually has several meanings. For a wealthy
Chinese industrialist who has made a lot of money in the past,
well, he's sitting on the money, he doesn't know what to do. This
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type of capital has little meaning on Taiwan economy. On the
other hand, a foreign company is trying to make an equity
investment in Taiwan - a loan that would bring in mass
technology would be used quite differently.
I also want to make a brief comment on the national
emergency situation. We all recognize that change of legislation
will take time. In the process, we also realize that many existing
laws are not being enforced. So there are two separate issues,
looking at the existence of certain laws and at what laws are
being enforced. In other words, just reading in the law books there
is a national mobilization act or a national emergency law, is
quite different from saying as a fact how much these laws are
enforced on a daily basis.
DR. CHIU: Thank you. The afternoon session will start at 2:30
p.m. sharp. The Chairperson will be Oliver Oldman, Learned
Hand Professor of Law and Director of the International Tax
Program at Harvard Law School.
The first session ended at 12:30 p.m.

Reported by Joyce Seunarine

WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMI'ITED BY
PROF. CHUNG-SEN YANG* AFTER
THE CONFERENCE
I would like to make some remarks on the question raised in
the first session about the labor law and working conditions in the
ROC. To improve the workmen's livelihood and welfare as a
means to foster social security is set forth in the Constitution of
ROC as the basic national policy. There is a great amount of labor
legislation aimed at protecting the working conditions and
promoting the welfare of the workers. The workmen's right to
organize or join a labor union is not only protected but also made
mandatory by the Labor Union Law. Certain unfair labor
practices which might hinder the activities and development of

* Professor of Law, National Chunghsing University, Taiwan; Visiting
Scholar, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976-77.
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labor unions on the part of the employers are prohibited with
criminal sanctions. The Factory Law sets forth various safety and
sanitation standards as well as minimum working conditions
which every employer shall comply with. The contents of this law
are pretty comprehensive. It covers, among other things, maximum working hours, minimum wage, allowance, overtime
payment, fringe benefits, vacation and termination of contract.
Among these provisions, one especially merits attention, namely,
that the workers are entitled to participate through their
representatives in the decision-making process of the fQ.ctory
policies with their employers (Art. 49-55). In order to enforce this
Factory Law, the government employs many factory examiners
who have the duty of visiting periodically each factory to examine
whether the legal requirements are observed. If there is any
irregularity or violation on the part of the employer, the employer
may be prosecuted and punished by the court. As far as I know,
there have been a number of court cases in which certain factory
owners were fined heavily by the court for failure to maintain the
minimum sanitary facilities or for having the workers work
beyond maximum working hours.
Since 1960, the ROC government has enforced a compulsory
insurance program for the workers so that they are insured
against sickness, injury, disability, unemployment, old age, death
and childbirth. This program has turned out to be very successful.
As far as collective bargaining and labor disputes are
concerned, the labor union may negotiate with the employer
through the collective bargaining process (see the Law Concerning Collective Agreement). If certain labor disputes should happen
and both sides fail to reach an amicable settlement through
conciliation, then the workers may go on strike according to Art.
26 of the aforementioned Labor Union Law. However, a special
law entitled Law Governing the Settlement of Disputes between
Labor and Management provides that in a time of emergency any
labor dispute shall resort to conciliation and arbitration and the
employers are not allowed to shut down their factories nor are the
workers permitted to go on strike (Art. 36, Sec. 2). Since at the
present time the ROC is still facing the military threat of the PRC,
the right to strike on the part of the workers is therefore
temporarily suspended in order to assure industrial peace and
internal stability.
It is to be noted that the government agencies concerned in
the ROC are not unmindful of the welfare of workmen. As a
matter of fact, in the past years, the Ministry of Interior Mfairs
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has endeavored to revise and codify the existing labor laws and
regulations and bring them in line with those of the developed
countries for the purpose of promoting considerably the welfare of
laborers and giving them much better protection. However, such
revisions may increase the costs of doing business and may have
an adverse effect on the competitive power of the ROC's exports as
well as on the incidence of foreign investment, which may in turn
retard the economic prosperity in the ROC. Since at the present,
the first priority for the ROC is to enhance industrial prosperity
and economic development, the attempt to raise workers' benefits
cannot but yield to the general national interest to a certain
extent.
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II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF US-ROC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
(2:3Q-5:00 p.m.)
April 15, 1977
The second session was opened by David Simon, Chairperson
of the Conference. Mr. Simon welcomed the participants and
introduced the Chairman of the second session, Oliver Oldman,
Learned Hand Professor of Law and Director of the International
Tax Program, Harvard Law School.
Professor Oldman stressed the importance of legal incentives
to investment and trade, in terms of tax advantages and
flexibility in corporate options, as well as the importance of
viewing the ROC not as an isolated entity but as an active
member of the international trading community, with the rights
and duties that accompany such membership.
Following his introductory remarks, Professor Oldman
introduced the session's first speaker, Norman Littell. Mr. Littell,
who practices law in Washington, D.C., spoke of his experiences
as drafter of the ROC's Foreign Investment Encouragement Law.
[The following is the text of Mr. Littell's paper.]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT ENCOURAGEMENT LAW
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA*
M. LITTELLt
While the United States expended nearly $23 billion of United
States taxpayers' dollars between the end of World War II and
1949, we learned by trial and error how to export our mightiest
resource: the secret of the dynamic relationship that joins
resources, manpower and capital investment to ensure production
and employment.
NoRMAN

*An expansion of the present paper, providing a more complete exposition of
the author's political views on the US-ROC experience, has been published: 123
CoNG. R.Ec. 86804 (daily ed. April 29, 1977).
tAttomey at Law, Washington, D.C.
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In creating the Economic Cooperation Administration
through the ECA Act embodying the Marshall Plan, Congress
sought to surmount the many obstacles preventing private
enterprises and investment from going abroad, and adopted as a
part of the Act the so-called Guarantee Clause for private
investment abroad, offering to insure the investor for an approved
American investment abroad against loss by (a) inconvertibility
of foreign currency into dollars because of exchange and other
restrictions, (b) loss through destruction by riot or revolution, and
(c) war, for projects approved by ECA and the foreign government
concerned on undertakings helpful to general recovery. 1
It so happened that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate
approved and adopted a draft of the "Guarantee Clause"
submitted by the writer in testifying as Chairman of the Foreign
Investment Committee of the International Bar Association (and
successively thereafter as Chairman of a corresponding committee
of the American Bar Association and of the Inter-American Bar
Association). This ECA program worked so well that by 1959, a
program was developed to bring many delegations from underdeveloped countries to the United States in order for them to see
the private enterprise system in operations by visiting chain
stores, banks, factories, stock exchanges and other enterprises.
Doubtless because of the above-mentioned background, the writer
was asked by the Secretary of State to meet with each of these
delegations during one day of their visit to the United State& to
examine the foreign investment encouragement (or discouragement) laws of their respective countries.
This sounds like an assignment requiring great learning in
foreign and international law but in meeting with these delegations, having had advance briefing as to their laws and
translations of the material parts, their legal restrictions on
foreign investments were, generally speaking, so hopelessly
impossible for a foreign investor to face or live with, that it was
like shooting sitting ducks to tell the delegations (as diplomatically as possible!) what was wrong with their laws.
An alert and able group was from Taiwan. 2 The delegation
returned to Taiwan to draft the Foreign Investment Encourage1. See "Guarantee Idea," Fortune Magazine, Nov. 1949, by the writer.
2. One member of the ROC group, the Honorable C. K. Yen, is now President
of the Republic of China, succeeding the Honorable Chiang Kai-shek. Another
member, the Honorable K. T. Li, became Minister of Finance and is now semiretired, because of ill health, as "Minister Without Portfolio."
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ment Law of 1959. The new law as drafted was adopted by the
Legislative Yuan, the elected "Congress" of Taiwan.
Impracticability of some provisions of the law of 1959 soon
became apparent. Request was made from Taiwan to Secretary of
State Dulles to send the writer to Taiwan to help revise the 1959
law. I was invited to go as consultant to the State Department.
While under great pressure in other legal business, I agreed to use
my vacation time to go to Taiwan, accompanied by Mrs. Littell, a
member of the Bar of Louisiana and the Supreme Court of the
United States. We went together during our vacation time in the
summer of 1960.
Without detailed discussion of the intensive redrafting period
in Taiwan, it is sufficient to say that what became the "Foreign
Investment Encouragement Law of 1961" took shape. The writer
was the first "foreigner" to be invited to appear before the
Legislative Yuan in order to explain the law, and he was also
invited to the "White House" of Taiwan to see President Chiang
Kai-shek for the same purpose. In the course of the latter
discussion, the President said that he understood that I would like
to visit Quemoy, which islands lying off the mainland of
Communist China, together with Matsu, was under Nationalist
control, but was under bombardment by the Communist People's
Republic of China on alternate days.
I readily seized the opportunity afforded by the President's very kind offer to provide transportation by plane, and in a
small government plane landed at Quemoy on a day when
bombing was not scheduled. On that day and on the alternate
days when the Republic of China from the mainland was not
sending real bombs, the air force from Taiwan "bombed" Quemoy
and Matsu with leaflets showing on one day the picture .of clothes
and their prices available in the free order of Taiwan, and on
another day, yardage of goods-needed in all households, readily
available in Taiwan ...and the low prices of such merchandise,
together with all manner of products, including food readily
available in the steadily rising standard of living on Taiwan. I
mention the incident because it dramatized graphically the force
and effect of private enterprise as a weapon in the arsenal of free
government.
The success of the Republic of China in bringing the fruits of
the private enterprise system to Taiwan achieved a record in
economic progress, temporarily interrupted by a world recession
in 1974-75, but mounting to a gross rate of 10% annual increase in
contrast to 7.2% in the ten years preceding the Foreign Investment
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Encouragement Law (1953-62). While great credit must be given to
the performance of the high productivity of the Chinese worker in
the Republic of China's economy, and sound government
management, American policy in encouraging foreign investments with its own guarantees of security, plus the incentives
offered by the Chinese law, the percentage of gain in gross
national production in 1976 attained 11.86%, surpassing the target
of 6.4%. The Gross National Product was $17,145 million. In
realistic terms, after allowance for inflation, the increase was
11.86%, compared with 2.4% in 1975.
Above all, getting down to the lives of individual citizens of
Taiwan, the per capita income was $809, or an increase of 14.6%
over 1975.
All of which was aided and precipitated by a flow of private
investments from abroad from the United States, the overseas
Chinese, Japan, Europe, and a number of other countries. 3
Following the exodus of the Nationalist government from
Mainland China in 1949 to Taiwan, there was a brief period in
which world opinion was that Mainland Communist China
represented the wave of the future, but under the dictum of
President Chiang Kai-shek that "self-help was the best help," the
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan grew to
spectacular success. As Ambassador James C. H. Shen from the
Republic of China to the United States stated to the 20th Century
Club in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 2, 1976:
The United States has played a major role in Taiwan's
economic growth from its beginning. At a time when Free
China was in dire need of help of many kinds, the United
States provided us, shortly after our government was
transferred to Taipei, with a liberal economic assistance
program. Such aid continued for a period of 15 years, from
1950 to 1965, totalling US$1.5 billion, which contributed
considerably toward stabilizing Free China's currency and

3. Statistical reports and releases of the U. S. State Dept., 1965-77. "Free
China Weekly," Feb. 27, 1977, p. 3; "Free China's Strategy for Prosperity," Address
by James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States,
before the 20th Century Club, Hartford, Conn., Dec. 2, 1976; "U.S.-ROC Economic
Cooperation, Past and Prospects" by the Hon. Leonard Ungar, U.S. Ambassador
to the Republ.ic of China, Jan.-Feb. issue of International Business, March 9, 1977;
Chinese Information Service release of Jan. 25, 1977.
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helping to build up Taiwan from an agricultural economy to
a semi-industrialized society. 4
The head of ECA aid to Taiwan from 1958 to 1960, Wesley
Haraldson, said that the hard work of the Chinese people "fueled
the rapid growth of Taiwan's economy . . . . I have never known a
people who worked so hard as the people of Taiwan. It was
amazing. And I never saw a hint of hanky-panky with our aid
funds."
So successful was this cooperative program between the
United States and the Republic of China that it stands as a
monumental lesson to our foreign aid policy - namely, that selfhelp in the private enterprise system is the ultimate key to a sound
economy. In 1965, the Republic of China was the first country to
be dropped from our foreign aid appropriations. 5
As Ambassador Shen rightly pointed out, American private
industry took up where the American government aid left off, and
in due time evolved specifically no less than 250 industrial
projects, from the manufacture of automobiles to the production of
plastic shoes, but with the largest segment being invested in
electronic and chemical industries.
Our former American Ambassador to the Republic of China,
the Honorable Leonard Unger, was lavish in his praise of
achievements on Taiwan in his article in the January/February
1977, issue of International Business. 6
Now, in overwhelming statistics and generalities as to the
individual, we can note these sensational gains: The people in
Taiwan are far better fed and clothed than in Mainland China.
The individual calorie count exceeds 2,800 daily, up 37 calories for
the past ten years, and the per capita daily consumption of protein
has increased from 57.8 grams in 1962 to 74.8 in 1975. 7

4. Speech by James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the
United States, before the 20th Century Club, Hartford, Conn., Dec. 2, 1976, entitled
"Free China's Strategy for Prosperity," p. 5.
5. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help
and Development, New York: Praeger, 1966.
6. "U.S.-ROC Economic Cooperation: Past & Prospects," by U.S. Ambassador
to Republic of China, Leonard Unger, Jan.-Feb. issue of International Business;
March 9, 1977, Chinese Information Service release.
7. Supra, note 4, p. 12.
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Energies were not devoted entirely to material progress as
indispensible for national survival, but every effort was made to
fashion a viable free nation of cultural enlightenment and social
justice, fostering democratic rule, cultivation of universal education, advancement of social well-being, promotion of public health
and revitalization of Chinese culture.
In spite of the vulnerability of Taiwan as a subtropical
country, normally spawning grounds for tropical diseases,
Taiwan has succeeded in eliminating such Asiatic scourges as
smallpox, malaria, cholera, typhoid fever and yellow fever.
According to the World Health Organization, Taiwan has become
"one of the healthiest places in Asia," increasing the life
expectancy on Taiwan to an average of 66.7 years for men and
72.2 for women, as compared to 41 years for men and 45.7 for
women in 1945. The Constitution of the Republic of China charges
the government with ·the responsibility of providing universal
education, beginning at the age of nine with free education for all
children. The attendence rate of children of school age has
reached an all time high of 99.3% -possibly unequaled elsewhere
in the world. 8
At the end of 1975, there were 3,400 schools of all levels, with
an enrollment of 4.42 million students, or 27.4% of the entire
population. Great strides have been made in the field of higher
education; whereas there were only four college-level institutions
in 1945, today there are about 100 universities and colleges.
A vital facet of national life on Taiwan has been the effort
made to foster human freedoms under the rule of law. Visiting
American jurists noted that significantly impressive progress has
been made in maximizing the basis for the people's enjoyment of
all fundamental human rights. The people there enjoy the rights
of free election, freedom of expression, freedom of association,
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the rights of private
ownership, free choice of education and employment, freedom of
travel and the rights of a free judiciary.
The importance of the US-ROC economic interaction lies not
so much in the outstanding growth which the ROC has
experienced, as evidenced by the impressive statistics of the last
fifteen years, but in the effect of that growth on the people of
Taiwan and in the foreign policy lessons to be learned. As to the
first lesson, the statistics do speak for themselves; there can be no
8. Id.
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doubt that, as a people, the Chinese in the ROC enjoy a level of
existence that exceeds that in virtually every other developing
country. The ROC's present policy, of shifting from labor- to
technology-intensive production, will undoubtedly increase the
ROC's standard of living even further, as Taiwan moves beyond
the developing countries and joins the developed countries
economically.
But the foreign policy lessons are at least as important,
especially from the U.S. point of view. Although the ROC remains
strongly dependent on the United States as a trading partner, it is
important that that dependence is grounded in trade for mutual
benefit rather than on U.S. governmental largesse. The ROC's
tum-around in this respect- from aid recipient to trading partner
- is perhaps the most spectacular example of the success of the
American free-enterprise system as expressed in American foreign
policy. The American blend of public expenditures and private
enterprise has ensured the survival of a nation that had teetered
on the brink of absorption, has given Americans the benefits of a
highly desirable trading partner, and has given the Taiwanese the
benefits which accrue to a free and prosperous nation. It is
important, in this period of re-evaluation of American policies
with regard to China, to remember the successes and lessons of
our experience with Taiwan. We must remember that the Chinese
in Taiwan were willing partners in their development, neither
subservient nor bullying, and that the key to the success of USROC relations has been and continues to be the strong community
of interest and mutuality of respect between the two nations.
Surely, the Republic of China, the great experiment and exemplary
success of the free-enterprise system in American foreign
relations, should not be delivered up as an expendable pawn on an
impersonal chessboard in the maneuverings between the United
States and the People's Republic of China: the loss would simply
be too great, in terms of the personal stake of the Taiwanese, in
terms of America's moral options in world politics, and in light of
what would be the vast contradictions between America's express
belief in free enterprise and its spurning the very people who most
relied on that belief, the Chinese in the ROC.

Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Littell for his presentation
setting the historical stage for the afternoon's session. He then
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introduced Dr. Chun Li, who spoke on the lawyer's role in
structuring trade and investment in the ROC. Dr. Li, who is an
attorney in Taipei, outlined the principal tax advantages offered
by the ROC for foreign investment and set forth the forms of
corporate structure available to foreign investors, foreign traders,
and enterprises wishing to establish resident agents on Taiwan.
[The following is the text of Dr. Li's paper.]

HOW TO STRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND
TRADE OPERATIONS FOR AMERICANS
IN THE ROC: A LAWYER'S
EXPERIENCE
CHUN LI*

I. INTRODUCTION

In writing this paper, my sole purpose is to bring to the notice
of prospective American investors and traders certain crucial
aspects relating to investment and trade in the Republic of China
(hereinafter ROC) from my many years' experience of private law
practice in that country.

Land and People
As many are undoubtedly aware, the ROC used to be a huge
national entity whose territory embraced the entire Mainland
China and many outlying islands, large and small, including,
among others, Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu and Penghu (the Pescadores). In late 1949, following the Communist take-over of
Mainland China, the government of the ROC moved its seat to
Taiwan. At present, only Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu, and Penghu
are under the effective control of that government, Taiwan being
the largest land mass of all, on which over 95 percent of the ROC's
population resides.
For centuries Taiwan has been known to Westerners as
Formosa, a name given by the 16th century Portuguese mariners
who first occupied and administered the island following their
* Attorney at Law, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.
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discovery. Subsequently, the island was taken over by the Chinese
and renamed "Tai-Wan," meaning literally "terraced bay." In
1887 Imperial China proclaimed it a province, formally bringing it
within the ambit of the Chinese Empire. Upon China's defeat in
the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan,
thus becoming a Japanese colony. It was restored to China in
1945 after World War II. Thereupon, it was made a province of the
ROC.
Shaped roughly like a tobacco leaf, Taiwan is 240 miles in
length and 85 miles in width at its broadest point. It has a total
land area of 13,885 square miles. Its present population is
approximately 16 million, with an annual rate of increase at
slightly less than two percent.
Some comparison between Taiwan and mainland China
might be of interest. Mainland China, with a total land area of 4.4
million square miles, is 300 times the size and its massive people
of 800 million 50 times the population of Taiwan. However,
notwithstanding Mainland China's undisputed superiority in
territorial space and manpower, it lags behind the ROC in the
important areas of economic development and foreign trade. In
1976 foreign trade of the ROC totalled US$15,760 million, while
that of Mainland China was only US$13,400 million.
Economic Development and
Foreign Trade
Since the early 1950s the people and government in Taiwan
have made economic development their foremost national goal.
Through a series of governmental processes which included a land
reform program, basic social structural changes, many legislative
enactments designed to encourage investment, credit revision,
expansion and improvement of infrastructure, and upgrading of
education, the economy of the ROC has prospered, so much so
that today many leaders of the world community speak of her as a
model of economic development among developing nations.
Concomitantly, foreign trade of the ROC has expanded by leaps
and bounds. The latest statistics of the International Monetary
Fund lists her the twentieth among the world's trading countries.
She is a major trading partner of the United States, being as of
the present the twelfth on the list of America's trading partners.
Two-way trade between the United States and the ROC in 1976
amounted to over US$4.6 billion, with the latter enjoying a
surplus of approximately US$1.3 billion. If trade between the two
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countries keeps expanding, it is hopeful that the ROC will move
up to the seventh or sixth place among U.S. trading partners
within the next few years.
Taiwan has been one of Asia's most attractive investment
sites and it will remain so if the government's present
development-oriented policy continues. Foreign investment since
1952 totals US$1.405 billion. The United States is the single
largest investor (US$470.04 million), followed by overseas Chinese
(US$411.33 million), Japan (US$215.9 million) and European
countries principally West Germany and the Netherlands
(US$161.6 million). Since the energy crisis in late 1973, foreign
investment has somewhat tapered off, but this is believed to be a
transient phenomenon. As economies of major industrial powers
are gradually recovering, it is expected that more foreign investors
will come to the ROC to make investment in the years to come.
II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ROC LEGAL SYSTEM
AND MAJOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
REGULATING INVESTMENT
AND TRADE

Legal System
Although ancient Chinese society was principally guided by
the moral teachings of Confucius, law as a social institution was
known to the Chinese as early as before the birth of Christ.
China's first legal code, Fa Ching (The Canons of Law), dates
back to 255-206 B.C. in the Ch'in dynasty. From then on down to
the Ch'ing (Manchu) Government (1644-1911), all Chinese
dynasties had their own codes oflaw. It should, however, be noted
here that from today's point of view, these codes could hardly
have been called law, as they were enacted without any form of
legislative process. Largely penal in nature, they were actually
fiats promulgated by the governor for control of the governed.
In the closing years of the Ch'ing dynasty, because of China's
repeated military defeats at the hands of foreign powers,
agitations for constitutional, legal, social and industrial reforms
gained nationwide momentum. Legal reforms were given top
priority as the entire Chinese nation was pained by the
humiliating effects of the extraterritorial rights imposed by the
victorious powers. The Ch'ing Government made a special effort
to formulate new laws to meet public demands, but before the
work was completed, revolution broke out in 1912 causing the
downfall of the Manchu dynasty.
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After the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the work of
law reform continued. In the initial stage assistance of Japanese
legal scholars was sought. As Japanese law is by and large
German and French oriented, so is ROC law. Up to the time the
ROC Government evacuated to Taiwan in 1949, the nation had
various modem statutory laws comparable to those in force in
other civilized nations.
Today the laws previously used in Mainland China remain in
force in ROC-controlled territory.
The ROC has three levels of courts. On the national level,
there is the Supreme Court, which is the court of last resort. On
the provincial level, there is the High Court, which is a court of
intermediate appellate jurisdiction. The High Court may have one
or more branches, depending upon the volume of judicial business
that comes before it. On the local level, there is the District Court,
a court of first instance having general jurisdiction in both civil
and criminal cases. Attached to each court is a Public Procurator's
Office staffed by one or more public procurators whose duty it is to
investigate and prosecute criminal offenses on behalf of the State.
The nation's chief public procurator is the Procurator-General, an
executive official serving under the Minister of Justice.
Like other foreigners, Americans in the ROC, except for those
enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunities or those enjoying
privileges and immunities under the Status of Forces Agreement,
are all subject to the jurisdiction of ROC courts. ROC criminal law
has both territorial and extraterritorial application. Thus, if a
ROC national or foreigner commits a certain act outside the ROC
which is an offense under her criminal law, such as counterfeiting
ROC national currency, sedition or high treason, the actor is
punishable by ROC law. Once he is in ROC territory, he can be
arrested, prosecuted, tried, and convicted.
There are no jury trials in ROC courts. For this reason, the
judge is all powerful: he finds facts, rules on evidence, and renders
judgment. The role of the lawyer in the courtroom is rather limited
- a trial is in the main the judge's show. In this respect, the ROC
judge very much resembles his counterpart in German courts.
There are local bars and one national bar in the ROC. The
national bar is an association of all local bars. ROC bars,
however, are in fact lawyers' guilds, as, unlike bars in the United
States, their membership is restricted to private law practitioners
and does not extend to judges, public procurators, government
attorneys and law professors.
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Agencies Regulating Investment
and Trade
Foreign investment and trade are under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). A special agency by the
name of Investment Screening Commission (ISC) was set up
within the MOEA to screen and approve investment applications
submitted by overseas Chinese and foreign nationals. A ViceMinister of the MOEA serves ex officio as Chairman ofth~ ISC,
whose membership includes several officials at the vice-minister
level of other ministries and representatives of the provincial and
local governments. The ISC has a secretariat and a number of
divisions, each charged with certain responsibilities of daily
routine. Decisions, however, are made by the members of the
Commission at meetings on a collective basis.
For every investment application that has to do with
manufacturing, the clearance of the Board of Industrial Development, also an agency under the MOEA, is essential. The Board
has responsibility for the overall planning of the nation's
industrial development, so investment applications involving
manufacturing activities are subject to its review. In fact, without
its favorable recommendation a foreign investment application
has little hope of being approved by the ISC.
If a foreign investor desires to import from abroad equipment
and raw materials for its own plant, his investment application
will, as a rule, be forwarded by the ISC to the MOEA's Board of
Foreign Trade (hereinafter BOFT) for review and recommendation. Invariably, the BOFT will require the foreign investor to
purchase equipment and raw materials from the local market to
the extent that they are available locally. What is more, it will
refuse to permit the foreign investor to import used equipment
from abroad for fear that foreign manufacturers would use the
ROC as a dumping ground for obsolete equipment. Only in very
exceptional cases where the foreign investor is able to support
importation of used equipment with incontestable grounds will the
BOFT make an exception to the above.
On a more general level, the BOFT controls all imports and
exports through its power to grant import and export licenses.
Together with the Bureau of Commodity Inspection of the MOEA,
it also exercises a certain degree of supervision over the quality of
export merchandise. Occasionally, the BOFT, when requested to
do so, will go out of its way to mediate in disputes between the
local purchaser and the foreign supplier and vice versa.
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Mention should also be made of still another agency under the
MOEA which, though not regulatory in nature, stands prominently in the government hierarchy insofar as foreign investment
is concerned. That agency is the Industrial Development and
Investment Center (IDIC), created solely to provide assistance to
foreign investors. The IDIC maintains overseas offices in half a
dozen major cities around the world, including New York City,
Chicago, Los Angeles and Frankfurt. These offices furnish
information to and assist prospective investors in identifying
investment possibilities in the ROC.
The Ministry of Finance also plays an important role in the
administration of foreign investment. Many tax incentives,
including those of tax exemption and accelerated depreciation of
fixed assets, fall within its jurisdiction. Other investment
inducing benefits, such as free importation of equipment, five-year
deferred payment or installment payment of import duty, tax
rebates for raw materials used for export products, establishment
of bonded warehouses or factories, and so on, also must receive its
approval. Of all the Ministry's powers the greatest is, perhaps,
that of determining what products should be accorded the status
of encouraged products, thus entitling them to five years tax
exemption. In this connection, attention is called to the fact that
not every product manufactured by the investor's plant is eligible
for the tax holiday; the Ministry has prescribed certain criteria
which products must meet in order to qualify therefor. Reference
will be made to such criteria elsewhere in this paper when the
subject of foreign investment is to be treated in more detail.
At the provincial level, the Department of Reconstruction of
the Taiwan Provincial Government is the agency with which
foreign investors will come into the most frequent contact. This
agency is responsible for the licensing of all factories in Taiwan
save those situated within the Municipality of Taipei, which has
its own Bureau of Reconstruction to do the job. The Provincial
Department of Reconstruction has one other important function,
that is, classifying land and issuing industrial land certificates
without which factories will not be permitted to be established.
This function is, however, rarely exercised by the Bureau of
Reconstruction of the Municipality of Taipei, as land within the
city limits is too expensive to be used for factories.
Occasions may arise when foreign investors are called upon to
deal with the local governments within whose jurisdictions they
keep business offices or factories of their invested enterprises.
Clothed with no decision-making or supervisory powers, these
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local governments are not regulatory agencies and they treat
foreign invested enterprises the same way as they would any local
enterprises.
III. THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND TRADE

Local lawyers specializing in investment and international
business transactions ought to be a valuable asset to the foreign ·
investor or trader. As a common practice, American investors or
traders used to retain their own American lawyers for consultation on legal matters. This is certainly fine at home, but several
considerations weigh against the use of American lawyers in the
ROC. In the first place, American lawyers usually do not speak,
read, or understand enough of the Chinese language to be capable
of effectively handling their clients' legal business. Second, it
cannot be expected that they possess a thorough knowledge of the
local laws and regulations applicable to foreign investment and
trade. Third, not being brought up in a Chinese environment, they
usually lack that degree of tactfulness which is characteristic of
the Chinese in the course of human relations. Of all these
qualifications the last is particularly important in terms of
accomplishment of objectives in Chinese society, but it apparently
cannot be acquired through learning processes. Thus, it is perhaps
to the advantage of the American investor or trader to utilize the
services of a local lawyer to handle for him matters relating to
investment or trade in the ROC. A most ideal arrangement, which
has in fact been widely adopted by American investors or traders,
is to employ a local lawyer to work with their own American
counsel. By so doing, the local lawyer complements the work of
the American counsel, with the client getting the benefit of the
legal talents of both.
The local lawyer's role should not be limited to handling legal
technicalities for his clients. It does not take much legal expertise
. to fill out a foreign investment application or application for
import or export license, even though it is required to be written in
the Chinese language. What should be the first and foremost
requirement for the local lawyer is to help his clients map out
investment strategies. For instance, he should be able to advise
his clients as to whether a small equity with a large loan from the
parent company is a better mode of investment than a large
equity investment without a loan, or whether loaning equipment
by the parent company to the subsidiary enterprise is a more
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flexible arrangement than an outright cash equity investment in
times of fast technological or other changes. Advice such as this is
crucial to the investor in the sense that it will help him arrive at a
correct decision so that he can set his venture on a proper course
at its very beginning.
It is not even unusual for American investors or traders to
consult with their local lawyers on business issues. To generalize
here the kind of advice sought by them is both impractical and
impossible, but a couple of examples may throw some light on the
nature of questions they commonly ask. They may, for instance,
be concerned with the pricing of their export products and ask
whether it should be at a higher or lower level because of possible
consequences upon their present or future tax liabilities. They
may also ask whether purchase of raw materials from local
sources is, in regard to cost and in other respects, more desirable
than importation from abroad. Quite obviously, not every local
lawyer is competent to answer such questions, as they call for
some familiarity with the client's business as well as a fair
knowledge of general business know-how. These examples
nevertheless give some indication of the whole spectrum of
services the local lawyer may be called on to perform.
If the American investor or trader is not physically present in
the host country, the local lawyer may have to act as his
representative. In this capacity, the local lawyer will conduct
negotiations with the client's business counterparts or officials of
gov~rnment agencies on behalf of his absentee principal. He will
thus· be more than the investor's or trader's attorney; in a truer
sense, he will become the latter's business agent.
Last, but not least, the local lawyer will at times serve as
interpreter for his American clients, most of whom do not speak
the Chinese language. While English is the second language for
the majority of the educated sector of the ROC population, it is
deemed advisable and prudent for the American investor or trader
to use his Chinese lawyer as interpreter in conversation with his
business counterparts or government officials, particularly when
matters of legal importance are involved.
At present, there are in the ROC a dozen or so law
practitioners who not only have excellent English language
capability but also received legal training in the United States,
some being holders of the J.D. degree. These lawyers are generally
competent for legal service to American investors and traders.
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IV. INVESTMENT

Not all American investors or traders have the same business
objectives in the ROC. Some are attracted to the country by the
favorable investment climate there and they desire to set up
factories to manufacture products for sale to local consumers or
for export, or both. Others are interested in purchasing merchandise from local producers and exporting it to the United States
and/or other areas, and vice versa. Still others simply want to
send a representative to the ROC and have him stationed there for
liaison purposes, such as doing market research, supervising
execution of purchase orders by local suppliers, maintaining
contact with prospective customers, and so on. Depending on the
objectives of a particular client, the local lawyer's role is to advise
him on the proper approach to take and to assist him in the
structuring of his operations within the legal framework of the
ROC.
From what has been stated, it may be appropriate to classify
the business objectives of American investors and traders in the
ROC, according to their nature, into two major categories, i.e.,
investment and trade. Representatives of American business
establishments sent to and stationed in the ROC are sui generis,
having little to do with either investment or trade. They· perform,
nevertheless, a pattern of activities quite commonly adopted by
American companies, thus deserving some treatment as a
separate and distinct category. The main object of the writer, as
previously stated, is to deal with certain crucial legal aspects.
relating to foreign investment and trade.

Foreign Investment - Legal Definition
and Scope
To the layman, investment may conceptually mean a variety
of business undertakings: setting up a factory for manufacture of
products, forming a company to carry on trade, purchasing real
estate, buying stocks and bonds, and the like. The writer had the
personal experience of being asked on one occasion by an
American businessman to assist him in making an "investment,"
as he called it, in the ROC by opening a steak house.
The legal definition of investment can, of course, be markedly
different. Under the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals,
promulgated July 14, 1954, and last amended June 22, 1968
(hereinafter SIFN), investment has a restricted meaning. Only the
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establishment of one of the following enterprises will be treated
legally as foreign investment: (i) productive or manufacturing
enterprises capable of meeting domestic needs; (ii) enterprises
whose products have export markets; (iii) enterprises which will
foster the development and improvement of the nation's major
industries, including mining and communications industries; and
(iv) other industries which will benefit the nation's economic and
social development. Thus, it is clear that not every type of
business is open to foreign investors. The dominant theme is
production and manufacture, since the government policy With
respect to foreign investment is primarily oriented toward
national economic development.
When legal assistance is sought by an American client on a
specific investment project in the ROC, the local lawyer should
first carefully look into the client's plans to see whether the
proposed project can qualify for foreign investment. In this
regard, a few key questions should be asked. Will the investment
provide import-substitutes needed for domestic consumption? Will
the investment produce export items to improve the nation's trade
balance and generate more foreign exchange earnings? Will the
investment tend to develop or improve the nation's important
industries, including mining and communications industries? If
the answers to the above are all in the negative, then ask a last
question: Will. the investment be in any way beneficial to the
economic and social development of the nation? This last question
is broad enough to provide a leeway through which a good case
may be made for the client's project, as any direct financial
investment is bound to result in some benefit to the economic and
social development of the host country.
The SIFN provides certain privileges and benefits for foreign
investors, such as repatriation of invested capital, outbound
remittance of net profit, guarantee against requisition or expropriation, waiver of nationality and residence requirements, and so
on. Attention is, however, called to the fact that the SIFN itself
contains no provisions of tax benefits which for practically every
foreign investor are a major incentive. Tax benefits are provided
in the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (hereinafter SEI),
a statute applicable to both national and foreign investors. These
include a five-year tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed
assets, a maximum rate of business income tax, import duty
exemption or five-year deferred payment of import duty on capital
equipment, and many other lesser benefits.

84

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES

It is overridingly important to point out that even though a
proposed project of a foreign investor approved by the government
may qualify for foreign investment, it does not necessarily mean
that it will be entitled to the tax holiday or accelerated
depreciation of fixed assets under the SEI. Only certain enterprises prescribed in government executive orders published from
time to time may enjoy such benefits, subject to the further
condition that they meet certain procedural requirements. The
prescription of these enterprises is officially designated "Categories and Criteria of Productive Enterprises Eligible for Encouragement." The local lawyer must check carefully to see whether the
particular investment project proposed by the client falls within
the prescribed categories and meets the prescribed criteria.
The latest categories and criteria, amended and published by
the Executive Yuan, the nation's highest administrative body, on
April 28, 1975,* list 14 categories of enterprises with various
criteria as being entitled to encouragement treatment in the form
of a tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets. The
principal categocy is manufacturing industries, which include:
food processing industry, paper industry, rubber processing
industry, chemical industry, processing industry of non-metallic
minerals, basic metals manufacturing industry, machinery
manufacturing industry, electrical equipment manufacturing
industry, electronics industry, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, ceramic industry, textile industry, building and
prefabricated materials manufacturing industry, and other
manufacturing industries (such as clinical and surgical instruments; photographic and optical instruments, watches, clocks,
and their parts and assemblies; etc.). The other 13 categories of
encouraged industries are: handicraft industry, mining jndustry,
agricultural industry, forestry industry, fishery industry, animal
husbandry industry, transportation industry, warehousing industry, public utilities industry, public housing construction industry,
enterprises providing technical services, enterprises engaged in
tourist hotel operations, and heavy equipment construction
industry. For each industry the government prescribed certain
criteria of which a detailed description here is infeasible due to
limited space.

* Editors' Note: The Statute for Encouragement of Investment was again
amended on July 26, 1977. The English translation is available from the Chinese
Investment and Trade Office in New York, see p. 22 supra.
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Prescribed Form of Organization of
Invested Enterprises
In addition to the above, the form of organization of the
invested business is also a key factor in the granting of the tax
holiday or the accelerated depreciation of fixed assets or other
prescribed benefits. The SEI (Art. 3) explicitly stipulates that to
qualify for productive enterprises within the contemplation of the
"Categories and Criteria of Productive Enterprises Eligible for
Encouragement," each invested enterprise must be organized as a
company limited by shares in accordance with the Company Law.
In structure and legal ramifications a company limited by shares
is more or less similar to an American corporation, but it does
have some unique features which are worthy of note from the
standpoint of the American investor. These features are briefly
stated below.
1. There must be seven or more incorporators, more than
one-half of whom must have their domiciles within the ROC (Art.
128, para. 1). This domicile requirement is, however, waived in the
case of foreign investment. Both corporate persons and natural
persons can be incorporators. Thus, if X corporation, a Delaware
corporation, makes an investment in the ROC and organizes a
wholly owned subsidiary under the Company Law, then X
corporation itself can be an incorporator. To meet the requirement
of a minimum of seven incorporators, it will have to nominate six
or more other persons, corporate and/ or natural, but preferably its
employees, to be incorporators. To qualify for waiver of the
domicile requirement, however, such persons must join the
principal investor in applying for recognition of their status as coinvestors.
2. The company must have, at least, three directors elected
from among its stockholders (Art. 192; para. 1). The latter
qualification means that to be eligible for election to a directorship, one must, at least, own one share of stock. Since a corporate
investor cannot act by itself, it will have to appoint one or more
representatives to represent and act for it as stockholder, and such
representatives will be eligible for election to directorships. The
Company Law does not require directors to have ROC nationality,
nor does it require them to keep their residence in the ROC. It
does, however, require the chairman of the board of directors to
have both ROC nationality and residence, but again such
requirements are waived in the case of foreign investment. The
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term of office of directors cannot be longer than three years, but
they are eligible for reelection (Art. 195, para. 1).
3. Directors must attend board meetings personally, except
that the articles of incorporation of a company may provide that
one director may by written authorization appoint another
director as his proxy to attend board meetings on his behalf (Art.
205). No director, however, may act as proxy for more than one
other director. Each director is entitled to one vote.
4. A company limited by shares may, but is not required to,
have a number of executive directors elected from among the
directors. They meet regularly when the board of directors are in
recess to make decisions on corporate business and affairs. The
Company Law requires a majority of executive directors to have
their residence in the ROC, but if they are foreign investors or coinvestors, such requirement is waived under the SIFN.
5. The chairman of the board of directors, elected from
among the directors or executive directors, as the case may be, is
the legal representative of the company vis-a-vis the outsider. He
presides over board and stockholders meetings. He must be an
ROC national and have his legal residence in the ROC. Both
requirements are, however, waived if the company is a foreign
investment company.
6. The Company Law requires a company limited by shares
to have, at least, one supervisor elected from among the
stockholders. If a company has more than one supervisor, at least
one of them must be an ROC resident. Again, this requirement is
waived in the case of foreign investment. The institution of
supervisorship is of continental origin. Both the German Commercial Code and the Japanese Commercial Code have similar
provisions. Under the Company Law the structure of a company
limited by shares contemplates three direct sources of power and
control: the stockholders, the directors and the supervisor. The
directors, whose functions are executive in nature, are solely
responsible for the management and business operations of the
company. The supervisor, on the other hand, represents the
stockholders in overseeing the work of the management and the
financial condition of the company. One of his primary functions
is to check on the financial reports prepared by the board of
directors before they are submitted to the annual stockholders
meeting. Although the directors are legally bound to respond to
the requirements of the supervisor and to supply to him full
information concerning the business operations and financial
condition of the company, the ultimate controlling authority
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remains the stockholders, who may not only remove directors and
the supervisor through their voting power, but may also make
policy decisions and declare dividends. In actual practice,
however, the stockholders rarely, if ever, do so and tend to rubber
stamp recommendations of the directors on matters relating to
company policies and dividend distribution.
7. The president and vice president of the company must be
ROC residents, although they need not be ROC nationals (Art. 29,
para. 4, and Art. 39). This means that if the investor desires to
appoint a foreigner to be president or vice president of his invested
company, the appointee must take up his residence in the ROC.
This, in turn, means that the appointee must enter the ROC with
an entry visa, as only this type of visa will make it possible for
him to apply for resident status in the ROC.
8. To require stockholders or board meetings to be held
within the ROC would cause much inconvenience to foreign
investors, even though modern air transportation has considerably reduced the distance between the various continents. For
convenience sake, the articles of incorporation may provide the
holding of stockholders and board meetings outside the ROC.

Local Participation
To prevent foreign dominance of national economy, most
developing countries require some degree of local participation in
foreign investment. Either a foreign invested enterprise should be
joined by indigenous partners at the time of its initiation, or
indigenous partners should be allowed to participate in the .
enterprise after it has been in operation for a certain number of
years. In general, the ROC Government, even at this .date, still
allows foreign investors to freely set up 100 percent self-owned
subsidiaries. However, it does require local participation in certain
selected industries. The basic metals manufacturing industry,
considered crucially important for national economic and other
development, is, for example, one such industry; no foreign
investor or investors may own more than 40 percent of total equity
except in cases where special approval has been granted by the
ISC. Local participation is also required for the electronics
industry, but wholly owned subsidiaries are permitted if all their
products are intended for export. In the pork processing industry
local equity participation is prescribed at 50 percent at the
minimum.
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At the other end of the spectrum, if an invested enterprise is
100 percent foreign owned, the ROC Government may require the
transfer to local people of a designated percentage of equity
ownership after a limited number of years. When such dilution of
foreign equity ownership is required, the percentage of capital
stock to be transferred and the time limit within which the
transfer should take place are invariably prescribed in the
investment approval granted by the ISC.

Joint Ventures with Local Partners
Most American investors seem to prefer wholly owned
subsidiaries to joint ventures with local partners, largely out of a
desire to run their business without interference from any nongovernmental third parties. Where a wholly owned subsidiary is
impermissible and joint venture the only answer, the negotiation
and drafting of a joint venture agreement becomes vital to the
interests of the foreign investor. In this connection, the local
lawyer will have an important role to play. As a law pr~ctitioner
specialized in foreign investment, the writer wishes to offer the
following for the consideration of American investors interested in
joint ventures in the ROC:
1. In the absence of a required percentage of local equity
ownership, it will be a distinct advantage for the American
investor to own 51 percent or more of the total equity of the
invested enterprise. In the first place, his investment will then be
guaranteed by law (Art. 15 of the SIFN) against government
requisition or expropriation within 20 years from the date of
commencement of operation of the invested enterprise as long as
he maintains a minimum ownership of 51 percent of the total
capital stock. Secondly, he will have a majority vote - thus a
bigger voice - at the stockholders meeting. Because the
stockholders are the ultimate authority and controlling body of a
company limited by shares under the Company Law, this will in
turn assure him of firm, if not absolute, control of the business.
2. How many persons each ·party can nominate and have
elected to the board of directors is vitally important for corporate
decision making, for resolutions at board meetings are adopted by
a majority vote in number of the directors, each director, as noted
before, being entitled to one vote regardless of the amount of stock
owned by hjm. The nurp.ber of directors controlled by each party
becomes all the more important in the appointment of the
president of the company, which is legally effectual only by the
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concurrence of a majority of the directors. It is quite common for
joint venture partners to agree upon and set forth in their joint
venture agreement the respective numbers of directors they each
shall be entitled to nominate and have elected to the board as well
as the party which shall have the right to nominate the president.
Most American investors also like to reserve to themselves the
right to nominate the plant manager and the controller because of
the importance of these positions to the success of their ventures.
A suitable provision to this effect in the joint venture agreement
will prevent possible controversies over the issue from arising
between the partners.
3. The partners should agree upon the place or places where
stockholders and board meetings are to be held. As nonindigenous investors and their nominated non-indigenous coinvestors cannot visit the ROC too often, a provision in the joint
venture agreement that such meetings may, if requested, be held
outside the ROC should be of advantage to them. To ensure full
compliance by local partners with such a provision, it is desirable
to have it written into the articles of incorporation.
4. The mode of settling possible controversies between the
partners is one aspect deserving the closest attention of the
American investor. Joint ventures are usually business undertakings of long duration, and there is no guarantee that the
American investor and his local partner or partners will see eye to
eye on everything with respect to the business and operations of
the joint venture. To provide in the joint venture agreement how
differences or controversies arising between the parties out of, or
relating to how their joint venture should be settled, ought to be a
prudent and necessary step. Largely due to their cultural
background, local people are loath to fight legal battles whether in
ROC or foreign courts. Their centuries-old preferred disputesettling methods are reconciliation and arbitration. In recent
years there has been witnessed a growing tendency among
American investors favoring arbitration in the United States or a
third country in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association or the rules of conciliation and arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce at Paris, and this is
permissible under the ROC law if the local partner or partners
agree. Under Article 8 of the Statute for Technical Cooperation,
where a dispute should arise out of technical cooperation, it shall
be settled in accordance with the arbitration method as agreed
upon between the parties. Thus, if a certain foreign investment
has a licensing arrangement, i.e., supply by the foreign investor of
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technical know-how to the invested enterprise on a royalty basis,
the inclusion of an arbitration Clause in the licensing agreement is
mandatory.
Whether arbitration awards rendered outside the ROC will be
honored by ROC courts is surely a matter of deep concern for the
American investor. There is no precise legal provision, nor do
there exist any precedents, on this point. The law on the
enforceability of foreign judgments may, however, provide some
assistance in ascertaining the possible judicial attitude with
respect thereto. Under Article 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the validity of a judgment of a foreign court will not be recognized
by ROC courts if one of the following elements is present: (i) such
judgment is not res judicata; (ii) according to the laws of the ROC
the foreign court rendering the judgment did not have a valid
basis for exercising jurisdiction over the case; (iii) such judgment
is considered incompatible with the public order and good morals
of the Republic; and (iv) judgments of courts of the ROC are not
reciprocally recognized by the foreign court rendering the
judgment. It is believed that when a foreign investor applies to an
ROC court for execution on a foreign arbitral award the court will
probably refrain from subjecting the award to a review on its
merits, but that the possibility of the court applying some of the
criteria applicable to foreign judgments cannot be totally ruled
out.
5. The American investor and his local partner or partners
are free to agree upon a law governing their legal relationship
under their joint venture agreement. Under Article 6 of the Law
Governing Application of Laws in Cases Involving Foreign
Persons, contracting parties are permitted to choose any applicable law to govern their contracts. Most American investors wish to
choose laws of the State of New York as governing law, and this is
acceptable to the ROC authorities provided the choice is not
imposed upon the local partner or partners against their free will
and provided, further, that none of the provisions of the joint
venture agreement are against ROC laws or public policy.
6. Joint venture agreements may be written in the English
language. The ROC authorities, including the ISC and other
regulatory agencies, will accept English language agreements if
Chinese translations are attached thereto. It should, however, be
brought to the attention of the American investor that if he signs
a joint venture agreement in the United States, his signature must
be notarized at the nearest ROC Consulate in order for the
instrument to be effectual in the ROC. The signatures of signers of
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joint venture agreements executed elsewhere other than in the
ROC must likewise be notarized either at an ROC Consulate or by
an ROC representative if there exists no ROC Consulate in the
area.
Tax Benefits
It has become an established practice for developing countries
to offer certain benefits to investors as an incentive to investment.
The ROC follows this practice. Of the many benefits granted to
domestic and foreign investors under the SEI, the following are
worthy of particular mention.
A productive enterprise newly established and eligible for
encouragement in accordance with the "Categories and Criteria"
prescribed by the government, as referred to above, is entitled to
apply for a five-year income tax exemption starting from the date
of the first sale of its products or the date services were first
rendered, as the case may be, or for accelerated depreciation of the
fixed assets of its plant, which must be either imported or entirely
new. In his investment application the investor must state what
his choice is as between these two options. If his election is
accelerated depreciation, the useful lives of fixed assets for the
stated purposes shall be determined as follows: (i) for machinery
and equipment, if the useful lives prescribed by the tax authorities
are 10 years or more, they may be accelerated to 5 years; if the
prescribed useful lives are less than 10 years, they may be reduced
to one half of the prescribed number of years; and (ii) for
buildings, installations, or communication or transportation
equipment, their useful lives may be reduced to one-third of the
prescribed number of years.
When an existing productive enterprise eligible for encouragement expands its productive equipment to increase the quantity of
its products or capacity of its services, it is entitled to apply for a
four-year income tax exemption or accelerated depreciation of the
fixed assets of its plant, which, also, must be imported or entirely
new. Only that portion of the income which is derived from the
production of expanded plant facilities is tax exempt and only
expanded plant facilities can be depreciated on an accelerated
basis. The same useful lives of originally acquired fixed assets for
accelerated purposes apply to expanded plant facilities.
Under the SEI, as last amended D"ecember 30, 1974*
maximum rates of business income tax payable by productive

*

See Editors' Note p. 84 supra.
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enterprises not eligible for tax holiday or after termination of tax
holiday are as follows:

Categories of Enterprises

Maximum Income Tax Rates
(Percentage of
Total Annual Income)

(a) Productive enterprises in general which
started operation on or before December
31, 1973, or which were approved on or
before December 31, 1973, but started
operation before December 31, 1975, or at
a government approved later date

25%

(b) Productive enterprises employing more
advanced technology, using more durable equipment and running greater
business risks with delayed profit expectancies, which started operation on or
before December 31, 1973, or which were
approved on or before that date and
started operation before December 31,
1975, or at a government approved later
date

22%

(c) Productive enterprises in general, approved after January 1, 1974

30%

(d) Productive enterprises engaged in the
manufacture of basic metals or heavy
machinery, petrochemical industries, and
capital- or technology-intensive industries, approved after January 1, 1974

22%

By comparison, the present rate of business income tax for
ordinary profit-seeking enterprises, that is, enterprises not eligible
for encouragement, is 35 percent of the excess of taxable income
over NT$500,000.
The investor may also benefit from certain provisions with
respect to import duties on machinery and equipment used for his
plant. Under Article 27, paragraph 2, of the SEI, a limited number
of approved productive enterprises (such as steel, aluminum
refining, copper refining, electrical engineering, electronics,
machine making, shipbuilding, chemical, textile dyeing and
finishing, coal mining, and garbage treatment), if they meet the
"Categories and Criteria" referred to above, may apply for dutyfree importation of machinery and equipment used for their plants
under an investment project or a subsequent expansion project
approved by the government. Machinery and equipment for which
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a duty exemption may be granted are limited to those which
cannot be supplied by domestic manufacturers.
Less favorable than free importation is five-year deferred
payment of import duties on machinery and equipment. Under
Article 27 of the Customs Duty Law, a 100 percent export-oriented
invested enterprise organized as a company limited by shares
which makes substantial contributions to domestic economic
development or applies advanced technology is permitted to defer
the payment of import duties on machinery and equipment used
for its plant under a government approved project for five years,
subject to a satisfactory guarantee for the deferred payment being
furnished to the customs authorities. As of the present, only the
following industries are eligible for such benefits: steel, aluminum
and copper, electrical engineering, electronics, machine making,
automobiles and parts, shipbuilding, chemical, petroleum, mining,
precision instruments, metal processing, lumber processing,
rubber, and food. Most American invested electronics companies
in the ROC took advantage of this benefit, which in its net effect
is a five-year non-interest-bearing loan from the government to
the investor.
If a productive enterprise importing machinery and equipment for its plant qualifies neither for duty exemption nor fiveyear duty deferral, it may well seek an installment payment of
import duties under Article 27, paragraph 1, of the SEI.
Depending upon the amount levied, the importer may normally
pay import duties in 12 to 30 equal monthly installments, secured
by a satisfactory guarantee. The first installment payment is due
one year from the date of commencement of operation or the date
that services were first rendered.
The Regulations Governing Tax Rebates of Export Products
provide benefits to export factories by way of exemption of import
duties and commodity tax on raw materials used for export
products. Briefly stated, the exemption may be realized through
one of the following arrangements:
a. If duties, surtax, harbor dues and commodity tax
(wherever applicable) have been paid on raw materials at the time
of importation, a refund may be claimed when processed products
are re-exported;
b. Duties, surtax and harbor dues may be owed on credit, to
be offset against the raw material content of the processed
products re-exported with a prescribed time;
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c. Imported raw materials may be stored in a bonded
warehouse inside the importer's factory; and
d. Imported raw materials may be stored in the importer's
bonded factory under the supervision of either a designated
bonding agency or the customs authorities.

Other Privileges and Benefits
In addition to the above, foreign investors are entitled to a
number of other privileges and benefits which are not granted to
nationals. Under Article 12 of the SIFN, two years after
completion of his investment project, the foreign investor may
apply for necessary foreign exchange to repatriate, on an annual
basis, 15 percent of his invested capital. Repatriation must be
applied for not later than the end of June of the year immediately
succeeding the year in which the privilege accrues. The investor
may, however, with the permission of the Central Bank of China
(CBC), the nation's foreign exchange controlling agency, postpone
a particular repatriation for one year if funds are needed by his
invested enterprise as working capital, but other than this the
repatriation privilege is non-cumulative.
Under the same Article, profit earned from investment may be
remitted by the foreign investor out of the country yearly with no
limitation of amount. Applications for such remittance must be
submitted to the CBC within six months from the date tax
liabilities of the invested enterprise were determined by the tax
office. Like capital repatriation, the foreign investor may, with the
permission of the CBC, keep the profit as working capital for the
invested enterprise for one year, beyond which his privilege for
that particular remittance will lapse.
One thing must not slip from the foreign investor's notice.
Although one's invested enterprise may enjoy a tax holiday, he
himself remains subject to personal income tax as a non-resident
on the dividend earned from his investment. While an ordinary
non-resident is taxed at the rate of 35 percent on dividends or
other profit distributions received from ROC sources, favorable
treatment is accorded the foreign investor. According to Article 17
of the SEI, the withholding tax rate is 15 percent for those foreign
investors whose investment applications were approved by the
government on or before December 31, 1973, and 20 percent for
those foreign investors who received government approval of their
investment applications on or after January 1, 1974. As for the
latter, the non-resident taxpayer is entitled to claim a refund in
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the event he cannot make use of the entire 20 percent paid as a tax
credit in the country of his domicile. The refundable amount,
nevertheless, is limited to the excess of the 20 percent tax over 15
percent, or the excess over the rate which can be claimed as tax
credit in the country of his domicile, whichever is smaller in
amount.
Statutory protection is given to foreign investment from
government requisition or expropriation. Under Article 14 of the
SIFN, if the total amount of foreign equity investment of an
enterprise is less than 51 percent of its total registered capital, the
enterprise cannot be requisitioned or expropriated except where it
is required by national defense and then only with payment of
reasonable compensation. The government is obligated to make
available the necessary foreign exchange to the foreign investor
at any time desired by him for remitting such compensation out of
the country.
As already mentioned before, as long as the foreign investor's
equity investment in his invested enterprise is maintained at 51
percent or more of its total registered capital, there can be no
requisition or expropriation of the enterprise by the government
on any ground whatsoever. As this is a statutory guarantee, the
government is legally bound to honor its commitment.
Incidentally, the ROC is a signatory to the International
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Legislative
action has been taken by the ROC government for the implementation of the said convention in the ROC. Under a statute passed
by the Legislative Yuan, which is the ROC's national legislative
body, and promulgated by the President on December 21, 1968,
ROC courts are required to grant compulsory execution on any
arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of the
said convention.
Investment Procedures
Any foreign investor desirous of making an investment in the
ROC should file a Foreign Nationals Investment Application
(FNIA) with the ISC, except for the establishment of an export
enterprise in one of the Export Processing Zones, in which case an
application should be filed with the MOEA's Export Processing
Zones Administration. Application forms are obtainable from the
Chinese Investment and Trade Office in New York City (515
Madison Avenue) or any ROC Consulate in the United States.
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One oft-asked question is how long it will take to get an
investment application approved by the screening agency. Under
Article 7 of the SIFN, if an application submitted by the foreign
investor is complete in every respect and accompanied by all
required supporting documents, such as the certificate of legal
personality or certificate of nationality of the applicant, the
certificates of nationality of natural-person co-investors, and
power of attorney for the local lawyer, all duly consularized, the
screening agency must act upon it and make a decision not later
than four months from the date of its filing. In actual fact, if the
foreign investor hires a competent local lawyer who is capable of
writing a legally correct and comprehensive application, it is not
impossible to obtain a decision in less than two months.
The approval of the screening agency, in its net value, is an
approval in principle with six months validity only. In other
words, the government by its approval merely grants the investor
the privilege to apply for establishment of his proposed enterprise
within a six-month period. During the period, the investor must
take necessary steps to cause the approved capital to be remitted
into the country, to organize and register his invested company, to
apply for importation of capital equipment and raw materials,
and to commence the construction of his plant. In the event he
fails to take all these steps within this six month period, the
government may, if it sees fit, revoke its prior approval. Such
being the case, if the investor anticipates that he will be unable to
implement his approved investment plans within six months from
the date of the government approval, and he does not want to
forfeit his privilege of investment either, he should apply to the
original screening agency for an extension of the investment
implementation period well in advance of its expiration. Such
application for extension will normally be granted on good cause
shown. But, unless circumstances are exceptional, no more than
two extensions will be granted in one single case. Thus, all told,
the investor has a total of 18 months at his disposal to implement
his investment plans.
A word on the power of attorney granted to the local lawyer
by the foreign investor. It should be a general power of attorney,
granting him authority and powers to do any and all acts and to
make and submit any and all . applications to all relevant
governmental agencies, whether at the central, provincial or local
level, on behalf of the investor in connection with- his proposed
investment in the ROC. Moreover, it should include a substitution
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clause, as this will give the appointed local attorney the power to
appoint a substitute or substitutes in case of necessity.
V. TRADE

Trade is a much simpler subject than foreign investment.
Notwithstanding her diplomatic reverses in recent years, trade is
being carried on presently by the ROC with over 100 members of
the international community. Among the ROC's major trading
partners, the United States not only maintains diplomatic
relations with her but is also a close ally. The two countries have a
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between themselves, signed in Nanking on November 4, 1946, which contains a
provision permitting citizens of each country to carry on trade
throughout the whole extent of the territory of the other (Art. II).
By contrast, Japan, Canada, West Germany and Hong Kong have
no diplomatic relations with the ROC, but the absence thereof
does not seem to have had any negative effect on the trade
activities between one territorial unit and the other. Indeed, to the
amazement of many, since the ROC's termination of diplomatic
relations with Japan, trade volume between the two countries has
been steadily on the increase. Just to give some idea of their
expanding trade volume, in 1976 the ROC exported US$1,090
million worth of goods to Japan and imported from her US$2,442
million worth, with an unfavorable balance of US$1,352 million.
ROC trade with the United States in the same year fared much
better than with Japan, with sales at US$3,010.7 million and
purchases at US$1,802.3 million, thus leaving a balance of
US$1,208.4 million in the ROC's favor. A fair guess is that as her
economy steadily grows, the ROC will buy more from the United
States in the years ahead.

Modes of Trade Operation
Two principal modes are generally used by Americans or
other foreign nationals for carrying on trade in the ROC. One is
the establishment of a company limited by shares under the
Company Law with some participation of ROC nationals. To form
such a company, which will be on~ of ROC nationality, no Foreign
Nationals Investment Application is required to be filed with the
ISC, for such investment - if it can be called investment at all is not a foreign investment within the definition of the SIFN. The
minimum capital requirement for this type of company varies
with its business, the highest being NT$500,000,000 and the

98

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

lowest NT$500,000. If the capitalization of a company is
NT$20,000,000 or more, the application for incorporation should
be filed with the MOEA. If it is below NT$20,000,000, the
application should be filed with the Bureau of Reconstruction of
the city or county where the principal business office of the
company is located.
At the risk of being repetitious, let it be mentioned here that a
company limited by shares must have at least seven incorporators, three directors, and one supervisor, all of whom must own at
least one share of stock. It must also have a chairman of its board
of directors elected from among the directors. Whereas the SIFN
expressly waives the nationality and residence requirements for
board chairman and the residence requirement for incorporators
and executive directors of foreign investment companies, there are
no such waivers in the case of companies organized by foreign
nationals for trading purposes. At least one half of the incorporators and the supervisor, or one of the supervisors if the company
has more than one supervisor, must be domiciled in the ROC. If
the company has executive directors, at least one half of them
must also have their domiciles in the ROC.
Through the vehicle of nominees, the minimum number of
seven incorporators can be easily met. Until now the government's liberal policy with respect to local participation for
companies engaged in trade remains unchanged. There is no hard
and fast rule concerning a minimum percentage of capital stock
that must be owned by ROC nationals. The government will
license a company if there is more than nominal local capital
participation.
Companies so formed will be ROC companies and, as such,
will be entitled to the same treatment as is accorded to any ROC
companies organized and existing under the Company Law. They
will, however, not be entitled to repatriation of capital, remittance
of profit, and the other privileges and benefits under the SIFN. In
spite of this, some Americans still look with favor upon this form
of organization because it has the distinct advantage of insulating
the parent company from liabilities that might arise out of doing
business in the ROC.
The other method is for a foreign corporation to establish a
branch in the ROC. In such case, it is legally identified as a
branch of a foreign company. Several conditions, enumerated
below, must be fulfilled before the branch can open for business.
1. The foreign corporation must adopt a Chinese corporate
name, normally a literal translation of its English name or name
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in another language, which must not only indicate the type of
business organization but also the nationality of the corporation.
2. The foreign corporation must first apply to the MOEA for
recognition of its foreign corporate personality and obtain a
certificate of recognition. This certificate will entitle the recognized foreign corporation to act within the ROC boundaries.
3. The foreign corporation must remit into the ROC at the
time of establishment of its branch a minimum amount of
NT$500,000 as the branch's operating funds. At no time during its
existence will the branch be permitted to solicit from the public
subscriptions to the stock or float bonds or other securities of the
foreign corporation.
4. The foreign corporation must appoint an ROC national or
resident foreigner as its attorney in fact and legal representative
in the ROC to represent it in litigations and non-litigious matters
and to receive service of legal process on its behalf.
Only when all the above conditions have been fully met will
the foreign corporation be permitted to establish its branch and
commence business operations in the ROC. Within 15 days of the
date of its establishment, the branch must apply to the MOEA for
a corporate license. It may only carry on such businesses in the
ROC as are registered with and specified in the corporate license
granted by the MOEA. The branch may be headed by a foreign
national, subject to the requirement that he maintain a residence
in the ROC.
A branch of a foreign corporation is permitted under Article
19 of the Land Law to purchase and own land in the ROC to the
extent necessary for the carrying out of its business objectives.
This legal provision, however, is governed in its actual operation
by the principle of reciprocity. That is to say, only branches of
foreign corporations whose own States of incorporation permit
ROC nationals to purchase and own land in their own territory
may be granted the same privileges in the ROC.
A foreign corporation having a branch in the ROC has no
privilege to repatriate the operating funds it remitted in at the
time of establishment of its branch. Furthermore, profit earned by
the branch cannot be remitted out of the country. This is,
nevertheless, offset to some degree by an established practice
whereby the tax office, on application, will permit branches of
foreign corporations to remit abroad, on a yearly basis, an
approved amount of foreign exchange to contribute to the
overhead of their head offices.
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Import and Export Control
Import and export in the ROC are under government control.
Within the MOEA there have been established a policy-making
body called the International Trade Commission (lTC) and an
administrative body called the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT),
which has been mentioned previously. These two agencies are
charged with the important responsibilities of trade development
and administration of foreign trade.
Succinctly stated, imports and exports are classified into three
main categories: (i) permissible items, (ii) controlled items and (iii)
prohibited items. Depending upon domestic production and
international market conditions, classification of import and
export merchandise is subject to constant review and adjustment
by the lTC and the BOFT. Basic rules for imports and exports are
provided in the Regulations Governing Classification and Control
of Imports and Exports, last amended and published by the
MOEA on June 14, 1973, which importers and exporters should
familiarize themselves with.
The mere fact that an ROC company or branch of a foreign
corporation has come into being does not mean that it can
automatically engage itself in import or export business, or both.
To be able to do so, it must qualify for and register itself as a
Trader and obtain a Trader license from the BOFT. Necessary
qualifications for registration of a Trader include the following: (i)
having an export performance record of at least US$200,000 for
the year immediately preceding the filing of the application
(certain foreign exchange earned by exporters is assignable which
the applicant for a Trader license can buy at the prevailing
market rate); (ii) having a registered paid-up capital of not less
than NT$2,000,000; and (iii) having a permanent busines~ office
of its own. If the paid-up capital of the company is over
NT$100,000,000, the requirement for export performance record
may be waived by special approval of the BOFT.
In principle, imports of Traders are limited to permissible
items. When they import, licenses must first be obtained from the
BOFT. Controlled items may, nevertheless, be imported by
Traders when specially authorized by the BOFT.
Traders may export permissible items by applying directly to
any of the several government appointed foreign exchange banks.
For controlled items, however, prior approval must be obtained
from the BOFT. It should be noted here that export of permissible
items to countries which enforce import quotas · is subject to
special regulation by the BOFT.
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VI. REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

If a foreign corporation does not intend to make investment or
actually engage in trade in the ROC, but only wishes to do certain
acts there, such as monitoring trade opportunities, supervising
execution of its purchase orders by local manufacturers, advertising its products in local newspapers or through other mass media,
or giving technical advice or assistance to local purchasers of its
equipment or materials, a most economical and convenient way of
achieving these objectives is to send a Representative to the ROC.
This is permitted by Article 386 of the Company Law. The foreign
corporation may also authorize its Representative to bring suits
and receive service of legal process in the ROC on its behalf.
A Representative of a foreign corporation is permitted to
maintain an office with a limited staff to assist him in the
performance of his duties, but he must not carry on business
transactions. Business transactions, if any, must be conducted
directly between his principal, the foreign corporation which
sends him, and the local purchaser. His position is thus very much
like that of a business correspondent. Furthermore, he must not
receive payments from his principal's local customers. All
expenses of his office, including salaries for himself and members
of his staff and other necessary expenditures, must be remitted in
by his principal from abroad, and he is required to report such
remittances to the Bureau of Foreign Exchange of the CBC on a
monthly basis for record purposes.
As to tax liabilities, the principal of the Representative is free
of any ROC taxes as long as transactions are concluded, contracts
signed, and payments made outside the ROC. Every care should
therefore be taken by the Representative to see that he does
nothing that could possibly be interpreted by the local tax office
as constituting doing business in the ROC. The Representative
himself and members of his staff are subject to personal income
tax as any other residents of the ROC.
The sending of a Representative to the ROC requires an
application to be filed with the MOEA, giving the name of the
foreign corporation which sends the Representative, the name,
nationality and other personal data of the Representative, and the
juristic acts and/ or the scope of activities he is authorized by his
principal to do in the ROC. The application must be accompanied
by certain supporting documents, such as the certificate of legal
personality of the applicant, a certified transcript of the board
resolution authorizing the sending of the Representative, the
power of attorney granted to the Representative, and so on. Mter
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a written approval is received from the MOEA, the Representative
can officially function and legally do all the authorized acts in the
ROC.
A Representative of a foreign corporation need not be a
foreign national. If a foreign corporation so wishes, it may
appoint. a local person as its Representative. American corporations, however, normally prefer to send Americans as their
Representatives because of faster entry and exit processing by
using the American passport.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

How well a local lawyer can help his American clients
structure their investment and trade operations in the ROC
depends to a considerable. extent upon certain qualities of the
lawyer. A prerequisite for him is, of course, an adequate
knowledge of the English language, both written and spoken.
While interpreters can always provide a bridge, direct communication between the lawyer and the client is considered essential, not
only because of the lawyer-and-client privity but also because of
the absolute need of meeting of minds in terms of the client's
objectives. Unless the lawyer understands fully and clearly what
the client wants to do in the ROC, there is no assurance that he
can structure the latter's operations satisfactorily. Since much of
the communication will be through the telex machine and by
letters, written English is even more important than spoken
English. The lawyer must have at his command a sufficient
vocabulary of both legal and business terms. An additional
arsenal of accounting terms is desirable and useful, but not
necessary.
It is absolutely essential that the lawyer be thoroughly
familiar with the laws and regulations of the ROC applicable to
investment and trade, particularly foreign investment. His legal
expertise will be put to an acid test when he is initially called upon
to prepare a FNIA. A knowledgeable lawyer, after having
ascertained the client's objectives, will usually be able to work out
an investment plan tailored to the client's needs and then write a
flawless application that will ensure its early approval by the ISC.
On the other hand, if the legal knowledge of the lawyer in such
field is inadequate, chances are that he may miss something in
the application, thus either delaying its approval due to the
necessity of amendment or causing the loss to the client of a
certain benefit or benefits. With regard to the latter, a good case in
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point is where the scenario of the client's investment in fact meets
the requirements for a five-year deferred payment of import duties
on capital equipment, but this benefit is denied to him because of
the failure of the lawyer to apply therefor. For a major investment
project, this could mean a very large sum of money in terms of
loss of interest.
Equally important is the lawyer's experience. In an investment case, the lawyer's professional duties do not end with the
submission of the FNIA; unless his arrangement with the client
dictates otherwise, he must go on to take care of many other
important legal matters including organization of the company,
importation of equipment and raw materials, and the obtaining of
a factory license for the plant. Even after the plant has been in
operation, matters requiring the attention of the lawyer continue
to spring up. Although by local practice paper work for the
application for tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed
assets is within the realm of the CPA's duties, the lawyer's advice
may be needed hy the client on legal issues pertaining thereto. It
is possible that the client may desire to add some new products to
the production lines of his plant, thus requiring the lawyer's
assistance in preparing and submitting an additional FNIA to the
ISC. Also, investment equity may have to be increased as a result
of expansion of manufacturing facilities, necessitating approval
by the ISC and consequent recapitalization. These are but a few
examples demonstrating the wide spectrum of work the lawyer
may be.called upon to perform. They are, nonetheless, sufficient to
bring home to the investor the point that an experienced local
lawyer who knows the entire spectrum of the investment process
is indeed essential for the successful completion of his investment.
Some background of the investor's business at home will help
the lawyer in the performance of his duties, particularly in the
initial stage of his employment when investment plans are being
worked out by him with data supplied by the investor. As foreign
investment in the ROC is, in general, gradually shifting from
labor-intensive to technology-oriented products, it is quite likely
that in a particular case the local lawyer may know nothing or
very little about the investor's business or the products he is going
to manufacture in the ROC. If this is the case, it will be desirable
for the investor to brief the lawyer along these lines so that the
latter will acquire a clear notion of the client's business as well as
his investment objectives. The importance of this cannot be
overemphasized as the categorization of the investor's products
will ultimately affect their eligibility for tax holiday or accelerated
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depreciation of fixed assets, which is a major incentive to most
investors.
In the actual selection of business form, the lawyer's
recommendation will naturally be by and large dictated by the
client's objectives. Past record indicates unequivocally that an
option favored by the overwhelming majority of Americans
seeking business opportunities in the ROC has been foreign
investment. This is understandable in view of the many
substantial privileges and benefits conferred by the SEI, the
SIFN, and the other applicable laws and egulations. With this
end in view, if the client is prepared to set up some sort of
manufacturing facilities in the ROC through equity investment,
the local lawyer should to the extent possible invoke every legal
support to structure his venture as a foreign investment, so as to
help him maximize his values .
. From the standpoint of the host government, large equity
investment is perhaps the most welcome, and the reason for this is
not far to seek. In his own interest, however, the foreign investor
may want to structure his investment with a small equity and a
large loan. Loans may be obtained from either domestic or foreign
sources, but one aspect deserving special attention is that the
ROC government permits foreign investors to make investment in
the form of loan to their invested enterprises. This makes it
possible for the foreign investor to substitute loan for cash equity
with accompanying benefits of interest payment and shorter
repatriation period.
A technical and management service agreement between the
foreign investor and his invested enterprise providing payment by
the latter to the former of a lump-sum fee is another subtle form of
accelerated repatriation of capital worthy of exploration. In recent
years the host government has adopted a more stringent policy as
regards such agreements. It is, nevertheless, one area which the
local lawyer should look into in the course of planning investment
strategy for the client.
Trade is a lesser and much simpler approach. The establishment of a company or branch of a foreign ·corporation under the
ROC Company Law does not involve much legal complexity
insofar as the application process is concerned. Furthermore, the
Trader license is also not difficult to obtain provided the
prescription of the required US$200,000 export performance record
is duly complied with. Subject to the existing applicable regulations, foreign Traders can import and export commodities as
business exigencies call for. It is not uncommon for them to enter
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into long-term output/supply contracts with local manufacturers
in order to guard against disruption of supplies. Lack of privilege
of outbound remittance of profit is a bit annoying. But most
foreign Traders do not seem to be overly bothered by this, as they
can either use their profit for paying such expenditures as air
tickets and hotel bills of visitors, expansion or decoration of
business offices and the like, or deposit the same in a bank
savings account.
Sending Representatives to the ROC was once a popular
approach among foreign corporations because of its distinct merit
of tax immunity. Due to abuses by some foreign corporations, the
host government has lately tightened supervision over such
establishments. American corporations which have sent or intend
to send Representatives to the ROC will do themselves a great
service by requiring the latter to strictly refrain from any kind of
business activity while in the host country. As stated previously,
business transactions, if any, must be conducted directly between
the local customer and the Representative's principal.

Professor Oldman thanked Dr. Li for his detailed and
complete presentation, and introduced the session's third principal speaker, Mr. Myron Solter. Mr. Solter, an attorney in
Washington, D.C., spoke on the legal resolution of export trade
disputes, a topic that has taken on great significance following
the passage of the Trade Act of 1974 and the strengthened role of
the U.S. International Trade Commission.
[The following is the text of Mr. Salter's paper.]
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LEGAL RESOLUTION OF EXPORT TRADE
DISPUTES WITH THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
MYRON SOLTER*

I. INTRODUCTION

When an underdeveloped country blessed with an intelligent
and energetic population and favored with a skillful and dedicated
government adopts a course of economic development, its export
growth inevitably collides with the business and labor groups
producing competing products in the receiving countries.
For the Republic of China, the initial collisions between
exports from Taiwan and domestic industry began about fifteen
years ago, with plywood and mushrooms, and have intensified
since. Presently under attack in the United States are such
important products as footwear, TV receivers, textiles, solid-state
watches, and a number of lesser articles. With continued
expansion of exports to the United States from the Republic of
China, future collisions may be expected, both as renewals of
attacks against present export products, and as new products are
developed and become significant factors in the United States
market.
The scope of this paper is therefore directed to the legal
mechanisms in the United States by which these economic
conflicts are resolved.
II. SOURCES OF APPLICABLE LAW

A. International Sources

1. US-ROC Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation
(FCN)
It is this bilateral treaty which serves as the framework for
U.S. trade relations with the ROC. It provides, inter alia, for mostfavored-nation treatment in matters affecting imports.

2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The Republic of China is not a member of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and therefore does not
benefit directly from the rights and privileges enjoyed by GATT
signatories.
*Partner, Bregman, Abell, Solter & Kay, Washington, D. C.
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However, to the extent that the United States must resolve its
trade conflicts with GAIT members within the framework of that
body, in multination trade disputes involving both the Republic of
China and one or more GAIT members, the Republic of China
receives indirectly the benefit of United States-GAIT resolutions
by virtue of most-favored-nation treatment under the FCN treaty.
Not all GATI benefits pass to the Republic of China in this way;
e.g., it is doubtful whether, after restriction of its exports to the
United States, the Republic of China would be entitled to
compensation or retaliation vis-a-vis the United States under the
GATT rules. Similarly, in a trade dispute involving the United
States and the Republic of China alone, the United States is not
obliged to apply the GATI rules, but only the less comprehensive
articles of the FCN treaty.

3. Special International Agreements
Special international agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, are a not infrequent device for resolving trade disputes. The
most significant such agreement presently in force is the
Multifiber Textile Trade Agreement, under which the United
States has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with
exporting countries, including the Republic of China, limiting the
quantity of textiles which may be exported to the United States.

4.

Voluntary Restraint Assurances

A useful device sometimes used to resolve trade disputes on an
informal basis is the giving of "assurances" by the government of
an exporting country to the United States, usually in the form of a
memorandum of understanding, that it will restrain its exports for
a period of time to a stipulated level. While it-is doubtful that such
assurances constitute law in the sense of treaties or executive
agreements, the device can enable more flexible solutions than
can be achieved under the formal legal means. An example of its
use with the ROC was to restrain the level of canned mushroom
exports to the United States in 1968 and again in 1976.

B. Domestic Sources

1. Legislation
With Congress reposes the principal constitutional authority
to regulate foreign trade. Congress can, and from time to time
does, pass legislation increasing import duties in response to
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domestic industry pleas. One example of a significant such bill
currently under consideration, which would adversely affect
exports from Taiwan to the United States, is H. R. 14600 (94th
Congress) to impose very large duty increases on solid state
watches and parts thereof.

2. Antidumping
The Antidumping Act of 1921, and the regulations issued
thereunder, require that when it is determined that imports have
been sold at "less than fair value," and that the articles· thus
imported have caused injury to the domestic industry, an
additional duty equal to the dumping margin will be assessed.
Procedurally, the Treasury Department conducts an investigation
during six months from the date of its Antidumping Proceeding
Notice, which initiates the matter, to determine the existence of
sales at less than fair value. If Treasury finds the existence of
such sales, it forwards the matter to the International Trade
Commission (lTC), which conducts a three month investigation to
determine whether the dumped imports have caused injury to the
domestic industry. If the lTC so finds, it returns the matter to the
Secretary of the Treasury, who thereupon issues a dumping order.
The existence of an antidumping order can seriously inhibit
the growth of exports. For example, an order applying to clear
sheet glass from Taiwan issued in 1971. Despite the best efforts of
the manufacturer to remove all possibility of dumping margins,
by revising its home market and export pricing, uncertainties
concerning United States Customs administration under the order
have discouraged would be importers, and exports of clear sheet
glass from Taiwan have been seriously impaired.
An antidumping proceeding notice against PVC sheet and
film from Taiwan was issued on April 1, 1977. The Antidumping
Act thus remains a serious threat to export expansion from the
Republic of China.

3. Countervailing Duty
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that when the
government of an exporting country bestows a "grant or bounty"
upon exports to the United States, an additional duty equal to the
amount of the subsidy will be imposed.
The Republic of China, similarly to many other developing
countries, offers a number of governmental incentives to encourage new investment in productive enterprises. If such encourage-
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ment measures are to be deemed to constitute subsidization of
exports to the United States, the resulting countervailing duty
burden could become a major barrier to the Republic of China's
export growth.
Presently or recently before the Treasury Department, which
administers the countervailing duty statute, are three cases on
articles from Taiwan: non-rubber footwear, bicycles, and handbags. All are based on claims by the domestic petitioners that the
Republic of China's investment encouragement measures constitute countervailable export subsidization. While final determination has not been issued as yet in bicycles and handbags, it
appears from tentative determinations in these cases that
Treasury will probably finally determine the following incentives
not to constitute countervailable grants or bounties:
(a) Reduction in foreign exchange commissions charged by
banks in converting currency.
(b) Reduction in import license fees charged by banks for the
obtaining of an import license.
(c)

Exemption from the business tax (a gross receipts tax) on
export sales.

(d) Reduction in the stamp tax on export documents.
(e)

Suspension of interest charged by banks on bills of
exchange and letters of credit.

(f)

Resumption of duty remissions on imported raw materials and component parts which reflects internationally
accepted principles of "drawback" on such items.

(g) Suspension of harbor dues on exported items.
(h) Suspension of airport safety dues.
(i)

Increase in processing loss ratios for purposes of duty
drawback.

Treasury will probably find that the following incentives do
constitute grants or bounties:
(a) Loans at preferential rates of interest for the purchase of
equipment by manufacturers and short-term export
financing.
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(b)

Exemption from income taxes, deed taxes and customs
duties on imported capital items for firms located in
Export Processing Zones.

(c)

Income tax holidays for newly established firms granted
under the Statute for Encouragement of Investment.

However, it appears likely that as applied to exports of bicycles
and handbags, the impact of these measures on stimulating
exports to the United States has been de minimis, and that
countervailing duties will therefore not be assessed.

4. Escape Clause
The most significant legal mechanism by which domestic
industries can seek protection from import competition is the
"escape clause" found in sections 201-203 of the Trade Act of
1974. Under this authority, upon petition by an interested group, a
request by the President, or upon its own motion, the lTC
conducts a six month investigation to determine with respect to
the imported article whether:
(a)

Imports are increasing;

(b) The domestic industry producing like or directly competitive articles is being seriously injured, or is threatened
with serious injury; and
(c)

The increased imports are a substantial cause of the
serious injury.

If the lTC so finds, it reports its findings to the President together
with its recommendation of the quantum of import restriction
necessary to remedy the injury, and its opinion on whether
adjustment assistance would provide a remedy.
Within 60 days after receipt of the ITC's report and
recommendations, the President must determine whether and to
what extent he will grant import relief and/or adjustment
assistance. The President is not bound to follow the recommendation of the lTC, but, being guided by the total interest, may
provide (1) a duty increase, (2) a tariff rate quota, (3) an absolute
quota, (4) negotiate orderly marketing agreements, (5) take any
combination of these actions, or (6) take no restrictive action. If
his action differs from the ITC's recommendation, the Congress
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may within 90 days override the President's determination by a
concurrent resolution of both houses.
Since first implemented in domestic law as section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, the escape clause has
been the device most used by domestic industries to attack import
competition. It is more flexible than the other statutory remedies,
since the President may tailor the final result to policy and
international considerations with which the more narrow determinations of the lTC are not concerned.
Plywood and canned mushrooms were the first Republic of
China products to be attacked via the escape clause in the early
1960s. Since then the escape clause investigations have been
directed to canned asparagus, sheet glass, footwear (twice), TV
receivers (twice), canned mushrooms (twice), marble products,
sugar, and presently cast iron cookware and stoves, all of which
are important elements in the Republic of China's exports to the
United States.

5. Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, upon petition, the
ITC conducts an adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether
there exists in connection with the importation of an article
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts . . . the effect or
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an
industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States."
If the lTC finds a violation, it may bar the offending article from
entry or may issue cease and desist orders. The President can
revoke the ITC's orders for public policy reasons.
When this statute was first enacted in 1922, it was hailed as
the foreign trade counterpart of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. However, in the past, this mechanism has been applied
virtually exclusively to articles claimed to infringe the United
States letters patent.
An example of its application to Republic of China exports
was the recent exclusion of reclosable plastic bags for patent
infringement. It does not represent a serious threat to the Republic
of China's export expansion as long as it is applied only to cases
of patent infringement. However, there is now pending before the
ITC a section 337 case against TV receivers imported from Japan,
which is based solely on allegations of unfair practices. If the ITC
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should find affirmatively for the petitioners in this case, it would
represent a very considerable extension of the jurisdiction of the
United States antitrust laws beyond the scope hitherto allowed
them.
III. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

The hypothesis stated at the outset of this paper makes it
highly probable that trade disputes between export industries in
the Republic of China and the comp.eting industries in the United
States will expand as the Republic of China's exports grow. There
is no doubt that increasingly recourse will be had by domestic
interests to the protective mechanisms outlined above. However,
the aggregate outcome of these disputes, in addition to the case-tocase merits, will be determined very substantially by two extralegal factors: United States foreign trade policy and the Republic
of China governmental policy toward such disputes.

A. United States Foreign Trade Policy
As of this time, only one major trade case has been decided by
the Carter Administration, but its implications give a fair
appreciation of the policy direction in which the Carter Administration may move. This is the non-rubber footwear escape clause
case. Involving some $2 billion in trade annually, it is economically important. Due to the geographic dispersal of footwear
factories in the United States and the long protection-seeking
effort of the industry, it is politically important. The lTC had
recommended a tariff-rate quota which would have had a very
depressing effect on footwear imports. President Carter chose,
however, to take the least restrictive action, that of announcing
that he would seek orderly marketing agreements with the
Republic of China, which by the way is the largest import
supplier, and Korea. The policy thus indicated is one of reluctance
to impose unilateral trade restraints, and to seek instead solutions
based on negotiation.

B. Policy of the Government of the
Republic of China
Some industries in Taiwan such as the mushroom packers,
have through long experience become knowledgeable and capable
in coping with trade disputes. Other industries, either small, or
facing such problems for the first time, are not sophisticated in
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this sense and have not always taken timely and vigorous
defensive steps. However, the Board of Foreign Trade, which is an
agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, under the guidance of
DirectorY. T. Wong and Deputy Director H. K. Shao, has long
been sensitive to the need for the affected industries actively to
defend these actions in the United States at the administrative
level, rather than relying solely on government-to-government
efforts. The BOFT is actively encouraging and guiding Taiwan's
export industries. The continuation of this policy will undoubtedly
favorably affect the future.

Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Solter for his presentation and
then invited the discussants to contribute their comments. The
first discussant was Edward Laing, Associate Professor of
International Law and International Transactions at the University of Maryland School of Law.
[The following is the summary of Professor Laing's statement.]

COMMENTS
EDWARD LAING

Taiwan is doing some very interesting things with other
developing countries. Taiwan has offered technical assistance and
has had exchanges and visits with other developing countries.
These kinds of contacts with the rest of the developing world, who
have seats in the UN, may help Taiwan in the future.
My reading and discussions with Dr. Li lead me to conclude
that a lot of the success of Taiwan has to do with a very stable
and interesting legal order. One thing that interests me is that
Taiwan seems to steer a middle course between the overtechnicalization of the legal practice of the U.S. and a somewhat
oversimplified legal practice of the PRC. The legal regime in the
ROC has contributed rather significantly to the ROC success.
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One of my areas of interest as a teacher is the protectionist
forces in the United States, at which I am now quite bothered.
They are doing things against the interests of the developing
countries. Protectionist trends in the lTC and elsewhere in the
U.S. are apparently likely to continue, and unfortunately these
trends are backed up by some ambiguous legislation, e.g., the
Trade Act of 1974.
The Trade Act has loopholes that can be used by protectionist
forces in the U.S., but I hope they will not continue to be used to
the disadvantage of the developing countries. For example, the
lTC "clear glass" case in 1971, an anti-dumping case concerning
Taiwan, was based on statistics relating to Japan. This was one
of the more extreme actions of the lTC in this area. I hope that the
ROC's success in trade in the last few years will not lead
protectionist forces to hurt Taiwan.
Finally, I hope that international organizations will realize
the inadvisability of Taiwan's non-participation in them. It would
only be to the benefit of the entire trading world if Taiwan were to
participate in these international organizations.

Professor Oldman thanked Professor Laing for his comments
and turned the floor over toR. Daniel Webster, Legal Advisor to
Chairman Daniel Minchew of the U.S. International Trade
Commission.
[The following is a summary of Mr. Webster's comments,
together with additional remarks submitted for publication after
the conference.]

COMMENTS
R.

DAN WEBSTER

I would like to talk briefly about two recent decisions made by
the lTC that may have significant impact on Taiwan.
The first is the footwear case. In this case the lTC found that
footwear was being imported into the United States in such
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increased quantities that it was a substantial cause of injury to a
domestic industry. The ITC recommended that a tariff rate quota
system be imposed over a five-year period. The quota level would
be established at 265,000,000 pairs per year with all shoes
imported above that level to be assessed a tariff of 40 percent
annually, then reduced to its original levels at the end of that
period. The quota level for the ROC was 88,000,000 pairs. This is
to be contrasted with imports of 110,000,000 pairs in 1975. The
President exercised his authority to provide other relief under the
Trade Act of 1974, and notified the Congress that he was
attempting to negotiate orderly marketing agreements. N egotiations are now underway.
In the television case, the Commission found that color TV's
were being imported from Japan into the U.S. in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the U.S.
color TV industry. An increase in tariffs on color TV's was
recommended to the President. While the President has not
formally announced his decision, indications are that he will
attempt the same orderly marketing agreements as in the
footwear case.
The ROC is the second leading supplier of U.S. imports of
television receivers. I would suspect that the President will
attempt to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with the ROC,
as he is presently doing with Japan.
There are certain advantages to orderly marketing agreements which the President opted for in the footwear case and
which the Commission does not have in its authority to
recommend. The orderly marketing agreement process allows the
President to negotiate with the supplying country a level of
imports and possibly by doing so arrive at an agreement which
has less disruptive effects on both parties. There is the additional
benefit to the U.S. in that it is not required to give compensation
under the general agreement on tariffs and trade.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Considerable discussion has taken place as to whether the
U.S. International Trade Commission is properly fulfilling its role
in administering sections of the Trade Act of 1974 and previous
legislation amended by that Act. Most of the controversy centers
on the administration of section 201 of the Trade Act, which
provides the mechanism for relief to domestic industries seriously
injured or threatened with serious injury by increasing imports.
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This provision, known as the import relief section or "escape
clause," spells out the criteria the Commission must use to
determine eligibility for relief, and then to provide relief to remedy
the injury.
The most common criticism - that the Commission is
recommending relief which will be damaging to consumers or
cause serious international political repercussions - shows that
we at the U.S. International Trade Commission have not done an
effective job in educating the public and, in some cases, the bar, as
to our role in the overall trade policy network.
First of all, we are an independent agency,. not a part of the
executive branch. Our funds are not reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget, and, as far as I know, we are the only
agency in the U.S. Government of which this is the case. The
reason is simple. The Congress, in attempting to exercise its
constitutional authority, under Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, to regulate international trade, decided to create an
agency which was totally independent from the executive branch
so that decisions could be made based on economics, rather than
politics.
The criteria for eligibility for relief from imports were relaxed
with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974. Under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, the Commission had not in a single case
been able to find a domestic industry eligible for import relief. It
was a conscious effort on the part of Congress, not the
Commission, to relax these criteria.
As for the criticism that the Commission has not considered
costs to the consumer in its recommendations, or that we have not
adequately considered the international implications of our
"protectionist" policies, let me just say that I am pleased we have
not. If we had done so, we would have been stepping well outside
our authority and usurping the role of the President as outlined in
the Trade Act. The Act provides that the President, after receiving
our advice on the economic impact of imports on the domestic
industry and our recommendation of relief which would remedy
this adverse economic impact, will weigh this impact against such
factors as consumer costs and international political ramifications and then make his decision. We do not take it personally
when the President does not implement one of our remedy
recommendations; if the law allowed us to consider other factors
we may have reached the same conclusions.
Despite the outcry against the U.S. "protectionist" policies,
there has been only one case since the Trade Act became law in
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which the United States has placed unilateral restrictions on
imported goods - that being the case involving specialty steels.
We at the USITC are comfortable in providing our advice to
the President based on only the effect of imports on the domestic
industry. By providing good economic advice in this one area, we
avoid having to deal with political pressures that the Executive
and Congress encounter daily, and we are able to give the
President sound advice on one of the important factors he must
consider.

Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Webster for his statement, and
then introduced Preston M. Torbert, an American attorney
practicing in Taipei with the law firm of Yahng & Roles.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Torbert's comments.]

COMMENTS
PRESTON

M.

TORBERT

The question which I believe people may be asking themselves
is what am I doing in Taiwan. There are two functions which the
U.S. lawyer fulfills in Taiwan. First, he advises on U.S. law,
particularly advising U.S. clients engaging in transactions in
Taiwan, either directly operating from the U.S. or through
subsidiaries or joint ventures in Taiwan. The second function is as
a liaison between Chinese attorneys and American clients.
The legal system of the Republic of China provides many
contrasts and surprises for an American attorney. Perhaps one of
the greatest contrasts is the importance of administrative law in
the daily operation of the legal system. This will come as no
surprise to attorneys from Washington, D.C., but for most
American attorneys administrative law is a very minor part of
their total practice. Mr. Chun Li's comments on investment,
import and export procedures indicate well the extent of the
government bureaucracy's role in managing trade and investment.
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The administrative character of law practice is due in large
part to the great authority exercised by the Executive Yuan, the
executive branch of government. Statutes in the ROC are often
broadly drafted grants of authority from the legislative to the
executive branch to handle certain matters. The executive branch
then drafts more detailed regulations and interprets them in the
best interests of the country as it perceives them. One example of
the executive branch's power to interpret is in the Regulations on
Visas for Foreign Passport Holders which state that a foreigner
should present "evidence of his purpose in coming to the ROC."
Since mid-1976 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fundamentally
altered practice under these Regulations by interpreting this
language to mean that all foreigners going to Taiwan to work
must comply with other regulations which only refer to technicians. Accordingly, foreigners who are not techncians have found
it impossible to get a visa through normal channels. Examples of
harsh administrative interpretations are common in all areas, but
particularly taxation. Of course, the immigration and tax areas
are in large part administrative in the United States, too. The
ROC legal system, however, appears to allow substantially more
administrative discretion to its executive branch sub-departments
than the American system. One result of this preeminent
authority of the executive branch is a comparatively large degree
of administrative supervision of the economy. Indeed, two surveys
on U.S. corporate investment in Taiwan have mentioned excessive
government "red tape" as the major complaint of the investors.
Of course, government involvement in the economy also has
its positive side. Among these are the statutory incentives for
investment· mentioned by Mr. Chun Li. In addition to these,
negotiated business assurances have also been an extremely
important factor in attracting investments. These assurances by
the ROC government to the investor have entailed such practices
as promises to purchase a plant's entire output at a fixed price, a
guarantee of raw materials supplies at a set price or the exclusion
of competing foreign products from the Taiwan market. The ROC
government has also played a positive role in trying to prevent
unnecessary conflicts between Taiwan and American manufacturers by promoting education about foreign markets. After the
recent misunderstanding concerning reclosable plastic bags made
in Taiwan and exported to the U.S. which allegedly infringed an
American patent, the government took steps to help inform
Taiwan manufacturers about U.S. patent law to prevent future
incidents of this kind.
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An interesting aspect of Taiwan's exports to the U.S. and
resulting trade disputes involves the nature of the parties. Mr.
Myron Solter mentioned disputes relating to television receivers
and solid-state watches made in Taiwan and exported to the U.S.
It is interesting to note that a large percentage of these products
made in Taiwan are made by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
The disputes, therefore, are often not simple conflicts of interest
between Taiwan and the United States, but disputes between
American companies producing in Taiwan and American companies producing in the U.S.
Finally, in regard to the papers relating to the future of ROCUS economic relations, a change in U.S. policy toward recognition
of the People's Republic of China would not necessarily cause any
significant legal problems under ROC law. The ROC Constitution
(Article 141) requires the ROC's foreign relations to be conducted
on the basis of "equality and reciprocity." Recently the Premier
and the Foreign Minister have made public statements indicating
that they believe that the ROC's foreign relations include its
relations with countries which do not have formal diplomatic
relations with it. _This constitutional standard of equality and
reciprocity, therefore, should apply generally to ROC-US relations
after a possible break in formal diplomatic relations. As long as
the U.S. continued to conduct economic relations with Taiwan on
a non-discriminatory basis, there is no reason to believe that the
ROC would discriminate against American business. The practice
of ROC-Japanese relations indicates that economic ties can
continue without major difficulties after the rupture of formal
diplomatic ties.

Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Torbert for his comments,
then adjourned the session for 20 minutes. Following this
intermission, Professor Oldman opened the session for questions
and comments from the floor.

DISCUSSION
PRoF. OLDMAN TO MR. SOLTER: The Chinese find it useful and
sometimes necessary to defend their actions relating to the United
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States in American administrative agencies. Do Americans who
have disputes with Taiwan have the same ability to appear before
Taiwanese agencies?
MR. SoLTER: A lot of decisions in Taiwan are made by
administrative agencies. A foreign investor can appeal his
decision from a lower administrative agency to a higher one. For
example, if a request or application of a foreign investor is turned
down by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the decision can be
appealed to the Executive Yuan. This is an appeal from the
ministerial level to the cabinet level. In some cases one can make
an appeal from the cabinet level to an administrative court.
PROF. OLDMAN: Is adjustment asSistance one of the forms of
relief asked for by U.S. groups adversely affected by imports?
MR. SoLTER: It is generally believed that adjustment assistance doesn't provide a workable solution to imports. The passage
of the Trade Act in early 1975 has not altered this belief.
MR. WEBSTER: Adjustment assistance is inadequate as now
funded.
MR. SoLTER: You may be interested to know. that President
Carter has announced that there will be legislation within 90 days
to amend adjustment assistance.
PROF. LAING: There is a low limit on adjustment assistance
loans that can be made available to firms. One million dollars is
the limit on direct loans and three million is the limit on
guarantees. I think adjustment assistance can be a good
alternative to harsh tariffs.
MR. WEBSTER: Adjustment assistance to workers is different
from adjustment assistance to firms. It is unlimited and goes
through labor unions.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: In the ROC are there
regulations for foreign technology to be transferred to the local
people so that the developing state can become independent?
DR. LI: The ROC wants advanced technology, and it
encourages the transfer of technology in the form of certain tax
benefits. If a foreign investor has advanced technology, it is
entitled to the free import of capital equipment. If this is not met,
it can apply for five years of tax deferral. Also, a person will
receive a royalty for importing management know-how.
PROF. OLDMAN: There are great tax benefits in the ROC.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: Why is the ROC not a
member of GA1T?
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MR. L. CHAo: Although the ROC was a member of GATr, I
could not recall when the ROC terminated her membership.* Mr.
Solter commented, however, that the ROC gets the advantages of
most favored nation status even though it is not a member of
GA'IT.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: How serious are the U.S.
complaints about Taiwan tariffs on imported products?
ANswER: The complaint particularly applies to consumer and
electronic machinery, An American businessman in Taiwan who
made the complaint said that the import duty makes it impossible
for him to import to Taiwan. There is no final outcome as yet, but
the U.S. has suggested to the ROC that the complaint perhaps has
merit as to certain products.

Professor Oldman closed the second session by commenting
on the great complexity ofthe issues involved in the interaction of
the ROC's political and economic position in the world. He
thanked the speakers for the clarity they brought to these issues
and adjourned the session.
Reported by Stewart Diana and David Simon

The second session was followed by a reception sponsored by
the University of Maryland International Law Society, after
which the conference participants enjoyed a banquet dinner.
Following the dinner, Jane Brandt, Editor-in-Chief of the
University of Maryland Law School's International Trade Law
Journal, introduced the dinner speaker, Mr. William Morell, who
had recently left his position as Assistant Secretary, Department
of Treasury, to join the US-ROC Economic Council.
[The following is the text of Mr. Morell's speech.]

* See the discussion in Session III at

p. 204 infra.
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PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
WITH TAIWAN
WILLIAM MORELL*

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a real privilege for me to speak
with this distinguished group this evening and it is also a great
personal pleasure since there are a number of friends here in the
audience I have known for some time. It was only six weeks ago
that I left government; and this evening I find myself on new turf.
I am reminded of a session not long ago with Bill Simon when one
of our group in Treasury who was about to leave government,
remarked that he was returning to the "real world." Simon having
spent some four years in Washington, with all of the usual
frustrations, responded a little ironically by saying: You know the
great tragedy is that some people think THIS is the real world.
In the Republic of China clearly this distinction between
government and private business is more blurred than in the
United States. Few would question, however, that the ROC blend
of government and private business has had an extremely
salutary effect on its international commerce. The government
has taken a strong lead in this area and not only has been
courageous in setting its economic goals but also has been very
practical in helping to ensure that they are carried out. I was once
told by a senior ROC official that during a meeting with a number
of Cabinet officials there was a discussion of books for recommended reading. I asked which ones were at the top of the list.
Two, he said, led all the rest. One was Peter Drucker's Effective
Executive; and the other was Jonathan Livingston Seagull. This
blend of the practical and, in a sense, the inspirational, in part,
characterizes Taiwan's approach to the development of its
economy. The results, needless to say, have been impressive.
As you all know, Taiwan's economy has the great advantage
of operating in a basically stable political environment with an
essentially market-oriented, mixed economy. This, together with
pragmatic economic policies, has enabled Taiwan to achieve one
of the soundest international financial positions and one of the
most enviable performances in foreign trade in the world. It also
has an excellent record of price stability, employment, distribution
of income and economic development, and as most of you are
aware, few countries have done more to stimulate the expansion of
* Managing Director of United States-Republic of China Economic Council;
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Treasury.
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the external sector and to provide incentives for foreign capital in
the development of the economy.
How the economy progresses in the future and how our
economic ties develop in the coming years will depend to a great
extent on those laws, regulations and procedures - in both the
ROC and the U.S.- that are so essential to the maintenance of a
reasonably predictable and very attractive commercial environment. I personally am confident that these sessions we are all
involved in here can usefully contribute to this objective.
·
I need not remind this group that in addition to understanding the law and learning to work within it, there is also an
obligation to contribute to its formulation. My four and a half
years on Taiwan convince me that the ROC is almost unique
among nations in affording international organizations, foreign
governments and foreign businessmen an opportunity to critique
its laws and regulations governing international business and
banking activities. The ROC is no less proud and protective of its
sovereignty than other nations, but it clearly is less defensive and
more constructive than most in eliciting assistance which might
improve the effectiveness of its economic guidelines and commercial law.
In my opinion, we in the U.S. should take greater advantage
of this opportunity. During my stay in Taipei we in the Embassy
worked closely with the Taipei-American Chamber of Commerce,
for example, in recommending changes in the ROC Statute for
Encouragement of Investment. While we lost many battles, a
number of our suggestions were accepted, at least in some form,
though our proposals often were not as carefully prepared as they
might have been. Unfortunately, time did not permit adequate
consultation by American business representatives on Taiwan
with corporate legal experts in company headquarters.
In the future, American business must be more alert to
opportunities to influence legislation of this kind. In many cases,
of course, we can make our own opportunities by taking the
initiative in proposing changes; but certainly when the Chinese
afford us the chance to comment on existing laws and procedures
we should try to ensure that we have the lead time necessary to
prepare our case carefully and persuasively.
A new opportunity involving these regulations governing
investment may be presented again in the not too distant future.
The ROC government has recently said it is considering a revision
of the statute governing these incentives. As Managing Director
of the new US-ROC Economic Council I have already encour-
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aged our membership to consider what changes in this statute
they feel would be desirable and mutually beneficial. And on my
trip to Taiwan in May I will not only be looking for trade,
investment and contracting opportunities of interest to our
members; I also intend to look into questions put by our
membership dealing with current regulations and impending
changes.
In addition to laws of broad scope such as the Statute just
mentioned, there are of course many laws and regulations dealing
with narrow, more specific topics which affect American firms
involved in both banking and manufacturing. Here again I
believe there are rules impacting on American firms which would
warrant a dialog with the ROC government. Some years ago, for
example, the withholding tax on interest had been considered
inequitable by some U.S. firms, and we in the Embassy working
with the U.S. banking representatives on Taiwan discussed our
concern with ROC officials and a new formulation was developed.
All of this is not to suggest that we can readily achieve changes in
directions favorable to us. Quite often the Chinese have found our
proposals unacceptable; however, as I have said, opportunities for
a hearing of U.S. business and U.S. government views are as
favorable on Taiwan as almost anywhere in the world.
In applying the law to particular commercial cases, my
experience has been that when disputes arise the Chinese
apparently prefer a negotiated solution with consideration to all
aspects of the situation rather than focusing merely on the legal
and technical virtues of each position. They would prefer to avoid
a stand-off confrontation- particularly a confrontation involving
litigation. The law and the regulations are always present as a
basic framework for discussion, but on many commercial issues
other factors are an important part of the negotiation and the
bargaining.
This is not to say that matters of principle and law are cast
aside. They clearly are the basic reference point of the dialog. It is
incumbent then on those representing U.S. interests - be they
lawyers, representatives of corporations, Embassy officials,
whoever - to make certain that all of the major considerations
are properly presented to those they represent and that the key
officials in the ROC government most directly concerned with the
issue are properly informed. While almost axiomatic, this
approach is often not followed in practice.
In one case in the early seventies, for example, a major U.S.
firm had spent a considerable sum preparing to invest in a new
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facility. The investment application went forward in compliance
with the regulations several times and each time was returned
with modifications, mostly adverse to the U.S. company's
position. Even the Legislative Yuan became involved. The
American corporation representative finally concluded that the
ROC government did not want his company involved and that his
proposal was in effect being rejected. He had about decided to
throw in the towel and return home. As a last resort he asked the
Embassy's help. After reviewing the case we felt that, while there
clearly were misunderstandings on both sides, some of the
problems were bureaucratic, much as they are in all governments
including our own. The Embassy presented the case to three key
officials. The company representative was called in by the
Chinese again for negotiation and the issue was quickly resolved.
Needless to say, U.S. companies all over the world have such
problems even when they adhere to the regulations. On Taiwan
the difference is that the chances probably are better that a
solution can be worked out provided there is a good case and
provided the appropriate officials are brought in and are fully
informed.
It is important to understand what is at stake here in our
search for improvement in the legal aspects of our trading
relations. The story of the dramatic growth in ROC foreign trade
has been discussed in this conference at some length. The key
question is: Where is this trade heading and what is in it for
American business and the U.S. economy?
As a starter we can look at the ROC's own trade projections.
But then how good are they? My own experience has been that the
ROC has an almost unequaled track record in meeting its foreign
trade goals. In fact, I have always suspected that there is a
"kuchi" factor (i.e., a modesty discount) injected into most official
foreign trade estimates. Therefore, when the ROC announced
recently that their foreign trade plans call for an increase in 1977
in two-way trade, worldwide, from $15.7 billion to $18.5 billion, I
think we are obliged to take this enormous increase seriously and
to consider what this might mean for American business.
If the U.S. merely retains its present share of total trade
which was about 31% in 1976, our two way trade with Taiwan in
1977 could increase almost $1 billion to a total of around $5.5
billion. This would rank the ROC within a few hundred million
dollars of our trade with the Netherlands and Italy, who rank
ninth and eleventh, respectively, on the spectrum of U.S. trading
partners. This trend also suggests that by 1978 our commerce with
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the ROC could well approximate our trade with France, which in
1976 ranked eighth among our trading partners. I think it is still
very difficult for many westerners to appreciate that Taiwan has
already become one of the great trading nations of the world.
For both importers and exporters it is new business opportunities that are a prime consideration. If we talk not in terms of
percentages but dollar gains we find that the ROC, with an
anticipated surge in trade of almost $3 billion in 1977, offers
perhaps more new business than most of our leading trading
partners. Both U.S. exporters and importers will profit substantially from this commerce, to say nothing of the benefits to wages,
employment and consumer prices in this country.
Some say that the uncertainties of the next few years raise
questions about prospects for further expansion of our trade with
the ROC. I can only say that I have heard this for almost ten
years and those who have taken counsel of their fears have had to
count their losses. Those who have looked at the realities have
prospered. There were those, for example, who were nervous after
the Shanghai Communique. At that time there was some capital
flight, Taiwan currency sold at a discount and some businesses
contracted their operations. However, our economic reporting from
the Embassy during this period and the advice of many of our
bankers on Taiwan took an optimistic and we felt a realistic line.
But some in the Embassy and in the State Department felt, to use
John Foster Dulles' words, that we were taking on the protective
coloration of the local scene. As it turned out, our estimates were
somewhat off the mark, but only because they were not optimistic
enough. The economy continued to surge ahead; capital returned
from abroad; the Taiwan dollar increased in value; and businessmen began to expand their investment.
Again during the world-wide recession of the recent past,
there were many fears expressed about the viability of Taiwan's
economy with its enormous dependence on foreign trade. Prices of
imports were skyrocketing while the ROC's exports were meeting
resistance all over the world. Inflation became a serious problem.
But again the economy adjusted in a pragmatic way and today
Taiwan's price stability is among the best of all nations and
exports are booming once again.
Some may ask how recent pressures within the U.S. to
restrain the import of certain commodities of importance to
Taiwan's trade, such as footwear, might affect the ROC's ability
to earn foreign exchange and to support the continued expansion
of its two-way trade with the U.S. This is a complex equation and
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I have no more ability than anyone else to look at the future as
history. But I can draw from the lessons of the past.
I know that the U.S. government since World War II has
generally sought to avoid more restraints on trade. In fact, most of
our efforts have been in the direction of freer trade. And in those
instances when the U.S. government has felt obliged to restrict
imports, it has usually not moved precipitously and has sought to
balance the political and economic considerations involved.
The "voluntary restraints" imposed on textile imports from
the ROC in the early seventies did require substantial adjustment
by Taiwan's manufacturers and of course impacted universally on
anticipated foreign exchange earnings. But history has shown the
ROC economy to be dynamic, inventive and adaptable. It has
accommodated extremely well to new situations, ranging from the
cutoff in earlier U.S. aid programs to the shock of the Shanghai
Communique. Considering the expected levels of U.S. trade
restraints, and without commenting on the arguments for and
against such restraints, I am confident the ROC will continue to
grow in importance as one of our leading trading partners.
A major problem in our trade with Taiwan, however, is the
weakness in our exports. There has been a noticeable increase in
recent years in the attention paid by American manufacturers,
and particularly by our bankers, to the Taiwan market. Major
efforts are being made by many American firms to develop this
market both for sales and imports. In addition, our Trade Center
in Taipei has become one of our two most successful trade centers
in the world. In recent years it has held some 170 events and has
attracted enormous attention from prospective buyers of U.S.
products. But much more needs to be done to promote the sale of
U.S. commodities. Our trade deficit with Taiwan in 1976 was more
than $1.3 billion, which in a sense is a measure of the shortcoming
of our sales promotion.
The Japanese, of course, are our principal competitors. They
have outstripped us in this market with exports of almost $2.3
billion in 1976 compared to our $1.6 billion. Japanese businessmen
are well aware of the burgeoning Taiwan market and the fact that
Taiwan is their second largest export market in the world. They
also know that for the remaining five years of the ROC's
current six year plan Taiwan represents a market for foreign
exporters of approximately $50 billion. The Japanese are eager to
win the lion's share of this market, and their promotion efforts
treat it accordingly. Within the ROC the Japanese rely very little
on their local officials resident on Taiwan for trade development
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support. Essentially they depend on the activities of their
individual corporations and the aggressive sales promotion of
their various foreign trade associations, with strong support at
home from their Ministry of International Trade and Industry
and the Japanese banks. They are particularly adept at identifying new opportunities for sales and too frequently seem to be
ahead of us in uncovering the many import and contract
engineering requirements that fall out of the growing number of
new development programs in the ROC's public and private
sectors.
In many ways the Japanese linkage between government,
business associations and private firms has not been acceptable
in our society and does not correspond to many elements of our
economic philosophy as reflected in our laws and regulations. But
there are lessons to be learned from the Japanese experience and
of course many legal questions would be involved if we decided to
modify our approach to trade promotion.
On the ROC side there are other questions that should be
addressed which affect our competitive position vis-a-vis the
Japanese. For example, the ROC tariff is based on CIF which,
because of distance, gives Japanese exporters an advantage over
our own. This is not a new issue but one that perhaps should be
reviewed. And there are other questions of this kind for those of
you concerned with the legal aspects of our trade.
In closing let me say that when the subject of these sessions
was first announced I was sure there were many questions as_ to:
whether the exercise was worth the candle. Yet when we consider
that over the next five years the ROC's two-way trade may total
roughly $100 billion; that the ROC could be well inside the top ten
among all of our trading partners; and that there has been,
perhaps, less thought, discussion and writing by foreigners·
concerning the laws relating to this trade than for that of most
other great trading nations we can readily appreciate the
significance of this pioneer meeting. I think we are all indebted to
the organizers of this conference for their foresight, and I
congratulate them for a superb job.
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III. FUTURE OF US-ROC ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
(9:30 a.m. -12:00 noon)

April 16, 1977
The meeting was opened by Mr. Simon, who introduced the
chairperson for the session, Dr. G. J. Sigur, Director of the
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University. Dr. Sigur said that he was delighted to be here this morning
and to serve as chairman of this final session of the Conference on
U.S.-Republic of China Relations. He thought that it was always
exciting to deal with projections concerning the future. He had
always envied Herman Kahn in the Hudson Institute, and he had
thought often that perhaps it would be interesting to join him and
deal with things in a way that you did not have to concern
yourself too much with facts. However, that was not what we were
going to try to do today. We were going to be concerned with facts,
and would deal with one of the most important questions facing
the United States in its global policies, and especially in its
policies toward Asia and the Pacific and what would happen in
terms of our ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan,
particularly in the economic area. The resolution of the American
position toward the ROC could be critical to the whole question of
American intentions and hopes of maintaining peace and
stability throughout the world. Dr. Sigur did not think that such a
formulation overstated the case. He believed it was true, and
therefore he was sure that we would all take this matter of the
future of these relations with the seriousness which it warranted.
He was very pleased to start this session off by introducing David
Simon, who would summarize the American Chamber of Commerce on Taipei position paper on US-ROC relations. Dr. Sigur
then invited Mr. Simon to speak. Mr. Simon said that none of
what he had to say here was his own words. It was all directly
from Taiwan's American Chamber of Commerce and he was just
going to summarize the position paper..
The position paper stated that the PRC engages in restrictive
trade practices as compared to the ROC, which presents a truly
reciprocal trade pattern with resulting economic benefits to both
the United States and Taiwan. The People's Republic of China
has a non-consumer product market of limited products, nonrecurrent purchases and import restrictions. The interest of the
PRC is in technology, not in products. It was estimated in the
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report that consumer products will not be in demand in the PRC
for two generations. The loss of United States relations with the
Republic of China would have many ramifications: the outlook for
economic increase would be negative and abrogation of the
Defense Treaty would remove protection essential for Taiwan.
Some specific problems cited were Eximbank loans and guarantees of 1.5 billion dollars, U.S. banks on Taiwan, United States
investment, OPIC insurance, and the most favored nation
treatment of Taiwan. It was also pointed out by the Chamber of
Commerce that United States security could also be threatened.
[The following is the text of the position paper prepared by the
American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China.]

US-ROC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP:
A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW*
AMERICAN CHAMBER oF CoMMERCE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A.

INTRODUCTION

Since the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, a
great deal of attention has been given to the question of what
benefits would be gained from improved relations between the
United States and the People's Republic of China. Aside from the
fundamental geopolitical advantage of keeping the USSR and the
PRC from greater solidarity, there have been high expectations as
to the eventual economic benefits which will accrue to both
countries.
At first blush these benefits seem well worth achieving.
Certainly very few of us would take issue with the goal of keeping
two communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., or
support the argument that we should continue to ignore the 850
million Chinese on the Mainland. But when it comes to the
economic issues, we believe that these have not been adequately
analyzed, and that they should be thoroughly assessed before any
further steps are taken toward normalization with the PRC. In
essence, we think that the U.S. Government has expected more
gains than can be realized ... but more importantly, we think it
has totally ignored the potential losses.
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For the past few years, the American Chamber of Commerce
in the Republic of China has supported positions which favor the
expansion of commercial and cultural relations between the U.S.
and the PRC, provided this is not done at the expense of the
Republic of China. Our position has echoed the recent resolution
by a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, which states
"that the U.S. Government, while engaged in reducing tensions
with the PRC, do nothing to compromise the freedom of the
Republic of China and its 16 million people." Basically we believe
that the long· standing American relationship with the Chinese
who have made Taiwan a flourishing example of economic and
cultural cooperation should not be sacrificed for a political
objective which does not give comparable reciprocity to American
initiatives.
This position paper has been prepared by members of the
American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China, an
organization of U.S. business executives who manage some 220
U.S. invested corporations in Taiwan. The Chamber's prime
objective is to enhance and protect American trade, investment
and credit relations with the Republic of China.
B. U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE TWO CHINAS

While the opening of U.S. commercial relations with the PRC
began in an encouraging way and with great expectations, they
still give no opportunities for normal commerce; even the cultural
and tourist interchange has been unilaterally restricted by the
PRC to minimum levels. The U.S. two-way trade with the PRC in
1975 declined to $462 million (from $922 million in 1974) while the
U.S. did $3.5 billion in two-way trade with Taiwan in 1975.
The PRC refuses to accept credits from foreign trading
partners including the U.S. and has generally confined commercial contacts to the Canton Trade Fair. The PRC also refuses to
permit American buying or selling offices to operate in the
country and refuses to permit American banks to handle financial
and trade transactions between the two countries.
In extreme contrast, the Republic of China on Taiwan has
consistently offered full business reciprocity, investment opportunities and unlimited support to two-way commercial interchange, to a point where our two-way trade with them made
Taiwan America's 13th largest trading partner in 1975. This
created opportunities for thousands of export-related jobs in the
United States. Also, U.S. investment as of July 1976 amounted to
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$476 million and has prospered in one of the most hospitable
investment climates in the Asia-Pacific area. In addition, Taiwan
has also opened its arms to American religious groups, scholars
and tourists serving to maintain our long standing relationships
with the Chinese people at a high level of compatibility and
cooperation.
It could be argued that normalization of the political
relationship should begin at least to remedy the lack of
commercial and cultural reciprocity, but thus far this is not
supported by the experiences of other countries which do have
diplomatic relations with the PRC. It appears that reciprocity is
not a 50-50 proposition with the PRC.
C. WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE U.S.?

Yet there still seems to be a compulsion to forego the triedand-true relationship with the ROC in favor of the hope of great
economic benefits from the PRC. And even more alarming, we
observe a sense of urgency in the U.S. Government's desire to
culminate normalization with the PRC "before it's too late."
Admittedly, the public posture of the current Administration is
low at present, no doubt due to the Presidential election campaign.
But the stated goal is still "normalization" and we perceive that
even though it is alleged that there is no time-table and no
formula, there appears to be an academic and State Department
grounds well (possibly amplified by press speculation) which ..is
anxious to conclude an early agreement with the PRC. We believe
this issue will surface rapidly once a new president is elected.
Therefore, it is essential that we analyze what the real
economic benefits to the U.S. will be- or put more colloquially,
what's in it for the U.S.? An analysis follows as to the prospects of
improved US-PRC trade based on the assumed condition of
diplomatic recognition.
D. WHAT'S THE REAL MARKET POTENTIAL WITH THE PRC?

When we evaluate the PRC's past buying policy we find that
the potential market for U.S. products is limited to a few select
product categories, that the purchases are non-recurrent, that the
availability of a broad consumer market base may well be 40 to 50
years away, and that the emphasis is on self-sufficiency which
exhibits itself in an interest in technology rather than in products.
In addition, the fact that the PRC is a non-market economy will
affect the ability of U.S. exporters to sell their products on a
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competitive and reciprocal basis; there are many import restrictions levied on a variety of products which limit the current as
well as eventual market potential. Furthermore, the absence of
free choice by the consumer will restrict the ability of U.S.
exporters to develop new markets for their products. Brief
comments are given below on the three most important categories:

Industrial Products
In line with former Premier Chou En-lai's report to the 4th
National People's Congress, one of the PRC goals is to build "an
independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system by 1980." Therefore it is reasonable to expect that
the PRC will be looking abroad for equipment during the next few
years. But history has shown that they are more interested in
technology than in equipment, with some limited exceptions to
meet their urgent needs where either their capacity or technical
know-how is limited. Some of the examples are the purchases of
jet aircraft, fertilizer plants, and deep-well oil drilling platforms.
In the case of the aircraft sale, the PRC technology is obviously
not at a comparable level to the U.S., and purchases of this type
are expected to continue. As for the fertilizer plants, this is a good
example of a dire need to supplement their capacity on a one-time
basis. The same holds true for the oil drilling platforms; after
purchasing several from Japan, France and Norway, the PRC is
now manufaCturing their own.

Consumer Products
Even though the PRC is a rich land with numerous natural
resources, ·many areas are still uninhabited and thus have little or
no infrastructure. In short, its economic development may well be
some 40 to 50 years away from where the needs of its people can
be matched to the richness of its resources. Therefore, the
opportunity for selling U.S. consumer goods appears to be at least
two generations away. A good example is provided by the
Japanese: to date they have not managed to sell any consumer
products to the PRC.

Agricultural Products
As for a sustained favorable outlook for agricultural products,
it is not expected that the PRC will remain a large importer of
foodstuffs for long. Less than 20% of its total land surface is now
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cultivated, which is quite low compared to its potential arable
acreage. In addition the current per acre yield is very low due to a
lack of fertilizer and pesticides as well as a limited irrigation
system. Therefore, the capability of the PRC to increase its
agricultural output is substantial, large enough to be a threat as
an eventual competitor to the U.S. in their surplus crop years.
After analyzing the economic realities, the prospects of
significantly increasing trade between the U.S. and the PRC are
certainly not optimistic. So the question remains, What's in it for
the U.S., particularly if it is to be accomplished at the expense of a
valued trading partner, the Republic of China?
E. DISADVANTAGES TO THE U.S.

Now let's turn our attention to what the potential loss would
be to our economic relations with the Republic of China. There are
basically two scenarios; the first involves de-facto derecognition of
the ROC without regard to how future trade, investment and
credit relations would be handled. In this first scenario we would
also assume the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty,
inasmuch as we understand that it may not be possible to have a
Defense Treaty with a country with which we have no diplomatic
relations.
Without sounding ominous and without making any predictions as to what the PRC and ROC might do militarily, our feeling
is that we in Taiwan would experience serious difficulties in doing
business. There could be a degree of social unrest which might
vent itself on American companies. Further investment would
stop, and capital flight would be probable. In short, sudden
diplomatic derecognition without any redress does not provide a
positive outlook for U.S. economic interests. (Frankly speaking, it
seems inconceivable and unrealistic that such a scenario would
take place; in all our 200 year history there is no precedence for
abandoning a trusted ally and valued trading partner in the way
just described.)
A second scenario involves "normalization" with the PRC but
not under the three conditions outlined by the PRC (diplomatic
recognition, U.S. troop withdrawal, and abrogation of the Mutual
Defense Treaty). We particularly believe that the third condition,
that of abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, is totally
unacceptable to the protection of American economic interests
with the Republic of China. In short, the Mutual Defense Treaty is
central to our economic survival on Taiwan. Without offering any
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new "formula" for solution, we will state a number of additional
issues which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken
toward normalization with the PRC. We hope that the U.S.
Government is already working on these areas. It is critically
important that solutions be found to these problems.
F. ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED

1. Eximbank Loans and Guarantees

As of December 1975, the ROC had loans and guarantees
outstanding in the amount of more than US$1.7 billion, thus
making it the Eximbank's largest customer after BraziL What
happens to these funds and will Taiwan be eligible for loans in the
future?

2. U.S. Banks on Taiwan
As of July 1976, there were eight U.S. banks represented on
Taiwan. What will be their status after normalization? Will they
be allowed to continue their operations in Taiwan?

3. U.S. Investment on Taiwan
As of July 1976, there was some US$476 million worth of U.S.
investment on Taiwan. This investment is distributed across the
range of the country's industrial projects and infrastructure. A
series of questions arise which are currently adequately answered
under the present Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
Treaty of 1948, but which will need review if the FCN Treaty were
not to be in force.
Will this investment have national treatment, meaning that
U.S. investment will be subject to the same laws and enjoy the
same rights as do domestic enterprises of the host country?
In the event of expropriation or nationalization for a public
purpose, will it be done without discrimination and accompanied
by prompt, adequate and effective compensation?
Will compensation under expropriation amount to the market
value immediately before the expropriation itself or before the
host government's official announcement that expropriation will
occur?
Will there be international arbitration in the event of a
dispute between the U.S. investor and the host country?
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4. Overseas Private Insurance Company
(OPIC) Coverage
As of July 1976, the maximum contract value of OPIC
insurance was $132 million for inconvertability, $153 million for
expropriation, and $137 million for war. Could additional
coverage be obtained?

5. Textile Quotas to the U.S.
Taiwan's textile exports to the U.S. fall under the 1974 MultiFibre Agreement, the international framework for voluntary
bilateral restraints between textile exporters and importers. On
the other hand, the PRC has been unwilling to subscribe to any
voluntary trade restraints, even with countries with which it has
diplomatic relations. What happens to Chinese textile exports to
the U.S.?
6. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Taiwan
In 1975, the U.S. exported some $420 million worth of
agricultural products to Taiwan. Most of these exports are
conducted under several long-range agreements negotiated between the U.S. and the ROC. What happens to these agreements?

7. Nuclear Fuel for Taiwan's Nuclear
Power Plants
Currently two nuclear power plants are under construction in
Taiwan, and four more are planned. Under what conditions will
Taiwan be able to obtain nuclear fuels for these plants?

8. Generalized Preference Scheme
Will Taiwan still be eligible for duty reductions under the
Generalized Preference Scheme?

9. Most Favored Nation Treatment
The ROC currently has MFN treatment, but the PRC does not.
Before MFN can be granted by the U.S. President to the PRC, the
Trade Act of 1974 requires that a bilateral trade agreement be
negotiated first, and then be approved by the U.S. Congress. Part
and parcel of Congressional approval is the settlement of frozen
assets, which has been an extremely thorny issue thus far.
Anyway, what happens to the ROC's Most Favored Nation
standing?
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10. Concerns for U.S. Security
We do not profess to be experts in international security
matters, but as U.S. citizens, we are vitally concerned with the
security of our country. We feel it important that the U.S.
maintain a strong military presence in the area. Breaking our
faith with the people of Taiwan would only weaken us in the eyes
of the other nations of the area, and would strengthen the position
of the Communists.
We find it ironic that we seem to be having trouble over the
use of our bases in the Philippines, whereas the ROC no doubt
would cooperate with us fully in our objective of having a strong
forward defense in the Western Pacific Island chain.
The foregoing listing represents only a sampling of the issues
which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken
toward normalization with the PRC.
G. CONCLUSION

We do not disagree with the objectives of keeping the two
Communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., but we
feel that this objective can be accomplished through skillful
negotiating, without sacrificing the people of the ROC or the U.S.
position in the Far East. We believe that the PRC has more to
gain from normalization of relations between the two countries
than does the U.S., and that the U.S. should negotiate more from
a position of strength. It appears that a group within the U.S.
Government is so intent with normalizing relations with the PRC
"before it's too late," that they are proposing giving in to the
demands of the PRC in the hope that they will agree to
normalization. We should have learned by now that this is no way
to negotiate with the Communists.
The PRC has stated three demands in the Shanghai
Communique. We believe that the U.S. negotiators should firmly
state two conditions. One should be to keep the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the ROC, and the second should be to protect U.S.
economic interests with Taiwan. If these two conditions are not
met, then it is our judgment that normalization of relations is not
worth the price.

Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Simon for his very excellent summarization of the view of the American business community in
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Taiwan, which represented, of course, some of the largest business
interests in this country. He thought that it was important that we
should take seriously what they said. He then invited Dr. Yuan-li
Wu of Hoover Institution to present the paper on the economic
impact of US-PRC relations on the ROC; this paper was prepared
jointly by Dr. Wu and Dr. K. C. Yeh. He also expressed his regret
that one of the co-authors of the paper, Dr. K. C. Yeh of The RaQ.d
Corporation, could not come because of his overseas trip.
Drs. Wu and Yeh's paper discussed the economic impact of
United States-People's Republic of China relations oil the
Republic of China. Their purpose was to examine factors
contributing to the rapid expansion of exports in Taiwan and to
Taiwan's economic growth and to determine how these factors
would be affected by the alternatives for changing relations with
the ROC.
Taiwanese expansion in exports is correlated with United
States direct investment. This is what Dr. Wu termed a linear
correlation, that is, exports from Taiwan come from United States
and Japanese manufacturers. Dr. Wu stated that for continued
export growth there must be continued investment and continued
increase in importation by the United States. However, continued
export growth depends on the political climate. Investors expect
stability, and the best way to eliminate uncertainties is for the
United States to make clear that present relations will continue.
Dr. Wu identified three alternatives: (1) continuation of the
status quo, (2) diplomatic recognition of Peking and abandonment
of the Republic of China, and (3) diplomatic recognition of both
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Dr. Wu
prefers the third alternative, the so-called German plan.
Dr. Wu stated that if the legal status of Taiwan is questioned,
a situation would arise where problems are created for businessmen by other countries. Some of those problems identified were
threats to curtail freedom of access to transportation and
resources, legal redress, and sea rights. Such problems would
require private intervention and Dr. Wu questioned whether
anyone would be willing to assist. Dr. Wu suggested that the
"open door" should swing both ways.
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Wu and
Dr. Yeh.]
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE
US-ROC RELATIONS
Y. L. Wu*

AND

K. C. YEH**

The central question discussed in this paper is the economic
impact of alternative US-ROC relations. As US-PRC relations
develop further, alternative forms of the relations between the US
and the ROC must be considered. Among these broad alternatives
are: (a) continuation of US-ROC relations as they now stand, (b) a
more unambiguous two-China policy on the part of the United
States which will reaffirm the latter's determination to abide by
existing treaties and to maintain its political and economic
relations with the ROC under bilateral agreements at the
government level, whatever may be the relationship between the
United States and the PRC, and (c) downgrading of US-ROC
relations, which can be carried out in varying degrees either
following or simultaneously with the diplomatic recognition of
Peking. We assume for the purpose of this paper that the term
"normalization" is used by most people at present as a code word
for diplomatic recognition of Peking, although the two terms are
not necessarily identical. (Some countries that have maintained
full diplomatic relations with Peking for some time do not seem to
enjoy closer substantive relations with the PRC than does the
United States. It is hard to define precisely what one means by
"normal relations" with Peking.) By "economic impact" we mean
the effect on (a) the economic viability of Taiwan as an
independent economic entity, (b) the present and future economic
interests of the United States, and (c) the economic interests of
such major interested parties as Japan.
We shall attempt, in the first place, to identify the basic
factors, insofar as they are relevant for our purpose, that have
made possible the impressive economic performance of Taiwan,
both in the decade and a half before the 1973 oil crisis and since
that crisis (see Figure 1). Taiwan's past economic performance can
best be illustrated here by a quick reference to (a) the growth of its
GNP and foreign trade, (b) the relative price stability up to the eve
of the oil crisis in spite of Taiwan's rapid economic growth, (c) the
continuous improvement of its balance of payments until the oil
crisis and even in spite of it, and (d) the relatively equitable
* Consultant, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and Professor and
Chairman of Economic Department, University of San Francisco.
** Senior Economist, The Rand Corporation.

140

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Figure 1
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distribution of income and economic power among the island's
population.
The United States resumed large-scale economic aid to
Taiwan in 1952. The index of Taiwan's real GNP (at constant
1966 prices) in 1972, the year immediately preceding the oil crisis,
stood at 538.2 (1952 = 100). 1 The annual rate of growth during the
two decades averaged 8.8 percent, rising from 7.2 percent a year
during the first decade to 10.4 percent during the second decade.
Alternatively, we can point to the increase in the average annual
growth rate in· successive periods from 7.2 percent in 1952-60 to
9.6 percent in 196Q-65 and 10.1 percent in 1965-72. The latter
comparison is perhaps more meaningful, for reasons which will
become clear later. The trend was briefly interrupted by the worldwide recession in 1974, but the economy has moved upward again
since then. While the real growth rate fell to only 0.6 percent in
1974, it returned to 2.0 percent in 1975, and bounced back to over
10 percent in 1976. 2 On a per capita basis, Taiwan's GNP growth
rate between 1952 and 1972 averaged 5.6 percent a year in real
terms, far exceeding the corresponding rates of most other
developing countries including the PRC. There can be little doubt
that Taiwan has taken off on a path of sustained economic
growth. The record of 1974-76 testifies further to the resilience of
the economic system in the face of exogenous shocks.
This remarkable growth record was achieved with only
moderate price increases. The average rate of increase of
wholesale prices between 1952 and 1972 was 4.6 percent a year;
that of consumer prices, 5.8 percent. The rate of increase of
wholesale prices slowed considerably from 8.8 percent a year in
1952-60 to 3.4 percent a year in 1960-73; correspondingly, that of
consumer prices fell from 9.7 percent a year in 1952-60 to 4
percent in 1960-73. As a result of the oil crisis, wholesale and
retail prices rose by 35.2 percent and 47.5 percent respectively in
1974. However, the price index was again stabilized after that. It
dropped by 5.1 percent in 1975 for wholesale and rose by 5.2
percent for retail.
After its reform in 1958, the official exchange rate of the New
Taiwan Dollar has not varied significantly from the free market
rate, except for a brief period following the loss of Taiwan's U.N.
1. Council for Economic Cooperation and Development, Taiwan Statistical
Data Book, 1973, Taipei, p. 18.
2. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975. For 1976, see report in the Central
Daily News (Taipei), December 11, 1976.
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membership in 1971 and, to a lesser extent, during the oil crisis in
1973-74. Taiwan's official international reserves were at the level
of about $1.6 billion in October 1976, apart from which additional
holdings of probably about the same amount are available.
From the point of view of social stability, the trend toward
more equitable distribution of income is even more significant.
The Gini coefficient declined continuously from 0.6 in 1953 to 0.30
in 1972.3 The top 20 percent of all households on the income ladder
received 61 percent of total income in Taiwan in 1953; this share
· dropped to 39 percent in 1972. The shares of those with lower
incomes increased correspondingly. A comparison of Taiwan's
pattern of income distribution with those of other countries shows
that the lowest 40 percent of its population on the income ladder
had a distinctly larger share of total income than the corresponding segment of populations in most other Asian countries such as
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and India. In fact, its relative
shares of income by income class were almost identical with those
of Japan and came rather close to those of the United States.
Measured in these terms, income distribution in Taiwan in 1972
was only slightly "less equal" than that of Poland in 1964 and
slightly "more equal" than in Yugoslavia in 1968. 4
The underlying factors of Taiwan's rapid economic growth
are many and their interrelationships complex. Two, however,
stand out as fundamental and are especially relevant to an
assessment of Taiwan's economic viability in the future; to wit,
the rapid growth of human and material capital stock and the
phenomenal expansion of exports. During the period in question,
the former laid the groundwork for the increase in the economy's
productive capacity while the latter provided the necessary
stimulus for the expansion of aggregate demand. At the initial
stage, that is, during the 1950s, when the economy faced a dual
gap in foreign exchange and domestic savings, massive U.S. aid
played a key role in sustaining a high rate of investment.
Subsequently, domestic savings and foreign investment replaced
U.S. aid as the major source of financing development; foreign
investment also served as a supplement to Taiwan's foreign
3. See, Wan-Yong Kus, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area Changes and Causes," Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and East Asia, The Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo
and the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, Manila, July 1975, p. 94.
4. Y. L. Wu, Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth,
(forthcoming).
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exchange earnings. Finally, although its amount has been small
relative to U.S. aid in the 1950s, foreign investment has been an
indispensable vehicle in export marketing and in the transfer of
technology, two of the principal factors that have made possible
the growth of Taiwan's export-oriented economy and its structural
change.
STAGES OF GROWTH OF TAIWAN'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Since Taiwan is an island with limited natural resources, its
continuous growth and economic viability must be predicated
upon its ability to draw upon available resources in other
countries. The fruits of these overseas resources must in general
be purchased. Accordingly, a priori, the sustained growth of the
economy requires the unimpeded growth of foreign trade and
investment, as well as long-run equilibrium in the balance of
payments. Furthermore, as long as the domestic market is
relatively small, demand for increasing production must rely
largely upon the export market. Hence our attention should be
focused, in the first place, upon the principal factors underlying
Taiwan's expansion in foreign trade.
A statistical overview of the growth of Taiwan's exports from
1952 to 1973 suggests that this historical development can best be
divided into four distinct periods. (Figure 2 depicts the annual rate
of growth of Taiwan's exports on a year-to-year basis; the index of
any given year is calculated by using the preceding year as 100.)
(a) Continual fluctuations were exhibited during the period before
1959. Increases in exports in some years were followed by declines
in others, and the annual growth rate in value terms varied within
a wide range, from +30 percent to -30 percent. (b) The second
period began in 1959 and ended in 1966. The annual growth rate
of exports in real terms increased steadily through 1964. The
corresponding rate in value terms fluctuated more widely due to
changes in export prices. (An increase of 50 percent in value was
registered in 1962.) During the second part of this period exports
in real terms grew at about 20 percent a year. (c) The third period
began in 1967 and ended in 1973. During this period Taiwan's
exports grew generally at 20 percent or more in quantum each
year. The annual increase in value terms was, of course, at a
faster rate, reaching a peak of 50 percent in 1973 due to a
considerable rise of prices during that year. (d) The fourth period
began in 1974. Because of the sharp increase in crude oil price and
the world-wide recession that ensued, Taiwan's exports declined
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by 4.4 percent in real terms in 1974. Recovery began in the latter
part of 1975 and the volume was substantially larger in 1976.
A similar review of the history of Taiwan's imports presents
us with the following picture (Figure 3). (a) Before 1963, the annual
growth rates of Taiwan's imports fluctuated considerably,
although the fluctuations were within a narrower range than
those of pre-1959 exports. The corresponding annual growth rate
of imports in quantum varied from +10 percent to -7 percent in
most years; greater fluctuations were registered in value terms.
However, declines in quantum were reported only in two out ofthe
eleven years in this period; declines in value were registered only
in three years. (b) The second period began in 1963 and ended in
1973. In value terms, imports rose at above 20 percent a year in
most years during 1963-71 with larger variations in quantum.
Between 1971 and 1973 the rate rose to substantially above 20
percent a year, reflecting price increases, while the rate of increase
in quantum remained at slightly above 15 percent. (c) The third
stage began in 1974. In that year the value of Taiwan's imports
rose very sharply as a result of the price increases of oil and other
intermediate products, as well as stepped-up purchases in the
preceding year. However, the recession led to a decline of real
imports by 11.2 percent in 1975, followed by a substantial recovery
in 1976.
MAJOR BENCHMARKS IN FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT

The transition of imports from one stage of development to
another lagged behind that of exports, apparently for two reasons.
First, imports fluctuated less than exports before 1963 because of
the availability on substantial imports financed by U.S. aid.
Second, although production and exports could not rise without
increasing imports, the expansion of imports in the later stages
was also an effect of the prior expansion of exports. The
conservative and cautious policy makers who managed Taiwan's
balance of payments apparently made sure that import expansion
would lag slightly behind the growth of exports. They were
apparently anxious to build up the country's foreign exchange
reserves in the light of their experience with balance of payments
deficits over a number of years.
The first benchmark in the expansion of Taiwan's exports
occurred in 1959, midway between 1958 and 1960 when major
foreign exchange reforms were instituted. During these three
years multiple exchange rates were abolished step by step, and the
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differential between the official and free market rates was
successfully narrowed. The premium of the free market rate over
the official rate, which stood at NT$24.78 to one U.S. dollar in
1957, declined from 54.9 percent in that year to only 9.6 percent in
1961. The official rate in 1961 was NT$40.03 to one U.S. dollar
while the free market rate was NT$43.89. Minor fluctuations
occurred during the intervening years between 1961 and 1966,
when the second phase of Taiwan's export development ended.
However, by 1966, the two rates were virtually at par, NT$40.10
being the official rate, and NT$41.00, the free market rate. 5 The
removal of multiple exchange rates and the effective devaluation
of the New Taiwan dollar were approached in a very gingerly
manner, and even this cautious approach was not adopted until
the price level had become sufficiently stabilized during the
preceding years. While price inflation was rampant in 1951 and
1952 - wholesale prices rose by 66 percent in 1951 and 23.2
percent in 1952- the rate of increase had dropped to 7.2 percent
in 1957 and 1.4 percent in 1958. 6 Without this prior development
and the restoration of confidence in a stable currency, the foreign
exchange reforms could not have been instituted; nor would they
have been so successful in promoting exports and in doing away
with the price distortions and inequities the multiple exchange
rates had engendered.
Establishment of the necessary prior conditions for economic
reform was in a very significant measure also a result of U.S. aid.
During 1951-55, U.S. aid amounted to 47 percent of Taiwan's
gross capital formation and 43 percent of total imports; these
ratios fell to 34 percent and 36 percent respectively in 1956-60, and
17 percent and 19 percent respectively in 1961-65. 7 Absence of
either of these two conditions - exchange rate reform and U.S.
aid- would have made a critical difference.
The benchmark separating the second and third stages of
Taiwan's export growth occurred in 1965-66. Having already
liberalized its regulations governing investment by overseas
investors at the time of the earlier exchange reform, Taiwan took
5. These data, originally derived from the Central Bank of China, are given
by Mo-huan Hsing in "Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies," in a volume
entitled The Philippines and Taiwan, Industrialization and Trade Policies,
published for the Development Center of OECD, Oxford University Press, London,
1971, Table A. 23, p. 292.
6. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help
and Development, Praeger, New York, 1966, Appendix C. Table 16, p. 286.
7. Mo-huan Hsing, op. cit., p. 197.
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additional steps in the same direction in January 1965. The first
Export Processing Zone was established at Kaohsiung, and a
sharp increase in direct investments from abroad followed
immediately. The cumulative total of foreign direct investment
approvals rose from $93.1 million at the end of 1964 to $134.7
million a year later. 8 By 1973 the corresponding total had risen to
$1,287.1 million; it was $1,405.2 million in 1975. The data in Table
1 will provide a historical perspective in capsule form.
Table 1. Foreign Investment Approvals
(U.S. $ million)

1952-59
196Q-64
1965-69
197Q-74

U.S. Investors

Investors
from Japan

9.5
38.0
126.9
254.5

6.4
52.7
132.2

1.4

All
Countries

20.2
72.9
327.2
866.7

Source: Sjou-eng Koo, "Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Taiwan,"
Academia Ecomonic Papers, Nankang, Taipei: The Institute of Economics,
Academia Sinica, Vol. 4, No.1, p. 128, March 1976. Original data from the Foreign
Investment Commission.
LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE, EXCHANGE AND
CAPITAL INFLOW: THE DOMESTIC AND
WORLD ENVIRONMENT

The history of Taiwan's foreign trade expansion points
indisputably to the importance of appropriate domestic economic
measures. Exports became profitable as a result of the 1958-60
reform which directed the attention of private business toward
export promotion, away from the hidden subsidy of licensed
imports at artificially low foreign exchange rates. The export
processing zones (EPZs) successfully attracted foreign investors to
Taiwan; not all of them located their plants within the zones.
Encouragement of di.,rect foreign investment in general, both
inside and outside the zones, was undoubtedly instrumental in
solving the very important marketing problem on which export
expansion depended. Once established in Taiwan, the foreign
firms outside the zones also supplied their products to Taiwan's
domestic market where demand was expanding with the very
8. These data are from the Foreign Investment Commission, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Republic of China.
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economic growth to which export expansion contributed most
decisively. The EPZs apparently served a path-breaking function,
providing this initial attraction to induce foreign investors and
other businessmen to come to Taiwan, and encouraging domestic
firms to locate the items solely to promote exports.
As of March 1977, there were 10 sole U.S.- and 68 sole
Japanese-owned firms in the EPZs. In addition, there were 68
joint ventures composed of U.S.-Japanese interests; 4 composed of
U.S.-Japanese and other interests; 9 composed of U.S. and other
interests; and 51 composed of Japanese and other interests. Still
other investors, many from Hong Kong, are also located in EPZs.
Thus many Japanese, Hong Kong and other firms export to the
United States, as well as to other markets, from Taiwan.
An earlier incomplete count shows that as of 1974, 14 U.S.
firms had been established within EPZs. 9 In addition, 313
American firms were located outside the zones. Of those outside
the zones 250 firms, or 80 percent, were established after 1965. It
was in 1965 that foreign investment rules were further liberalized
and U.S. aid to Taiwan officially came to an end. A more recent
count based on 1976.data shows that there were 63 additional U.S.
firms on the later list that were not on the 1974 list. A number of
these, if not all, must have been established after 1974. All the 63
are located outside the EPZs.
Figure 4 presents a vivid illustration of the rise of Taiwan's
exports and imports in current dollars. However, neither effective
marketing with the aid of foreign investors nor unilateral reform
on the part of Taiwan would have sufficed had not the demand for
Taiwan's exports expanded considerably during this period.
Figure 5 shows that the share of the U.S. market in Taiwan's
exports for the first time surpassed that of Japan during 1966-67.
The shares of the two countries became about equal in 1962.
Before 1962 Japan's share had been consistently higher. However,
the emergence of certain new agricultural exports from Taiwan to
Japan again pushed up Japan's share between 1962 and 1966. The
crossing of the two lines depicting the respective shares of the
United States and Japan as buyers of Taiwan's exports in
1966-67 (Figure 5) signaled the rise of the role of new exports of
manufactures from Taiwan. Their appearance was a direct
outcome of the increase in foreign direct investment.
9. Calculated from directories of U.S. and Japanese firms. The figures are not
all inclusive.
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Between 1966 and 1973 U.S. general imports rose from an
index of 100 to nearly 400 (see Figure 6). During the same period,
Taiwan's exports to the United States rose much more sharply,
from an index of 100 in 1966 to 1377 in 1973. This nearly 14-fold
increase was partly a reflection of the greater competitiveness of
Taiwan products on the U.S. market, but the increase was also
aided by the general expansion of U.S. imports. Furthermore,
Taiwan's exports to the United States had been so small that the
large increase scored during this period could in most cases be
better tolerated by Taiwan's competitors. Given the competitiveness of Taiwan's products and the increasing U.S. demand for
imports, the existence of U.S. as well as Japanese firms in
Taiwan, both making exportable goods for the American market,
contributed significantly to Taiwan's expanding share in U.S.
imports.
In the case of Japan, Taiwan's exports to Japan in general
increased after 1966 pari passu with the expansion of Japan's
import demand as a whole (see Figure 6). Taiwan's exports to
Japan did not rise in as extraordinary a manner as did Taiwan's
exports to the United States. Japanese direct investments in
Taiwan probably contributed as much to the increase in Taiwan's
exports to the United States as they did to increase exports from
Taiwan to Japan.
SENSITIVITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
TO POLITICAL EVENTS

The rate of foreign direct investment in Taiwan was
apparently very sensitive to political events, as is to be expected.
The rate of U.S. investment in Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972
probably as a result of the ROC's international setbacks during
those years and doubt about its future status (Figure 7). Between
1972 and 1973 there was a sharp increase in new U.S. investment
in Taiwan, which seemed to reflect some recovery of confidence on
the part of U.S. investors. However, the increase was smaller in
real terms if price increases are discounted. Investments fell again
in 1974 because of the general recession and postponement of
investment plans by many firms.
The flow of direct investment from Japan, including investments by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, rose steadily
during 1965-70, immediately after the establishment of the export
processing zones (Figure 8). The rate of flow fell in 1972, reflecting
the same concern felt by U.S. investors. Following Japan's
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transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1973,
another decline of new Japanese investment in Taiwan occurred
in 1974 and 1975 although the cause of the decline is again
somewhat ambiguous because it coincided with the recession. 10
STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY AND
FOREIGN TRADE

As the economy of Taiwan develops further, not only will
there be an increase in GNP and the volume of trade, but the
domestic sector of the economy should expand even faster. Such a
development would reduce the "foreign trade ratio" - defined
here as the ratio of foreign commodity trade to GNP plus imports
- which was as high as 60 percent in 1973. In this connection, the
case of Japan presents an appropriate illustration and comparison. During 1908-17 the Japanese "foreign trade ratio" averaged
29 percent. 11 It declined to 20 percent in 1950-54. The Japanese
ratio has always been much smaller than that of contemporary
Taiwan because of the latter's smaller size. To put it in another
way, Japan's very large GNP has dwarfed the tremendous size of
its foreign trade. Because of its smaller size, Taiwan probably will
have for a long time a much higher foreign trade ratio than
Japan. However, Taiwan is clearly fast approaching the point
when it should begin to expand the domestic sector of the
economy by "filling out" the many linkages which its exportoriented economy has· already succeeded in developing. Even
during 1972-74, domestic sales were already accounting for over
40 percent of the sales of enterprises owned by overseas investors
in Taiwan. 12
In the case of Japan, the ratio of export of goods and services
to GNP remained at a fairly stable level of 10 to 11 percent during
1955-73 -in comparison with about 20 percent in the 1930s while per capita GNP grew by leaps and bounds. 13 The percentage
10. According to Taiwan statistics, Japanese direct investment approvals,
including applications by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, declined 14.4
percent between 1973 and 1974, from $48.9 million in 1973 to $41.9 million in 1974.
Another 37.5 percent drop was registered in 1975. On the other hand, Japan's
overall direct investment to foreign countries declined even more during 1973-74,
from $3.5 billion to $2.4 billion, or 32.5 percent. Japan's Direct Investment
Overseas, Present State and Future Outlook, Keidanren, Tokyo, March 1976.
11. Simon Kuznets·, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, Free Press of Glencoe,
Illinois, 1959, p. 103.
12. Private communication.
13. Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, "Japan and the World
Economy," in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, Eds., Asia's New Giant,
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contribution of export to economic growth from 1921-25 to
1934-38 was estimated at 39 percent as compared to only 17
percent in 1955-71.1 4 The decline ofthe export to GNP ratio and of
export as a component of growth in the post-World War II period
was accompanied by a dramatic change in the structure of
exports. The proportion of such labor-intensive exports as textiles
and clothing, food, beverage and tobacco, etc. dropped from 65
percent of total exports in 1955 to 43 percent in 1973. Meanwhile,
the share of R and D-intensive (e.g., optical and precision
instruments), capital-intensive, and high-wage exports (e.g.,
automobiles, consumer electronics and so forth) rose sharply. If
the Japanese experience is any useful guide, the continuation of
Taiwan's GNP and export growth will also have to be accompanied by an increase in value-added in export, as well as a reduction
of import content per dollar of export. Rising wage rates and an
increasing share of exports originating from domestic enterprises
as compared to exports by foreign enterprises will make these
changes both necessary and possible.
However, upgrading of the technological content of Taiwan's
products in general, including exports, an increase in the ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor in the labor content of these products,
and a gradual rise in their capital content will take time. Nor can
they occur without the sustained infusion of new technology,
much of which will be embodied in capital equipment. Thus there
wi\1 have to be more direct foreign investment, more licensing
arrangements between Taiwan and foreign firms, and more joint
ventures between Taiwan capital and new technology from
abroad. Between 1972 and 1974 exports by Taiwan enterprises
registered a 53.4 percent increase in value; however, the share of
foreign enterprises in total exports increased from 22.3 percent to
29.2 percent. This means, therefore, that foreign businessmen will
have to help in marketing an increasing amount of new exports.

Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 399; Edward F. Desnon and
Willing K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," in ibid., p. 84. Also,
Economic Statistics of Japan, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 4 and 88.
14. N. Baba and M. Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade ·and Economic Growth in
Japan: 1858-1937," in Lawrence Klein and Kazushi, Eds., Economic Growth: The
Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era, Irwin, Homewood, lllinois, 1968, p. 177;
Denison and Chung, op. cit., p. 79; Krause and Sekiguchi, op. cit., p. 399. The
percentage contribution of exports is measured by dividing the increment in
exports by the increment in GNP, in constant prices.
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Figure 9 shows in a scatter diagram the close correlation (r =
+0.966) between the volume of cumulative direct U.S. investment
and Taiwan's export to the United States. A similar correlation
exists between total direct overseas investment in Taiwan and
Taiwan's total export.
It follows from the above that at this stage of its development
the continuation of direct foreign investment and technological
inflow are indispensable to the economic viability of Taiwan.
Furthermore, the flow of goods, people, capital and technology
must not be impeded or subjected to delay in any way. On the
contrary, they must expand further and be quickly responsive to
changing conditions. Finally, as the volume of Taiwan's exports
increases, further expansion needs to be accompanied by greater
commodity and geographical diversification in order to minimize
the effect of protectionist sentiments in the importing countries.
Thus a primary condition of Taiwan's economic viability is the
maintenance of the freedom of the high seas, the freedom to travel
to and from Taiwan, the freedom to communicate between Taiwan
and the rest of the world, and the ability to enter new markets and
to diversify - including upgrading - into new exports. Taiwan
needs the traditional open-door policy of the United States in
which the door will swing open both ways.
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE US-ROC RELATIONS ON THE
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF TAIWAN

How alternative US-ROC relations will affect Taiwan's
economic viability will depend, in the first instance, upon their
effect on t,he factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

A. Direct Foreign Investment
A statement of the American Chamber of Commerce in the
Republic of China, dated August 25, 1976, raised a number of
questions about the future status of American business in Taiwan
if diplomatic recognition is extended to Peking. Will American
business continue to enjoy national treatment in the hands of the
ROC government? Will there be nationalization? If so, what will
be the level of compensation? Will the various insurance schemes
against inconvertibility and expropriation offered by the U.S.
government and its agencies (e.g., OPIC) continue to be valid?
What will be the proper procedure for resolving questions, or
settling disputes, that may arise in present and future contracts or
in the course of doing business (e.g., in case of oil spills by one
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party's tankers in the territorial waters of the other). Whether
continuation of relations between the two countries as they now
stand will remove the uncertainty that has inspired these
questions is by no means sure. It will depend upon how long the
present status is expected to last. If the present condition is
expected to be transitory, investors will tend either to stay away
or to avoid heavy or long-term commitments. This attitude would
tend to increase Taiwan's dependence on (i) loans, (ii) export
earnings, and (iii) licensing arrangements for the acquisition of
capital goods and foreign technology. Conceivably Taiwan may
then be faced with a higher debt service ratio, and its balance of
payments position may deteriorate, which would in turn affect its
credit standing.
If relations between the two countries are downgraded and
U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking takes place, many of the
questions that inspired uncertainty among American businessmen in Taiwan will become immediately relevant. Even if efforts
are made by either the ROC or the U.S. government to allay fears,
and even if none of the untoward developments mentioned by the
American Chamber of Commerce actually transpires, fear of loss
will not go away entirely. A process of gradual withdrawal by
U.S. business interests may begin. Such a debilitating process can
be avoided only if the governments of both countries can offer
joint assurances, which would seem to require a degree of mutual
trust and good will that may not be consistent with the initial
assumption of the downgrading of their bilateral relations.
Only in the two-China case, which presupposes a reaffirmation of the current de facto situation on a more or less permanent
and de jure basis- that is, at least as far as the United States is
concerned - will the above uncertainties be removed. Long-term
large commitments would then involve no more than the usual
business risks. In view of Taiwan's past economic performance,
these risks would be less than in most other developing countries.
As Taiwan's economic structure changes gradually in the
directions noted earlier, economic vulnerability to external
influence will also diminish. This process of progressive improvement will be in direct contrast to the progressive deterioration of
the previous case.
B. Current Exports and Imports
If US-ROC relations remain as they are, Taiwan's external
trade can continue to expand as long as its products remain
competitive and the world economy - the U.S. and Japanese
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economies in particular - remains reasonably prosperous.
However, even under present conditions, there have been repeated
PRGinspired efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. One of the
latest examples was the attempt in 1976 by members of the
INTELSAT to replace the ROC with the PRC in its membership,
which could become a prelude to an attempt to deny the ROC
access to the INTELSAT Indian Ocean satellite for direct
communication with such countries as Spain, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia.
If US-ROC relations are downgraded and the legal status of
Taiwan can be questioned, both private organizations and
governments will be in a position to raise issues that are
disruptive of Taiwan's foreign trade. For instance, would Taiwan
continue to enjoy MFN status in the United States and other
markets? Would Eximbank facilities continue to be available to
private and public ROC firms? Would Taiwan benefit under the
General Preference Scheme of tariff reductions? Would ROC flag
ships and aircraft be able to function in foreign countries without
interference and delay? Would ROC government and private
interests be able to exploit resources in the deep sea and on the
continental shelf under whatever protection international law
normally provides? Would ROC fishing vessels be able to operate
in ever-widening areas as they do now? (One experimental voyage
to the South Polar region for shrimping was completed early this
year.) Can visa applications by ROC businessmen and other
travelers be processed quickly? Would contractual obligations
between ROC and other nationals be enforceable and in what
court? Perhaps some of these questions cannot be answered
without court tests. In other cases, administrative interpretations
of ambiguous regulations and statutes may be necessary. In either
case, delays will be unavoidable. As a matter of fact, delays can be
easily created, which alone may raise the cost of doing business
with Taiwan and by Taiwan businessmen, with the attendant
adverse effect on profit prospects. 15 Such tactics can be adopted by
15. An example of such delay, which borders on deliberate harassment, is the
recent case in San Francisco where the acceptance of a gift from the city of Taipei
to the city of San Francisco in the form of a pavilion to be erected in Golden Gate
Park has been held up by the San Francisco Planning Commission's insistence
that the donors file an environmental impact report to show how the aesthetic
quality of the park would not be adversely affected.
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Taiwan's political detractors. They can also be initiated by
business rivals. Only in the case of the two-China alternative can
the risks noted above be minimized.

C. Taiwan's Economic Response
One of the factors that will affect confidence on the part of
foreign investors and traders who deal with Taiwan is the latter's
response to the uncertainties and challenges posed by US-ROC
relations. For instance, following the unfavorable international
political developments in 1971-72 and partly as a response to
them, the ROC government has further liberalized its rules
governing foreign remittance and travel. Import restrictions have
also been liberalized. Conceivably, a similar response could be
forthcoming if US-ROC political relations are downgraded, or in
spite of such a downgrading. However, a diametrically opposite
response could have been made in the past, and it would be no less
possible in the future. This possibility is greater if a major adverse
economic impact, or the rapid worsening of an initially minor
impact, is envisioned by ROC policy makers. In such an
eventuality, Taiwan may turn inward with the result of stricter
foreign trade and exchange controls, rising defense expenditures
and a slow-down of economic growth and foreign trade. The issue
involves weighing short-run gains against long-run disadvantages. So far Taiwan has kept its economic policies focused on
long-term gains. However, short-run risks could loom too large to
be ignored.

D. Third Country Policies and Responses
of Private Individuals
Threats to curtail the freedom of access between Taiwan and
the rest of the world in terms of communication, travel by air and
sea, freight transportation, national markets, legal redress, and
exploitation of marine and undersea resources are unlikely to
materialize in the near future as a result of the direct physical
intervention of the PRC as long as the latter's capacity to do so is
limited. Implementation of such threats by Peking at this time
will require the cooperation of other governments or private
organizations and individuals that take advantage of Taiwan's
particular international status. While concrete actions can be
instigated by Peking, they can also be initiated by the individual
interests of third parties. Hence the policies of countries other
than the PRC and ROC can play an important role. Will they be
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willing to be a party to the infringement of the freedoms
mentioned above with respect to Taiwan or any other economic
entity regardless of the latter's de jure international political
status? Will they permit their own citizens to engage in
discriminatory practices that aim at the economic isolation of
Taiwan? U.S. policy and leadership in this regard are of vital
importance and can affect the attitudes of other countries. The
following examples in 1976 will serve as illustrations.
1. A message was delivered to the president of the National
Council for US-China Trade by a member of the PRC Liaison
Office in Washington in May 1976 to the effect that U.S. firms
might find their trade with the PRC adversely affected by their
membership in a recently formed US-ROC Economic Council. The
message ostensibly originated from the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade in Peking and was duly passed
on by the president of the National Council to the latter's
members in a memorandum for their attention, dated May 11,
1976.
2. According to a Los Angeles Times report on September 8,
1976, several U.S. firms had been targets ofPRC discrimination in
their trade probes because of their attempts to do business with
both Taiwan and the Mainland. This point was made amply clear
to them by the PRC. A less clear case was reported by the Wall
Street Journal on September 14, 1976, concerning the refusal of
Mainland China banks to cash American Express travellers
checks for visitors, presumably because of the company's
relationship with the ROC.
A directive by President Ford to the then Secretary of
Commerce, officially released by the White House on October 7,
1976, during the heat of the presidential campaign, reaffirmed our
national policy of opposition to boycott actions against "nations
friendly to us" and made Arab boycott request reports filed by
U.S. companies with the Department of Commerce available to
the public. The kind of implied request by Peking that U.S. firms
intending to sell to the PRC not engage in various relationships
with the ROC would seem to fall under the purview of U.S. Export
Administration Regulations paragraph 369.2 and paragraph 369.3
requiring reporting within 15 calendar days of receipt of the
request. A California law (A.B. No. 3080) has specifically made it
unlawful to exclude persons or corporations from business
transactions on the basis that the party conducts or has
conducted business in a particular location or on the basis of sex,
race, creed, color, etc. On the national level several anti-boycott
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bills with provisions of economic penalties for offenders are now
in the Congress. It remains to be seen whether the same principles
would in fact apply to discriminatory measures practiced by the
PRC aimed at US-Taiwan economic relations.
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES ON
U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The foregoing discussion attempts to identify the economic
consequences of alternative U.S. policies for Taiwan. From the
standpoint of the United States the relative desirability of the
three alternatives depends on which of them would on balance
further U.S. objectives the most. What are the fundamental U.S.
economic interests in the present context? In the short run, one
might include stable and expanding markets for U.S. exports and
sources of supply of U.S. imports and protection of existing U.S.
investments abroad. The major long-run U.S. international
economic objectives are economic security of the countries
concerned, expansion of world trade and economic growth of per
capita income in the developing countries, and safeguarding of
new investment opportunities for American investors. The relative
weights assigned to these objectives vary somewhat with the
decision-maker's perceptions, their relation with other noneconomic objectives, and' the specific circumstances in which the
choices present themselves. There are, therefore, always some
uncertainies regarding the relative importance of different U.S.
objectives at any given time. By and large, however, these do
represent the basic U.S. economic interests.
US-PRC VERSUS US-ROC TRADE

Since 1971 the United States has been trading with the PRC
and Taiwan at the same time. A no-change policy or a two-China
policy would probably have little short-run effect on US-ROC
trade prospects but might increase U.S. direct investment in
Taiwan. The PRC could be antagonized by such stands and divert
its U.S. trade to elsewhere, other things being equal, if shifts are
possible. Downgrading of US-ROC relations, together with
diplomatic recognition of Peking, may also create a similar but
reverse situation in which the United States may lose in its trade
with Taiwan and gain in its trade with the PRC. To provide some
background information for discussion of the possible tradeoffs,
Figure 10 compares U.S. exports to, and imports from, the PRC
and Taiwan in 1971-76. The comparison shows two distinctive
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features. First, US-ROC and US-PRC trade are of very different
orders of magnitude. Two-way US-ROC trade in 1975 was $3,602
million, almost eight times the US-PRC trade of $462 million. In
1976, the respective totals were $337.3 million for US-PRC trade
and $4,527.3 million for US-ROC trade, or 13 times larger. The
enormous difference suggests that Taiwan is at present a far more
important market for U.S. exports and source of supply of U.S.
imports than the PRC. A 10 percent loss of trade with Taiwan
would have to be compensated by a 130 percent increase in USPRC trade. On the other hand, a total loss of US-PRC trade could
be made up with a 7.4 percent increase in US-ROC trade. Second,
U.S. exports to the PRC were more erratic than U.S. exports to
Taiwan. For instance, there was a sharp drop in U.S. exports to
the PRC in 1974-75. In part this was a result of overcommitment
by Peking in the early 1970s. In part it was due to a shift of its
grain purchase to suppliers. In any event, Peking makes no secret
of its position that trade is a legitimate economic tool to be used to
enhance its diplomatic and political leverage, as has been made
abundantly clear in Teng Hsia-ping's speech before the United
Nations General Assembly on April 10, 1974. Therefore, in
expanding exports to the PRC, one must be prepared to face the
constant risk of abrupt shifts.
At any rate, a sustained increase in US-PRC trade cannot be
based on a shift of PRC trade from other partners to the United
States, but rather on growth of the PRC's total trade. The crucial
question is, therefore, the trade potential of the PRC. Since
Peking's imports depend on its exports, trade potential, in the long
run, means essentially export potential. In the two decades up to
1970, PRC exports grew at the rate of two to three hundred million
dollars a year, a small amount compared to T~iwan's current
level. When the PRC began to export oil in significant quantities
in 1973, it was widely believed that this new export would provide
the key to an upsurge of exports. There was indeed an upsurge
during 1970-75, but it was due largely to price increases during
this period. More important, it is questionable whether the PRC's
oil exports could indeed play a leading role; they have not lived up
to expectations thus far. Whether their growth has been restricted
by internal supply or demand conditions, or by the leadership's
change of plans, is not entirely cJP.ar. However, one external factor
is significant in limiting the contribution of the PRC's oil exports
to its foreign exchange earning power. Peking began exporting oil
at a time when the oil crisis triggered world-wide inflation and
recession. As a result, the prices of the PRC's imports rose much
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faster than those of its traditional exports (i.e., exports other than
oil). That is to say, the terms of trade became adverse to the PRC
so far as traditional exports were concerned. This was offset by
the rise in price of its oil exports. The net effect is that the increase
in export capacity in real terms was rather limited. In addition,
two recent events would probably delay export growth somewhat.
These were the Tangshan earthquake, which inflicted heavy
damage on a major coal production center, and the need for
foreign exchange to pay for the large number of plants contracted
earlier.
PRC earnings from exports to the U.S. can increase if Peking
is granted MFN status, which would enable suppliers of these
products to promote them more vigorously even if their dollar
prices were to remain unchanged. Greater sales are possible, of
course, if prices are reduced somewhat although lower prices are
by no means contingent upon MFN status since there is no direct
relationship between external prices and Chinese domestic cost.
When we compare the types of U.S. imports from the PRC and
Taiwan, as shown in Table 2, one interesting feature emerges.
What the United States buys most from Taiwan it buys very little
from the PRC, and vice versa. This suggests that Taiwan and the
PRC supplement each other as sources of U.S. imports. The PRC
provided mostly crude materials, food, chemicals and some
manufactured goods. Taiwan supplied large amounts of machinery and transportation equipment and manufactured goods. The
implication ofthis complementarity for the United States is that it
would be difficult to replace one source of supply with the other.
To make up for the loss of a supplier, it might be possible to
restructure the other's exports or to turn to a third source. But
restructuring exports is not a simple task and the question
remains as to whether the country's comparative advantage
would justify such a drastic change economically. As for the
possibility of a third supplier, the alternative is certainly feasible.
To a degree, South Korea or Hong Kong could partially take the
place of Taiwan. But again, there is the question of the terms of
trade. When there is less competition among the suppliers, the
terms of trade generally work against the buyer. This brings us to
the problem of the PRC and Taiwan as alternative markets for
U.S. exports.
Table 3 shows U.S. exports to the PRC and Taiwan by
commodity groups in 1971-76. The picture here is quite different
from U.S. imports. Both the PRC and Taiwan buy more or less the
same group of U.S. products. Both are competing for U.S. exports.
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Table 2.
U.S. Imports from Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S. $)

Total imports
Taiwan
PRC
Food, live animals
Taiwan
PRC
Beverages, tobacco
Taiwan
PRC
Crude materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan
PRC
Mineral fuels,
lubricants, etc.
Taiwan
PRC
Oils & fats, animal,
vegetable
Taiwan
PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan
PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan
PRC
Machinery, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous
Taiwan
PRC

1971

1972

1973

1974

817.4
4.9

1,293.5
32.3

1,772.5
64.0

2,107.6
114.7

54.2
1.5

84.1
4.2

85.3
6.0

111.9
13.5

1_92.4
14.2

0.3
0.7

0.4
2.8

1.8

11.7
12.3

15.0
14.6

14.1
16.3

11.1
17.6

13.9
38.5

0.4

2.1
0.4

0.4
0.1

3.4

0.01
neg.

0.1
0.7

0.1
0.4

0.5
1.9

0.3
2.4

7.0
2.2

1975

1976

1,946.0 2,958.4
158.3 201.9
142.0
23.8
0.09
0.3

6.9
0.3

9.5
2.1

12.1
8.2

31.9
18.4

16.2
15.9

26.1
18.0

119.4
0.5

193.2
7.4

242.2
21.0

288.0
42.7

238.0
79.4

355.4
68.5

202.2

401.1
0.1

600.5
0.4

685.3
0.1

488.5
0.3

780.2
1.3

420.1
0.3

584.0
6.1

797.6
11.2

954.7
19.2

964.5 1,618.0
25.6
47.5

7.5

9.4
0.1

17.1
0.8

20.8
1.2

31.4
1.6

22.4
1.6

Sources: 1971: U.S. Department of Commerce, General Imports, World Area by
Commodity Groups, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 374.
1972-75: Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 2, 1976, p. 44.
U.S. Dept. Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade, Office of East-West Policy,
U.S. Trade Status with Communist Countries, February 1977.
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Table 3.
U.S. Exports to Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S.$)

Total exports
Taiwan

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

342.7

629.5
60.2

1,165.0
689.1

1,423.8
806.9

1,655.7
303.6

1,568.9
135.4

30.5

55.9
56.0

154.1
410.1

167.8
329.6

180.9
0.02

202.1

10.1

14.9

18.7
1.4

30.8
2.7

27.5

13.2
neg.

141.6

149.1

319.1
171.9

307.3
328.0

407.5
100.1

304.5
13.0

2.1

2.6

3.5

7.2
0.2

7.2
0.2

0.01
0.1

4.4

4.3
2.2

5.2
19.2

18.4
7.5

10.0

12.2

25.2

32.4

90.0
7.9

127.4
10.2

125.3
5.2

154.6
10.4

25.3

31.4

76.2
9.0

123.4
18.5

141.3
73.8

132.2
43.3

157.5

233.4
2.0

398.2
69.0

562.7
106.7

599.7
118.8

666.2
65.1

13.1

20.5
1.1

21.2
0.8

32.4
2.7

39.2
4.9

69.5
3.4

1.8

2.5

5.9

6.7
0.3

6.2
0.4

PRC
Food and live animals
Taiwan

PRC
Beverages and tobacco
Taiwan

PRC
Crude materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan

PRC
Mineral fuels,
lubricants, etc.
Taiwan

PRC
Oils & fats, animal,
vegetable
Taiwan

PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan

PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan

PRC
Machinery, transportation equipment
Taiwan

PRC
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Taiwan

PRC
Items not classified
by kind
Taiwan

PRC
See Sources, Table 2 supra.

3.4
0.02
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It would be to the advantage of the United States to have two
buyers rather than one. On this account, the two-China case is
perhaps preferable to others simply because it offers the U.S. more
options so far as export markets are concerned.
LONG-RANGE U.S. INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY AND GROWTH

The oil crisis has brought into sharp focus the need to insure
economic security for all countries in an international environment characterized by growing interdependence through trade,
flow of technology and investment. It is a declaratory policy of the
United States to pursue this goal.1 6 Any abrupt move by the
United States that causes serious disruption and tension in
international economic relations is therefore contrary to U.S.
interests and to what it has been preaching to the OPEC
countries. By this criterion the no-change policy would obviously
be less disruptive than the other alternatives, particularly in the
short-run. As we have noted above, diplomatic recognition of
Peking and withdrawal of recognition of the ROC would probably
generate an economic shock in Taiwan with adverse effects on its
growth rate and perhaps even its viability.
In its struggle for economic survival, Taiwan may resort to
rather drastic measures such as devaluation to offset a possible
export decline, and stricter control of the free flow of goods,
people, information and capital - a series of measures that
probably would not hurt the U.S. economy seriously but nonetheless could have destabilizing effects in the region. The two-China
policy might also generate a shock, but it is likely to be a political
rather than economic shock, and would have its main impact on
the PRC. If we look beyond the immediate future, the potential
disputes over resources on the continental shelf could be further
complicated by an additional claimant. But the emergence of
Taiwan as an independent state has positive elements. The
current trend toward expanding trade and international flows of
technology and investment might continue as risks and uncertainties subside. They may even accelerate in the event of diplomatic
recognition of the PRC and Taiwan at the same time.
If indeed the latter occurs, a two-China policy would help to
attain the long-range U.S. objective of assisting the developing
16. Address by Henry A. Kissinger, delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan, at the
Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 1,
1975.
•
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countries to raise their living standards. A no-change policy would
probably have neutral effects, if we accept the premise that
Peking could expand its trade and technology transfer as much as
it can under the present arrangement. By contrast, diplomatic
recognition of Peking is likely to bring about economic stagnation
if not a decline in the Taiwan economy.
For Japan, U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking has yet
another unfavorable effect. Like Taiwan, Japan depends heavily
on the free flow of raw materials and fuels. It is therefore
important that no precedent be establised so that shipping and
trade involving Japan would be disrupted. Since diplomatic
recognition might lead to economic warfare and possibly military
confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC, it would be in
Japan's economic interest that the United States adopt another
alternative.

Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Wu for giving us quite a bit to think
about and discuss in the coming hour and a half or so. He was
particularly grateful that Dr. Wu brought in the Japanese
dimension, because he thought as we discussed the whole question
of US-ROC relations and involvement with the PRC, we had to
keep in mind that successive presidents of the U.S. over the past
several years as well as the present incumbent, Mr. Carter, had
stated over and over again that the fundamental American
relationship in the Asian Pacific is the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
Therefore we must understand how important this was in any
discussion that we had on events in Asia.
Dr. Sigur then introduced Dr. Robert Heuser of the Max
Planck-Institute at Heidelberg to speak. He said that he need
not tell the participants very much about that institute since all of
us knew of that famous institute. Dr. Heuser was going to speak
on the legal aspects of trade with, and investment in the Republic
of China in the experience of the German Federal Republic (FRG).
Dr. Heuser sketched the history of FRG-ROC trade relations
up to 1976, when Germany was the ROC's third-ranked trade
partner, following the United States and Japan. He noted also the
growth of German capital investment in the ROC, especially in
the last few years. Lack of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, according to Dr. Heuser, is not a substantial impedi-
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ment to trade. Government investment guarantees are available
to the German investor in spite of the lack of an FRG-ROC
"investment protection agreement"; however, because of the shortterm nature of most German investment in the ROC and because
of, among other things, the ROC's internal investment protection
scheme, German investors rarely take advantage of these
guarantees. Dr. Heuser also noted that protection with regard to
trademarks and patents is available, but that protection against
infringement of copyrighted textile designs remains unsatisfactory. Dr. Heuser concluded by discussing the effects of the EEC
common commercial policy on FRG-ROC economic relations. To
date, the common commercial policy has only affected German
textile imports from the ROC. However, the effects of protective
measures undertaken by the EEC remain an important matter of
concern.
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Robert
Heuser.]

LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH AND
INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON TAIWAN: THE
GERMAN EXPERIENCE
RoBERT HEUSER*
I. INTRODUCTIONt

It is the purpose of this paper to show a pattern of economic
relationship between two countries whose economies are greatly
dependent on foreign trade but whose trading citizens have to deal

* Dr. iur., research fellow, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law, Heidelberg; associated with Dr. Wellbrock and Partners,
law office, Heidelberg.
t Abbreviations: ABl. =Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemeinschaften (EEC
Gazette); AHD = Aussenhandelsdienst (Dusseldorf); A WD = Aussenwirtschaftsdienst, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (Heidelberg); BGBl. = Bundesgesetzblatt (Gazette of the FRG); Cosway-Ma-Shattuck = R. Cosway, H. P. Ma, W.
Shattuck, Trade and Investment in Taiwan, Taipei 1973; DWD =(Die Aussenwirtschaft, Deutscher Wirtschaftsdienst, (Koln); F. A. = Freies Asien (Bonn); ILM =
International Legal Materials; TIP = Taiwan Industrial Panorama.
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without much governmental assistance because of the lack of
diplomatic relations.
The information upon which this paper is based has mainly
been obtained from Chinese and German legal sources, from
relevant German journals and from interviews I had with Chinese
representatives in Germany as well as with members of German
institutes (including the German Ministry of Economic Mfairs),
finally with executives of German capital and merchandise
exporting companies.
Let me make at the beginning some short remarks concerning
the development of Chinese-German economic relations in
general, providing you with some statistical data.
II. GERMAN-CHINESE TRADE AND GERMAN INVESTMENT
IN TAIWAN: SOME HISTORICAL AND
STATISTICAL DATA

The development of economic relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the ROC reflects the relevant prewar experiences: a comparatively high trade exchange on the one
hand and a comparatively small investment willingness on the
other, a phenomenon - by the way - which can be observed in
German foreign economic activities in general. Direct investments
of German companies in developing countries are only one-half of
the French, one-third of the British and one-ninth of the U.S.
private investments in those countries. 1 The reasons for this are
highly complex - experiences of expropriation and confiscation
after two world wars, comparatively little training in dealing in
and with non-European countries because oflimited experience as
an imperial·power, may be mentioned.
A new beginning of ROC-German commercial interest after
World War II came no earlier than the end of the fifties,
increasing in the sixties, and taking on considerable volume in the
seventies.
Taiwan's development in to one of the leading industrialized
countries in the Far East within less than one decade, becoming
able to offer her industrial products to the markets of South-East
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Americas was
1. See, e.g., E. Eppler, Wenig Zeit fUr die Dritte Welt, Stuttgart 1971, at 88. For
a broader inquiry into the problem of direct investment in developing countries see
Awni-Al-Ani, German Investment in Developing Countries, in: Intereconomics
(Hamburg), No. 7, 1969, 219-221.
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carefully observed in German commercial circles. 2 It was noticed
with satisfaction by potential German traders and investors that
the ROC government promoted the economy of the country
according to the principles of a free enterprise, supporting the
extension of the private sector of the economy as well as a more
active participation of private domestic and foreign capital, 3 that
the establishment of Export Processing Zones was of such great
success as to become a model for other developing countries, 4 and
that the government was reorganizing the foreign-trade bureaucracy5 and simplifying investment formalities. 6
The comprehensive market studies undertaken by the Chinese
Industrial Development and Investment Center (IDIC) regarding
the development of industries emphasized six branches of
industry as deserving preferential support: petrochemical, plastics, electronic, steel, watch-making and synthethic resin industries. It is clear that such emphasis would appeal greatly to
German economic interests.
Since the end of the fifties the Federal Republic has played an
active role in Taiwan's economy. Leading German producers of
the chemicals industry are represented in Taiwan, and German
experts of various industrial branches are advising domestic
companies, many Qf which are producing under a German license.
German industries have delivered - partly with U.S. financial
assistance - a remarkable share of industrial equipment in
Taiwan. German firms supply on a basis of long-term payment.
Examples are the "Southeast Soda Ash Plant" in Suao, cement
plants, machinery for cargo-ships, and projects in the field of
traffic and communication and more recently in the field of petrochemistry.
Looking at some figures we realize the continuous growth of
foreign trade between the ROC and the FRG. In 1954 Germany's
2. See, e.g., AHD vol. 19 (1965), at 600:-Taiwans Werdegang zum autarken
Staat; DWD 1963, No. 23: Der industrielle Aufschwung in Taiwan; id. 1966, at 1142:
Giinstiges lnvestitionsklima fordert den industriellen Aufbau in Taiwan; id. 1967,
at 791: Auslandische Privatinvestitionen forcieren wirtschaftliche Prosperitat
Taiwans. For a scholarly assessment see J. Riedel, Wirtschaftspolitik und
Exportentwicklung in Taiwan, in: Die Weltwirtschaft, 1975, No. 1, 100-113.
3. In AHD vol. 22 (1968) at 190 "the excellent opportunities for foreign
investment in Taiwan" ("a model case of economic development within the
developing countries") are stressed.
4. AHD vol. 26 (1972), at 952.
5. AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 40.
6. AHD vol. 22 (1968), at 536.
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share of Taiwan's total imports was 2.46%, 4.74% in 1961, 5.1% in
1969 and 5% in 1976. Germany's share of Taiwan's total exports
was 1.82% in 1954, 3.83% in 1961, 4% in 1969 and 4.7% in 1976.
Expressed in absolute figures, the value of Taiwan's imports
from Germany was US$4.3 million in 1954, 9.1 million in 1961,
about 80.0 million in 1969 and 416 million in 1976. 7 For more than
a decade there has been a trade surplus for the ROC, with the
single exception of 1974. (This is also the case regarding the U.S.
but not Japan.)
A comparison with other major trading partners of the ROC
shows that Germany ranks at third place after the U.S. and
Japan, although there is still a broad gap between Germany and
those two countries concerning trade exchange with the ROC. It
would seem, however, that the ROC Government is attempting to
intensify the trade with European countries in order to avoid
dependence on any single country. 8 The trade deficits with Japan
are a particular object of concern, although Chinese specialists see
clearly enough that the time of economic independence from
Japan is "a long way off," 9 and that the competitiveness of

7. Sources: AHD vol. 16 (1962), at 376; TIP vol. 5, No. 2 (Feb. 1, 1977).
Shipments and financing of the FRG through Hong Kong are not
contained in these figures, which only reflect the direct foreign trade relations of
both countries. In terms of merchandise, the imports from Taiwan consist at the
present time of 35% textiles and 20% canned goods, tl)e remainder being products of
light industries as plastics and electrical. See, e.g., Lien·he pao (Taipei), Dec. 19,
1974.
8. In "Foreign Trade Development in the Republic of China," issued by the
Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1976) it says that "our
private enterprises have been urged to procure more sophisticated, high quality
machinery and equipment from European countries ... " (p. 11). And the Secretary
General of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development
of the ROC appealed in 1968 to European business men "not (to) give up Taiwan as
a captive market for Japanese and American suppliers" (see S. Y. Dao, How to
Strengthen Economic Relations between the Republic of China and Western
Europe, in: Chronique de Politique Etrangere, vol. 21 (1968), at 709, 719). From May
25 to June 15, 1969, a "European Industrial Machinery Exhibition" took place in
Taipei. It was sponsored by the Council for International Economic Cooperation
and Development and the Free China Europe Industrial Institute. The share of
German industry was more than 50% of the total participants (eight West
European countries). In the summer of 1973 a Chinese trade delegation consisting
of 13 representatives of Chinese companies visited the main commercial and
industrial centers in Western Europe. With the support of the Government, Chinese
commercial and industrial circles in Taiwan established in Nov. 1975 a "Society
for the Promotion of Chinese-European Trade."
9. Quoted in AHD, vol. 26 (1972), at 914: Europa·Orientierung Taiwans.

176

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

European products remains adversely affected by Europe's high
labor costs and the distance separating Europe and Taiwan.
In contrast to foreign trade, the export of private German
capital to Taiwan is rather limited in volume. Up to the present
time little more than a dozen German firms have established
themselves as government-approved direct investors in Taiwan.
All but one are fully owned subsidiaries 10 and are producing
mainly in the fields of chemistry, electronics, optics and clothes.
Most of them are situated in the Export Processing Zones, and
only the few looking for a local market are outside the zones.
The development of German direct investment in Taiwan is
expressed by the following figures: 11 Starting from 1972, the total
investment was US$3.7 million in that year, 4.1 in 1973, 5.3 in
1974, 6.6 in 1975, and up to June 30, 1976 already 6.9. 12
It is obvious that the gap between Germany on the one hand
and Japan and the U.S. on the other is even wider concerning
direct investment than it is in the case of trade. It is not surprising
that the ROC government tries to reduce the domination of single
countries in favor of a more balanced foreign investment
situation. A special need for such a balance seems to be felt
concerning investments in the fields of electronics and automobile
parts. In March 1972 the Vice-Chairman of the Council for
International Economic Cooperation and Development of the
10. One is a joint venture with local firms; another a joint venture with a
Japanese firm. From the German experience it would seem that the ROC
government does not follow the general trend in the developing countries towards
emphasizing joint ventures. For an assessment of the contribution of joint ventures
to the development of the South Korean economy see Chang Young Kim, Der
Beitrog von partnerschafts. Unternehmen (Joint Ventures) zum Eut~cklungspro
zess. Dargestellt am Beispiel der Republik Korea, Ph.D. thesis, Koln 1971.
11. Source: Information from the Federal Ministry of Economic Mfairs: See
also also Jahresbericht of the Ostasiatischen Vereins e.V. 1975/1976, p. 32. This is
little less than investments in the Republic of Korea, only a third of those in Hong
Kong, a fifth of Indonesia, a seventh of Singapore and less than a fifteenth of
German investment in Japan. According to paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Foreign
Economy Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) promulgated by the Federal
Government in 1966, German capital exports are to be notified to the German
Federal Bank and are published in the Federal Bulletin. All information
concerning the investor is protected by a secrecy clause. The above-mentioned
figures, of course, do not contain the quite considerable capital sums which are
raised by German companies on the well functioning Asia-Dollar market.
12. Within the last 25 years the total investment of European 'Countries was
US$194,437,000 (i.e., 17.73% of all foreign investments), as compared to
US$491,810,000 (i.e., 44.83%) of the US and US$246,632,000 (i.e., 22.48%) of Japan.
Source: F.A. no. 3/1977 (Feb. 10, 1977), at 4.
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ROC explained at the International Conference on Foreign
Investment in Asian Developing Countries held in Hamburg the
"Reasons and Motives for German Investment in Taiwan," 13
clearly with the intention of appealing to potential German
investors. An increase of German capital export to Taiwan is very
probable. Negotiations concerning a big German investment
project in the field of electronics have just been successfully
concluded.
Let me now turn to the consideration of some specific legal
problems which emerge in the economic relations between the two
countries.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT

A. The Institutional Framework
After July 3, 1941, when the Chinese Republic - then in
Chungching - cut off diplomatic relations with Germany (the
German government had two days before recognized the Wang
Ching-wei government of N anjing), and after the end of the Wang
Ching-wei regime in 1945, Germany has never established
diplomatic relations with the ROC. There are no agreements in
force between the two countries. Consequently, the existing
economic relations are of a purely private nature, little aided by
governmental encouragement and international legal assistance.14
In view of this situation the institutional framework for
economic cooperation is merely of a private and - as far as
Chinese representation in Germany is concerned - of a semiofficial (if at all) character. 15 The representation of ROC economic
interests in the Federal Republic is institutionalized in the Far
East Trade Service Center, which deals with trade relations
13. For W.H. Fei's speech see: Industry of Free China (Tzi-yu Chung-Kuo chi
kung-ye), vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (March 1972), at 2.
14. On a governmental level there was only "technical help" for a short time
at the end of the sixties, limited in volume (2.3 mill. DM) and dropping to none
when diplomatic relations were established with the PRC. (Information from the
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation to the author.)
15. But even less official than Japan-ROC relations, which are characterized
by simply changing the label. Former diplomatic personnel now work in the
"Japan-Taiwan Interchange Association" (offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung) and
the "East Asia Relations Association" (offices in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka).
Both organizations concluded an agreement on Dec. 26, 1972 concerning
"Commerce, economy and culture" (see China aktuell, Hamburg, Dec. 1972, at 14.)
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between Taiwan and Germany, and the Asia Trade Center, which
consists of three bodies: one responsible for purchase from all
Europe, one dealing with investment services concerning all
European investors, and one dealing with German-ROC tourism.
Both Centers have their seat in Frankfurt/Main and have close
contact with the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs. Cultural and
political information is offered by the Far East Information
Service, with branches in Bonn, Hamburg and West Berlin.
As far as German organizations are concerned, only the East
Asia Association (Ostasiatischer Verein e.V.) of Hamburg and
Bremen can be mentioned. This private association of German
businessmen interested in the Far East was founded in 1900 and
is engaged in the cultivation of trade relations with this region,
including the ROC. The German economy is so far not represented
in the ROC. The German Cultural Centers in Taipei and
Kaohsiung are not prepared to be of any assistance in economic
matters; there are no German banking and commercial institutions. Information concerning investment projects in Taiwan can
be received, however, from the German Consulate General in
Hong Kong.1s

B. Does This Lack of Diplomatic Relations Have a
Disturbing Impact on the Execution of Foreign
Trade and Investment Programs?

1. Protection of Investments
Foreign direct investments can be protected by different legal
means. The domestic legal order of the capital receiving country,
the contract between the government of this country and the
foreign investor, finally a bilateral or multilateral international
legal order all may be concerned with such protection.
The lack of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic
and the ROC frustrates the development of a bilateral international legal order in favor of the protection of German investments. Since 1959 the Federal Republic has concluded with 37

16. In contrast to the German absence of economic representation in Taiwan,
the Confederation of British Industries plans the establishment of an office in
Taipei with a "residential manager," and British and Canadian banks will open
branches in Taiwan. In 1974 an office of the "Australia-Free China Society,"
which represents Australian economic interests in Taiwan, was opened (see China
aktuell Hamburg, May 1974, at 227).
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developing countries so-called "investment-protection agreements."17 They are intended to assist in creating more favorable
conditions for private investments through a guarantee of legal
protection, especially against expropriation based on an international legal commitment. Whereas the government of the USA
relies for this purpose 18 on its traditional form of Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the German government
chose with its "investment-protection agreements" a new way. It
is characterized by being shaped for the special needs of
developing countries and is confined to the protection of capital; it
does not contain any provisions concerning commerce and
freedom of settlement. 19
· Such an agreement was of course not concluded with the
ROC. Although German investors have confidence in the ROC
legal order - German lawyers feel at home in a legal system
which is shaped according to the civil law system and especially
according to German law - there lacks the confirmation and
attestation of the relevant contents of this domestic legal order by
an international legal commitment. While the value of an
investment-protection agreement might be contested, 20 the nonconsideration of the ROC within the agreement system of the
German government leads to problems concerning the
investment-risk guarantee which may be obtained by German
citizens or companies under the German investment guarantee

17. See Justus Alenfeld, Die lnvestitionsforderungsvertrage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M., 1971 and Helmut Frick, Bilateraler Investitionsschutz in Entwicklungslandern. Ein Vergleich der Vertragssysteme der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin 1975.
18. The justification for such U.S. treaties was expressed as follows: " ... to
reduce the special hazards to which overseas investment may be exposed by reason
of unfavourable laws or judicial conditions. Rigid exchange controls, inequitable
tax statutes, or drastic expropriation laws are not conducive to the free flow of
capital, and it is against obstacles of this kind that these treaties are directed," in:
UN Doc. E/3021, at 40.
19. The standard contents of these agreements is mainly as follows: clause of
non-discrimination (art. 2); provision against expropriation and for sufficient
compensation (art. 3); guarantee of free transfer of capital and profits (art. 4);
provisions concerning the transfers (art. 6, 7) and the jurisdiction in case of dispute
settlement (art. 11).
20. See, e.g., Ingrid Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in
Developing Countries, Epping, Essex 1973, at 34 f. She argues that investment
guarantee agreeeements add "little or nothing to what would anyway apply under
international law."
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program21 (covering the risks of war, inconvertibility, and
expropriation or confiscation). The main condition for receiving
such a guarantee is the existence of an investment-protection
agreement. The chief significance of such an agreement is
therefore its link to the national guarantee scheme. 22
The problem resulting from this legal mechanism for the
potential investor in Taiwan is as obvious as it is surmountable.
According to information from the Federal Ministry of Economic
Affairs, an ad hoc declaration of the Chinese government
(Ministry of Economic Affairs) presented to the German investor
concerning legal protection is required and is sufficient for
participating in the national guarantee scheme. This declaration
must contain an agreement on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
arbitration tribunal according to the 1966 World Bank Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of other States (International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes, New York). 23 Up to the present there
exists only one investment case which produced such a declaration.24 Other German investors just don't take advantage of the
Federal investment guarantee. They are aware that they are
participating in Taiwan's export boom and that their investments
will have amortized within about three years. The Federal
guarantee thus does not appear to be of major importance.
In this context it may be interesting to take into consideration
the results of a study of the Hamburg Institute for International
Economics (Hamburges Weltwirtschafts-Archiv) concerning Ger:
man investments in developing countries. Better support to be
21. See, e.g., paragraph 20 I, No. 3 of the Bundeshaushaltsgesetz of 1969, April
18, 1969, BGBl. 1969 II, 793 ff. Corresponding provisions are in the subsequent
Federal Budget Laws.
22. This function of the treaties is also emphasized by E. J. Nwogugu, The
Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Manchester, 1965,
at 70: "These are important and expensive protective measures which provide a
firm basis for the insurance of investments."
23. ROC and FRG have both ratified the Convention. See Joy Cherian,
Investment Contracts and Arbitration. The World Bank Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Leyden, 1975. List of signatories at 121. See
also AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 532. The ROC deposited its ratification on Dec. 10, 1968,
see ILM (1969), at 446.
24. The legal nature of this ad hoc declaration might be questioned. For this
complex problem, see, e.g., A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign
Investors, New York and London 1962, at 120 ff., 190ff., and K.·H. Bockstiegel, Der
Staat als Vertragspartner ausllindischer Privatuntemehmen, Frankfurt 1971; see
also chapter 2. of Delupis (supra note 20).
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extended by West Gennan diplomatic missions abroad and the
conclusion of investment pacts and of agreements on avoiding
double taxation were among the proposals which Gennan
companies who had answered the Institute's questionnaires
recommended for making it easier and more profitable to invest in
developing countries.2s

2. Trademark and Patent Protection
The mutual protection of trademarks was not possible for a
long time. The Chinese Trademark Law provides that "an
application for registration of a trademark may be refused
acceptance if it is filed by a national of a foreign country which
has not concluded with the ROC a treaty of agreement for
reciprocal protection of trademarks or which, by its national law
does not admit of trademark application by nationals of the ROC''
(paragraph 1, art. 3, Trademark Law of July 4, 1972). According to
the German trademark law of January 2, 1968, a foreigner who
has no fixed establishment in Gennany is protected by the law
only when the Federal Bulletin announces that the applicant's
home country protects Gennan trademarks to the same extent as
those of its own nationals (paragraph 35, art. 1). Thus neither
trademark law states as a precondition for mutual protection the
mere existence of treaty relations. 26 Because the ROC is not a
member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1891, repeatedly revised) or any other convention by
which mutual trademark protection would be guaranteed without
the above-mentioned announcement in the Federal Bulletin, this
protection can only be achieved by undertaking the two one-sided
measures provided for in the trademark laws of both countries.
However, it was only in July, 1967 that the Federal Bulletin
announced that Gennan trademarks are admitted in the ROC for
legal protection to the same extent as Chinese trademarks, 27 thus
expanding the protection of German trademark law to Chinese
trademarks.

25. See Awni-Al-Ani, supra note 1, at 221.
26. But this was the case before the revis~on of the ROC trademark law in
1958.
27. BGBl. I, at 549 and 574 (July 21, 1967): Notification of the Fed.eral Ministry
of Justice. Not mentioned in the standard work of German trademark law:
Baumbach-Hefermehl, Wettbewerbs- and Warenzeichenrecht, lOth edition, Munich
1969, under art. 35.

182

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

The situation concerning the protection of inventions is less
complicated insofar as the German patent law does not discriminate between German and foreign applicants. Applicants who live
abroad merely have the obligation to appoint a domestic
representative (art. 16, patent law of January 2, 1968). The
relevant provision of the valid Chinese patent law (art. 14) is
identical with that of the cited trademark law, thus leaving patent
protection for foreigners beyond the need of treaty relations. 28

3. Copyright Protection of Designs
Another example for the execution of economic relations
under the given circumstances is an arrangement concerning the
protection of copyright in design, which was reached in summer
1976 on a private basis between the German and the Taiwan·
Textile Federation (TTF). For western merchants in East Asian
countries imitation of designs is a matter of some concern. There
is quite considerable imitation in Taiwan, but the legal measures
of the domestic legal order are insufficient: there is neither a
separate law concerning protection of copyright in design nor a
special legislation concerning the repression of unfair competition.29
28. There are some German trademarks registered in the ROC. For figures
concerning the patents issued to Germans see Cosway·Ma·Shattuck at 474, table
39.
For some comparative figures concerning applications of patents and
trademarks of Asian countries in Germany see the following table:
Statistical Data Concerning Applications of East-Asian
Countries in the German Patent Office
Country

ROC
Singapore
S. Korea
Japan

Patent applications

Trademark applications

1973

1974

1975

1976

1973

1974

1975

1976

4
0
3
4962

12
2
4
5122

9
1
2
4322

19
1
7
4643

0
2
0
323

0
1
0
301

1
2
4
213

2
3
3
322

Source: Information from the President of the German Patent Office (Munich)
to the author.
29. See Teruo Doi, in: Cosway-Ma-Shattuck, at 462.
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The above-mentioned arrangement between the textile federations took as its model a governmental agreement which was
concluded shortly before (in June 1976) between the Federal
Republic and Hong Kong. The principles of this agreement may
be summarized as follows: 30 The Federal government is entitled to
present to the government of Hong Kong concrete cases showing
imitations of German designs in the field of textiles and clothes.
The Hong Kong government will examine - according to the law
of Hong Kong - whether a German design was wrongfully
reproduced. If this is the case, it will employ certain measures· in
order to avoid further infringement. If consultations between the
Hong Kong government and the company involved show that the
designs were given by a German ordering firm to the producer in
Hong Kong without the title to use them, then the government of
Hong Kong is prepared to communicate the name of the ordering
firm at the request of the German government.
The arrangement between the Chinese and German textile
organizations is based on similar principles. Measures to prevent
an infringement of copyright in design, including communication
of the name of the German ordering firm, are based on the private
legal relationship between TTF and the respective producer. This,
however, already shows the limits of the arrangement. It concerns
only textiles; moreover, TTF can only communicate information it
has received from its members. Therefore it is not surprising that,
despite the many infringements in Taiwan, the practical relevance of the arrangement is virtually nil. Up to the present only
two cases were communicated to the German Textile Federation.

4.

Claims of a German Ordering Firm

Insuperable problems can arise if claims of a German
ordering firm against the Chinese producer - e.g., because of
deficiency in the quality of the supplies - are made. The lack of
diplomatic relations and thus of an official commercial representation in Taiwan impedes the contact with Chinese companies
and an examination of their soundness, thus increasing the
ordering firm's risk. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the goods
destined for export have to be checked according to the "Commodity Inspection Law." 31 Article 8 provides that such commodities
30. According to Bundesministerium Wirtschaft, Tagesnachricht No. 7245 of
June 30, 1976.
31. Promulgated on December 14, 1932, amended on May 25, 1965 and
September 3, 1970.
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are to be inspected according to the CNS (China National
Standard). A possible divergence from the European standard
may result in claims by the European ordering firm. It is
suggested that Chinese lawyers do not always handle such claims
with sufficient emphasis, and that it is sometimes difficult to
reach court decisions.

5. FRG Risk Guarantees
Finally, the Federal Guarantees regarding risks of manufacture (risk before shipping) and export (risk after shipping) which
can be granted to German exporters may be mentioned. 32 They are
not affected by considerations concerning the nature of the stateto-state relationship.

C. Consequences of EEC Common Commercial
Policy for FRG-ROC Trade
As far as trade is concerned, the membership of the Federal
Republic in the EEC takes on significance. What are the
consequences of the EEC foreign trade policy for Chinese-German
trade?

1. The Commercial Policy of the EEC and Protective
Measures as an Exception to the Principle
of Unrestricted Importation
Articles 110 to 116 of the EEC Treaty deal with the common
commercial policy of the community. The necessity for such a
policy derives from the fact that the EEC is founded on a full
customs union and therefore presents a common face to exporters
from non-EEC countries. 33 After the expiry of the transitional
period for the implementation of the EEC Treaty, "the common
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles" (art. 113)
with regard to both import and export policy. 34 Under EEC
Regulation 1025170 a common system to be applied to imports

32. The treatment of all relevant guarantees are delegated to the "Hermes
Kreditversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft" (Hamburg) and the "Deutsche Revisionsund Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft."
33. See A. Parry, EEC Law, London arid New York, 1977, No. 37-13.
34. For the progress made towards a common foreign trade law see Parry,
supra note 33, No. 37-27 ff., and Ehle-Meier, EWG-Warenverkehr. AuBenhandelZ<>lle-Subventionen, K<>ln 1971, at 419 ff.
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from non-EEC countries was established. 35 Its basic principle is
that of unrestricted importation. It means - together with its
counterpart in regard to EEC exports - that foreign trade with
third countries cannot be subjected to quantitative restrictions. In
a case of emergency, however, this unrestricted foreign trade can
be suspended for a specific period 36 through an introduction of
quantitative restrictions. Because of its exceptional character,
these restrictions have to take place within narrow limits,
particularly shaped by the principles of statutory reserve and of
proportion. The institutions of the Community and the member
states have only the right to issue specific protective measures
when the statutory preconditions exist, i.e., when by the import
situation the producers of same or similar goods within the
Community will suffer a substantial damage. The Community
regulations take the principle of proportion into account by
factual, temporal and local limits. The type of "appropriate
measures" (art. 11, Reg. No. 1025170) can be: introduction of a
license, fixing an import quota, issuing an instruction to stop all
imports. A newer measure consists of so-called "agreements of
self-limitation," 37 which result practically in an import quota
system.

2. Protection Measures Regarding Imports
from the ROC
The ROC was never officially linked with the EEC. 38
Nevertheless, in 1971 an agreement was concluded concerning the
trade in cotton. 39 This agreement was based on the 1962 Long
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles - Taiwan was a member of this arrangement - and
introduced quantitative restrictions by fixing certain quotas for
the importation of various cotton textiles. This ROC-EEC
35. Text: ABI. 1970, L 124 of June 8, 1970, p. 6; see also Regulation 1439174,
Abl. L 159, June 15, 1974.
36. There is the same mechanism in the GATT legal system.
37. Their compatibility with the GATT is doubtful; see, e.g., R. Zimmer, Zur
Problematik von Exportselbstbeschrankungen, in AWD vol. 15 (1969), 297-300.
38. In 1963 the ROC government applied to the EEC Commission in order to
accredit its ambassador in Brussels to the Community. It seems that the
institutions of the EEC were about to express consent see AHD vol. 18, 1964, at
116) when at the beginning of 1964 the breaking off of diplomatic relations
between the ROC and France took place, and the establishment of official relations
with the EEC was never realized.
39. ABI. February 2, 1971, No. L 43/22.
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arrangement had a term of three years, but was respected from
the end of 1973 until June 1975 through a unilateral decision of
the EEC. From July 1975 the governmental agreement was
replaced by a unilateral EEC commercial policy toward Taiwan,
by introducing quotas in the field of textiles. 40 This regulation
followed lines similar to the 1971 agreement but was extended in
its contents from cottons alone to all textiles. This extension
caused a considerable change in the European-ROC trade
relationship. Textiles presently make up more than one-third of
the total exports from Taiwan to the Common Market. In the 1971
agreement only the comparatively small share of cottons was
subjected to EEC import quotas, whereas the quotas concerning
all other textiles remained to be fixed by the several member
states. With the 1975 regulation the most sensitive part of the
textile sector was put under EEC import restriction. During the
last two years - in order to mention a pars pro toto - the EEC
has introduced by regulations issued by both the Commission and
the Council protective measures (usually import license requirements) concerning imports of textiles, canned mushrooms and
pipe joints made from malleable cast iron for several EEC
countries. There were also antidumping measures, e.g., concerning
imports of bicycle chains from Taiwan. 41
I may add that the ROC does not enjoy -probably because of
political considerations - the benefits of the Generalized System
of Preferences for developing countries sponsored by UNCTAD,
which the EEC adopted in July 1971. 42

3. EEC Impact on FRG-ROC Trade
As far as the significance of EEC commercial policy for ROCGerman trade is concerned, at present only imports of textiles

40. Regulation No. 1783/75 of July 10, 1975, ABI. No. L 182. The Taiwanese
textile production was several times the subject of discussion in the European
Parliament.
41. ABI. C 138, August 7, 1976. For the introduction of a temporary anti·
dumping duty in this case see the regulation of the Commission of November 12,
1976, ABI. No. L 312/41, November 11, 1976.
42. The Community offers, unilaterally, tariff-free quotas of semi-finished and
finished industrial goods to the seventy-seven (now more than hundred) developing
countries. See, e.g., H. Kramer, Zwei Jahre Zollpraferenzen der Europaischen
Gemeinschaften zugensten von Entwicklungslandern. Methoden und erste
Ergebnisse, in: Die Weltwirtschaft 1973, 1. Heft, pp. 196ff.
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from Taiwan are restricted, in that a German import authorization is required. 4 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

Let me summarize: The German economy is an important
trade partner but is somewhat reluctant to employ productive
capital; this, however, is gradually changing. The existing
institutional framework is regarded as sufficient for the execution
of trade and investment projects. The lack of diplomatic relations
is not felt as a heavy burden. Existing difficulties, as in the case of
claims, could be minimized by a more effective - of course,
unofficial - German representation (banking and commercial
institutions) in Taiwan, or, as in the case of the protection of
designs, by additional private arrangements and by new Chinese
legislation. The protection of direct investments in Taiwan seems
to be on a firm basis, even without the investor's interests being
secured under international law. The significance of protective
measures based on EEC law for an assessment of the WestEuropean markets and consequently for ROC industries remains
an important matter of concern.
You will have realized that I have only mentioned those
legally relevant aspects which develop on the surface of economic
relations with the ROC, aspects which are more or less familiar to
every lawyer dealing with foreign trade problems, and are not
necessarily linked to a specific cultural background. Implications
of cultural phenomena and their significance for international
business transactions are not easy to analyze. 44 Nevertheless, we
all know that they should not be neglected if reliable legal
counselling is to be achieved. Negotiations concerning a dispute
settlement clause, for instance, take on a quite different significance when they concern a contract with, say, a French partner
than in commerce with Chinese merchants who are well known
for their ability to compromise, although we must be sensitive
enough to realize where the cliche begins.
Only an insight into the socio-cultural environment of the
trading partner renders a responsible commercial contact possi43. Based on EEC regulation 1439174 of July 4, 1974 (see note 35 supra). See,
e.g., Reg. No. 1782175, ABI. No. L 182/1, of July 12, 1975; No. 3045175, ABI. No. L
3045175, ABI. No. L 303/26 of November 22, 1975.
44. See, e.g., A. T. von Mehren, The Significance of Cultural and Legal
Diversity for International Transactions, in: Ius Privatum Gentium, Festschrift fiir
Max Rheinstein, vol. 1, Tiibingen 1969, pp. 247-57.
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ble. This includes a deeper concern with the legal systems
involved. Chinese representatives in Germany have confirmed
that a closer cooperation between Chinese and German lawyers
could contribute in smoothing the way to a solution of trade and
investment problems and in participating in arbitration and
conciliation.
Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Heuser and also expressed his
appreciation to the three panelists for adhering to the time limit.
He then invited the three discussants to speak. The · first
discussant was Mr. Ralph Clough of the Brookings Institution.
Mr. Clough, Dr. Sigur pointed out, had served in the American
foreign service and was acting ambassador (charge d'affaire) at
the American Embassy in Taipei several years ago. Mr. Clough
has written extensively on Asia and American policy.
Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Heuser presented clearly the
obstacles to trade between West Germany and Taiwan, but
showed how many had been overcome, permitting trade with the
ROC to increase substantially. Mr. Clough presented some
questions for Mr. Heuser: Do merchants have travel problems?
Are trade fairs permitted? How does lack of diplomatic relations
with Germany affect Taiwan's trade as compared to its trade with
France and Canada, or compared to German trade with South
Korea? Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh make a strong
case that United States economic interests in Taiwan would be
best served by the adoption of a two-China policy, but do not take
account of overall U.S. interests. For one thing, the paper may
have underestimated the People's Republic of China's potential as
a trade partner with the United States. Mr. Clough pointed out
that in some years Japanese trade with the People's Republic of
China exceeded its trade with Taiwan. He added that both the
paper done by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh and the Chamber of Commerce
paper discussed the adverse effects of normalization, but did not
discuss possibilities for mitigating these adverse effects, as, for
example, by legislation providing for continuing access to
Eximbank loans.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Clough's statement.]
COMMENTS
RALPH

N.

CLOUGH

I would like to comment just briefly on the papers that have
been presented, raising a number of points which may be useful to
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discuss further in the question period. First, with respect to Dr.
Heuser's paper, it was a very interesting and unusual paper which
dealt with materials that most American scholars are unfamiliar
with. It brought out very clearly the obstacles to trade and
investment growing out of the fact that the German Federal
Republic has had no diplomatic relations with the Republic of
China since World War II. For example, he points out the absence
of a commercial representative to assist German merchants in
handling trade disputes in Taiwan. But he also shows ways in
which many of the obstacles have been overcome. For example, he
points out that a unilateral declaration by the government of the
Republic of China concerning legal protection for a German
investor qualifies that investor for participation in the German
national investment guarantee program. A third point that comes
out in Dr. Heuser's paper is that despite the obstacles which are
presented by the lack of diplomatic relations, there has been an
impressive growth in trade between Taiwan and the German
Federal Republic.
Perhaps Dr. Heuser could respond to some questions in my
mind concerning these relationships which he didn't touch on. I
wonder, for example, whether there are difficulties impeding
travel by merchants or officials to and from Taiwan. What about
trade fairs? Are these permitted? Further, I think it would be very
interesting to do some comparative studies to see how lack of
diplomatic relations affects trade between the Republic of China
and the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, it would be
interesting to look at the trade between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Republic of Korea, where diplomatic relations
do exist, to see how much greater that may be and why. It might
also be interesting to examine the trade between France and
Taiwan during the period before 1964 when diplomatic relations
existed between France and Taiwan to see how that compared
with German trade, or to compare the trade with Canada before
and after severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei to see how
that trade compares with German trade in these periods.
The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh and the statement of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan cover many of the
same problems. The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh is certainly an
excellent analysis of Taiwan's economic development. It identifies
very well those factors responsible for past development and those
essential to Taiwan's future economic development. I think the
paper makes a very strong case that U.S. economic interests in
Taiwan would be best served if the United States were to develop
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a more forthright two-China policy. Downgrading the political
relations between the United States and the Republic of China in
the process of normalizing relations with the PRC would
inevitably have some adverse effect on economic relations
between the United States and Taiwan. However, how lasting or
how serious that adverse effect might be is a matter for debate.
Much would depend on how far the United States went in
downgrading its political relations with the Republic of China.
I think that the paper may underestimate the potential of the
PRC as a trading partner of the United States in the long run.
Certainly, in the past Taiwan has been a good deal more
important and probably will be so for some years. But looking
farther ahead, much will depend on the kind of policies carried out
by the Peking government. Certainly, Mainland China will
always be a largely self-sufficient economy, just like the other big
continental economies, the United States and the Soviet Union.
But trade could grow substantially and provide more opportunities for American traders. It's interesting to note, for example,
that despite the importance of Taiwan as a trading partner with
Japan, there have been some years in which Japanese trade with
Mainland China has been larger than its trade with Taiwan.
It was, of course, beyond the scope of Dr. Wu's paper to
discuss the importance to overall U.S. interests of normalizing
relations with the PRC. The problem currently before U.S. policy
makers is to decide whether the potential gains from normalizing
relations with the PRC would outweigh the potential losses in
regard to interests in Taiwan. In reaching that decision they
would have to consider how possible economic losses in regard to
relations with Taiwan could be minimized. The American
Chamber of Commerce and Dr. Wu's paper point out ways in
which Taiwan's economy could be adversely affected by normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC and they identify a number
of legal questions which would arise on normalization with
Peking, but they do not consider ways in which the impact of this
change might be lessened, as, for example, by U.S. legislation
which retained guarantees of U.S. investment in Taiwan by the
Overseas Private Investment Insurance Corporation, permitted
the ROC to buy American military equipment; provided for
continuing access by the ROC to Eximbank loans, and so forth.
These are very complex, difficult issues. I don't want to get
into a discussion of them here, but I would just point out that
there seem to be two major factors in considering normalization of
relations with Peking and its potential impact on Taiwan. One is
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the psychological factor. It has been pointed out that past
progress in Taiwan and future progress, too, depend a great deal
on confidence, investors' confidence, in the future of Taiwan.
Consequently, if the United States nonnalizes relations with
Peking, it would need to take whatever action available to it to
preserve confidence in the future of our relations with Taiwan.
The second major area that needs to be considered - I've already
touched on it- is the legislative questions that arise. There are a
multitude of these which would affect American businessmen
dealing in Taiwan. There are many ways in which they might
conceivably be dealt with. All these factors have to be taken into
account. One must try to strike a balance between U.S. interests in
achieving nonnalization with Peking and retaining a satisfactory
relationship with Taiwan. Thank you.

Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Clough for his comments which
touched upon some of the very fundamental problems with which
we were trying to deal at this time. Dr. Sigur then introduced the
next discussant, Mr. Talbot Linstrom, to speak. Mr. Linstrom, Dr.
Sigur said, was from one of Washington's most prestigious law
firms, Whitman and Ransom, and he himself had dealt extensively with legal questions involving economic relations between
the United States and the Republic of China and other parts of
Asia as well.
Mr. Talbot Linstrom stated that law, economics, politics,
culture and social realities are all inseparable. He stated that the
papers presented indicate that from the standpoint of U.S.
balance of payments, trade with the PRC has been more favored,
because the greater proportion of our trade with the PRC consists
of American exports, paid for in hard cash, rather than imports.
On the other hand, while the Republic of China may be a large
exporter to the U.S., it is also a major debtor of the United States,
and hence has some leverage in negotiations - the larger the
debt, the greater the economic advantage. He suggested that
Taiwan might consider a reverse investment in underdeveloped
Central American and Caribbean countries and in United States
cities. He also suggested that as to nuclear and defense questions,
an abrogation of the defense treaty might not be so bad, because
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independent countries have a certain bargaining power and such
treaties prevent self-help in terms of a build-up of a country's own
defense mechanisms.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Linstrom's statement.]

COMMENTS
TALBOT S. LINSTROM

I would like to begin my brief remarks by noting that, as I
think both the papers and the prior discussant have indicated,
law, economics, politics, military realities and culture are
inseparable. Although I am here as an attorney, my comments
will of necessity be broader in scope than just the legal aspects of
the future relations between the United States and the Republic of
China and the United States and the People's Republic of China.
To the extent possible in the available time, I would like to cover
all three of the papers presented here today. With respect to the
paper submitted by the Chamber of Commerce, I think we ought
to focus on some critical issues which have been briefly touched
upon, and those are the nature of trade between the United States
and the People's Republic of China and the nature of trade
between the United States and the Republic of China. While trade
is mu~h, much larger in dollar terms between the United States
and Taiwan, in terms of balance of payments, it would appear
from the papers and, I think, on the basis of my own recollection,
that in regard to balance of payments the PRC trade has been
much more advantageous to the United States. There is currently
a very large, it would appear - I don't have any exact figures
immediately available -imbalance in trade between the United
States and Taiwan. Taiwan is a major exporter to the United
States for hard currency. A great portion of the total trade is
Taiwanese exports to the United States, whereas in respect to the
Mainland, the People's Republic, a great portion of that trade is
going from the United States and is being paid for in hard cash.
One of the points that the Chamber of Commerce made in its
paper was that it does not expect - at least it's not currently the
case - that the PRC will utilize American credit. A lot is being
paid in cash. I am not sure in respect to long-term good relations
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between nations that that is a net disadvantage. It may be a net
advantage.
However, with respect to the future, the fact that the Republic
of China has become a major debtor of the United States (I believe
that the paper points out that it is the second largest user after
Brazil of Eximbank-type credits from the United States and I
think that includes both direct credits, guarantees and FCIA
insurance) may give the Republic of China a very substantial - I
don't want to use the word "weapon" - means of leverage i.n its
future relations with the United States. This debtor relationship is
not a disadvantage to a country. In economic terms it is generally
an advantage, and the larger a debtor you become, the greater
your advantage. This has been proven to be the case in respect to
Yugoslavian financial relationships with both the United States
and the European Community. Whenever the Yugoslavians have
payment problems, they indicate to their creditor countries that
they may have difficulty in meeting their payments. The result of
that generally is an increase in credits available for purchasing
goods in both the Community and in the United States. I am not
suggesting this be done; I am only dealing here with potential
realities of the future, and I think that that factor is certainly a
net advantage to the Republic of China, and it's a net advantage
in dealing with the United States both in political terms and
economic terms.
Returning to the question of the proposition of the trade
between the United States and the Republic of China and its
future course, I think this has been gone into in some depth in Dr.
Wu's paper. Imports from Taiwan to the United States in recent
times have grown much more rapidly than our imports from the
rest of the world. This, of course, has been to a great extent in the
textile field and to a certain extent in shoes. I understand shoes
were touched upon yesterday; textiles were an earlier problem. In
both cases these rapid increases in imports from Taiwan to the
United States have resulted in some type of trade-restrictive
measure by the United States as a result of pressures both from
U.S. labor and manufacturers. The same thing is happening now
in the consumer electronics field. I think the major developments
in this field have also been touched upon both in the International
Trade Commission in the last month and in federal court two days
ago in New York, the Customs Court, with respect to consumer
electronics imports from Japan. But as Dr. Wu has pointed out,
there is a very close relationship between Taiwan, Japan and the
United States. Taiwan is a major supplier, not only of the
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components that go into Japanese consumer electronics, but has
itself been used by Japan to a certain extent as a supplier
manufacturing source for finished consumer electronic product
exports to the United States, a very good use and a very beneficial
one in trade terms to the U.S. consumer. Taiwan has become,
often through the aegis of Japanese trading companies, a major
supplier of consumer electronics to the United States. This means
it is directly involved in what is happening now. Perhaps if one
looks at the future, Taiwan ought to consider what Japan has
done in the U.S., and that is to reverse some ofthe investment and
itself come into the American market and invest in the areas in
which we have high degrees of unemployment and can utilize the
management and technology that Taiwan itself is developing. It
can also consider doing the same thing in the underdeveloped
countries of Central America and the Caribbean, which have and
will continue to enjoy very preferential economic relationships
with the United States.
I might touch in the one or two minutes I have left on two
other points in the Chamber of Commerce paper and which were
covered peripherally by the prior discussant. These are nuclear
questions and defense questions. It may not be a disadvantage to
the Republic of China to be under the threat of the abrogation of
the mutual defense treaty. What we have tended to learn in the
world, all of us in this community of nations, is that independence
gives a great deal more bargaining power. To the extent that
Taiwan is closely tied to the U.S. by a defense treaty, it is
hampered in its own development in the nuclear area. Political
pressures are easily applied by the United States to prevent its
purchase of nuclear materials from other countries, and at the
same time similar pressures are probably applied to prevent
Taiwan from developing its own defense capability. A nation the
size of the Republic of China is perfectly capable of developing an
extremely credible defense to protect its own interests in the
future. To the extent it does so, it enhances its prestige in the
world and its ability to deal as it should in the future as an equal
both with the United States and with the PRC.

The Chairperson thanked Mr. Linstrom and commended him
for touching upon, like Mr. Clough, some very fundamental issues
which would certainly generate a great deal of discussion. Dr.
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Sigur said that he thought that we all knew the importance of the
Export-Import Bank to the economic relations between the United
States and the Republic of China. Now we were very fortunate to
have with us a Senior Counsel from the bank who dealt a great
deal with these relations, Mr. Marvin Solomon, to be our third
discussant. The Chairperson then invited Mr. Solomon to speak.
Mr. Solomon stated that Eximbank has the largest stake in
Taiwan of any single institution, and cited the Eximbank's
history of dealings with Taiwan. He said that Eximbank has been
involved in the Republic of China at least since 1942, when it
invested in the construction of the Burma-China Highway. From
1945 to 1948 loans were made to the ROC under the predecessor to
the Marshall Plan. The PRC has no dealings with the Eximbank,
largely because the PRC has an outstanding debt which it
assumed when the ROC left the Mainland. Since 1965, the
Eximbank's dealings with the ROC have been in the areas of
financing power projects and petrochemicals, commercial aircraft,
telecommunications and industrial projects. Other banks participate with Eximbank in making these loans.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Solomon's statement.]

COMMENTS
MARVIN SoLoMoN

I am not going to direct myself precisely to the thoughts given
by the speakers this morning, but to nevertheless make comments
like them by first giving a little history and then a little bit of
prognostication for the future involving the Export-Import Bank,
which by the way, is the single institution in the world having the
largest exposure in the Republic of China. We have an exposure of
1.55 billion dollars there.
Eximbank's first relationship with the Republic of China was
in 1942 for the amount of 25 million dollars to build the BurmaChina Highway. In 1945 to 1948, Eximbank's relationship with
the ROC, on the Mainland, was as part of the Marshall Plan
program and its predecessor programs, principally loans for
locomotives, some old World War II Liberty vessels, and some
electrical generating equipment. These loans were in the amount
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of approximately 30 million dollars. When the ROC left the
Mainland and went to Taiwan, the equipment was left behind and
was used by the PRC, and Eximbank considered that since they
were using the equipment they should be paying for these loans.
Unfortunately they haven't paid for them. Consequently, Eximbank is presently blocked from making any form of financial
assistance in the PRC for two reasons, the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1962, as amended, and the fact that there is an outstanding
indebtedness to. Eximbank ofthe PRC. Between the late 1940s and
mid-1965, Eximbank was not active in the ROC. This was the
realm of the Agency of International Development and its
predecessor agencies. Since 1965, Eximbank has been active in the
ROC, principally in the areas of power, transportation, petrochemicals, heavy industry and light industry, and we had an actual
exposure several years ago of $1.8 billion. This amount has
dropped off to about 1.55 billion dollars, principally as repayments
have been received.
One of the more interesting factors of our activity with the
ROC is that we do not go to make transactions by ourselves. We
have participation by commercial banks, usually American
banks, but even in the past year or so, sometimes from Japan,
Canada and Great Britain. In many of these transactions we are
not guaranteeing these banks; they are just participating with us.
Even though most countries in the world recognize the PRC,
the United States manufacturer does not have the ROC's
contracts all to himself. He has to compete with manufacturers of
other countries, and those manufacturers of the other countries
have support from their official export credit agencies. So
notwithstanding the fact that country X does not have diplomatic
relations with the ROC, its official export credit agency is making
most of the guarantees in the ROC. This more or less summarizes
the past and the present situation concerning the Bank's dealings
with the ROC.
The future: Last week we authorized official financial
assistance to the ROC. Last month we had a team over in the
ROC and we found that Eximbank may be getting approximately
2 billion dollars worth of business. I might add that since
Eximbank does not provide 100 percent financing, we're talking
about 1.2 billion dollars in the ROC's present Six-Year Economic
Plan. As I pointed out, the Export-Import Bank as an official
export credit agency is still competing with other export credit
agencies; consequently Eximbank is looking forward to continu-
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ing its excellent relationship with the ROC and its large
corporations, banks and industries.

Dr. Sigur announced a coffee break for five minutes and then
the session would be resumed for discussion.
The meeting adjourned at 11:05 a.m. and resumed at 11:15
a.m.
Dr. Sigur announced the resumption of the meeting and first
called Dr. Heuser to answer several questions raised by Mr.
Clough.
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.]

DISCUSSION
DR. HEUSER: I shall try to respond to Mr. Clough's questions.
First, as far as the problem of travel is concerned, there is no
problem at all for private persons. Germans get letters of
introduction at private ROC agencies such as Far Eastern Trade
Center and use the letters to get visas at Taipei airport. With
respect to Taiwanese-Chinese travelling to Germany, they,
through travel agencies in Taiwan, get their visa at the German
Consulate-General in Hong Kong. As far as official travel is
concerned, I can only say that official travelers do not travel
officially, neither from Germany to Taiwan nor vice-versa.
As to trade fairs, there was one trade fair held in 1969, and
none since, perhaps for political reasons.
I found it very interesting to deal with the question of
comparison of trade. In order to understand economic relations,
you have to make a comparison with those countries which are
economically similar in their structure, for example, Korea and
Taiwan. For example, German trade with Korea is very similar in
structure and in quantity to Taiwan. But we are realizing that
investors seem now to prefer Taiwan. German investments in
Korea are still a little bit more than in Taiwan, but this seems to
be changing and Taiwan is getting more interesting to German
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investments in spite of the fact that Taiwan's labor costs are
higher than in other countries in Asia or Indonesia. But German
investors have appreciated very much the development in Taiwan.
As far as France is concerned, France has, as far as I know,
no approved investment at all in Taiwan. Trade between France
and Taiwan is also limited. After 1964, when France established
diplomatic relations with the PRC the trade relations did not
increase at all. On the other hand, at the same time West German
trade increased with ROC. Summarizing, the status of diplomatic
relations between European countries and Taiwan does not affect
the quantity of trade with Taiwan.
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. We'll be entertaining questions and
comments from the floor. Are there any questions?
MR. LITTELL: I would like to ask you [apparently referring to
Chairperson Dr. Sigur] certain questions.
Do you not think that we should take a position clarifying
relations with Taiwan by eliminating all reference to it in the
Shanghai Communique of 1972, which has virtually the effect of a
treaty as it is being treated from administration to administration?
Secondly, not one word has been said in this conference about
the danger of the excessive importation of opium, heroin, and
derivative undermining products of which the PRC is the
principal producer in the world. Not Turkey as one would suppose,
but the PRC, over 65 percent. I did not touch upon this subject in
my paper because it was not germane to the subject of private
enterprise and investment, but it hurt my conscience. I think we
should be alerted to that frightening problem.
DR. SIGUR: I suppose as Chairman I might step out of that
position for a minute and respond, though I would like the
thoughts of members of the panel also. It seems to me that a
clarification of our relationship with the ROC and the PRC could
be beneficial, I think, if done properly. The problem, of course,
comes from the confusion within the American government itself
on this issue. The President, after all, has taken the position in the
campaign in which he referred to the determination to maintain
the independence and freedom of Taiwan. That is the statement
that he used in his foreign policy debate with then-President Ford.
I don't think that he has officially ever retreated from that
position. He has, I think, in the past couple of months made
references on one or two occasions to the People's Republic
perhaps, but he has simply never retreated from that. In the
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Congress of the United States, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution in support of the continuation of American
guarantees to Taiwan. This has never been repudiated. It's my
feeling that if it were put to the House of Representatives for a
resolution again on that issue, it would once again be strongly
supported. I think all developments, as of now, indicate the
strength that our government has, if it has the will and
determination, to stand by our commitments to the Republic of
China in Taiwan. I think that's the crux of the matter. When we
negotiate with Peking, perhaps we are doing so now, on the
question of diplomatic recognition or whatever we want to call it,
the normalization process, I think that the American position, as
you say, should be a tough one, a strong one: this is where we
stand. If we intend to take a normalization position, it must be
within the framework of the American commitment to an ally, in
our interests in terms of our broad security and political and
economic interests totally to retain the closest possible ties. I look
at it, of course, from many sides in terms of our relations with the
Soviets, with the PRC in Southeast Asia. When you get down to it
and look at the complexity of all this, it would be destabilizing for
the United States to retreat from its firm commitment to Taiwan.
Whether the President has to come out fully and restate this
again, whether it would be advisable for him to do so, is
something I hope the other people on this panel might have
comments about. Mr. Morell, can you speak on that issue?
MR. MoRELL: This is more a political issue than I promised to
speak of, but I certainly agree with you that the President has
taken the position as you describe it. If he were to go further than
that, he would be obliged to go into formalities and details which I
presume he is not prepared to do at this time. I yield to Ralph
Clough on this.
DR. SIGUR: Ralph, could you comment on that?
MR. CLOUGH: Well, I think the problem is pretty clear. The
President on the one hand has said that he intends to pursue the
process of normalizing relations with the PRC and on the other
hand he has spoken of Taiwan; "independence and freedom" were
the two words he used. Since then Secretary of State Vance has
said that he regards the security of Taiwan as essential to the
United States. So I think the problem is how to reconcile these two
somewhat contradictory statements. This requires a lot of study.
DR. SIGUR: Anyone else have any comments?
DR. Wu: I have some comments on some other points.
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DR. SIGUR: On this particular point. What about the issue
which was also raised about the drug trade? Anyone have any
comments on it?
MR. MoRELL: I cannot speak to this as a member of the
government, and I cannot speak with authority; perhaps Ralph
can. I know it's not a popular thing to say, but I have never seen a
report in the U.S. government that would support the proposition
that there is a substantial flow of opium from the PRC.
DR. SIGUR: Do you know, Ralph?
MR. CLOUGH: My understanding is that most of the production comes from the so-called "golden triangle," Laos, Thailand,
and southern Burma. How much comes from there is anybody's
guess.
DR. KING-YUH CHANG: I would like to make two comments.
First, I think that it is very difficult for citizens of the Republic of
China to travel very freely in countries without formal diplomatic
relations. For instance, in the case of going to a country without
diplomatic relations with the ROC to attend an academic meeting.
It would take months to get a visa because there is no official
representative from those countries in Taiwan and you have to
apply via other nations. It's very time consuming to get visas, and
in this period of rapid change obviously our merchants who need
to take care of their business very fast cannot do so because of the
inconvenience of getting visas.
Secondly, I would like to comment on Mr. Linstrom's
comment about the nuclear treaty and future security arrangements with the United States. I think that I myself consider the
treaty and security arrangements with the United States to be a
most vital issue in the ROC. We will not develop nuclear weapons.
We need nuclear power but not nuclear weapons. We do not want
that kind of freedom to develop nuclear weapons. Also in this, if
countries need that kind of freedom, then obviously Japan, the
United Kingdom, or Germany knows that with that kind of
freedom it can abandon its treaty commitments with the United
States.
MR. LINSTROM: The comment I would make I am inclined to
express in terms of real politics and that is something that we in
the United States on occasion tend not to do. I would stand by the
point that sometimes, I am not advocating the abrogation of the
treaty with the ROC or taking a position on it, just pointing out
that sometimes treaties like this tend to create a dependence
relationship that is not particularly healthy for the independence
and strength, strong development, of one of the countries. And I
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think that a careful examination of the relationships in the past
twenty years in certain key areas, areas that I think of vital
importance to the Republic of China, its independence and its
stature in the world, may indeed have been hampered by this
treaty and the way it has been utilized by the United States
government to put pressure upon the government of the Republic
of China.
DR. WEI: I want to talk about what Dr. Chang said. By the
way, Dr. Chang is Chairman of the Diplomacy Department at
National Chengchi University. You must see the consequences of
your suggestions. We have seen a lot of creative ideas, we have no
shortage of friends, friends to advance suggestions to get us out of
this difficult situation. You mention our nuclear policy. Some of
you have mentioned Russian intervention. You have mentioned
about separation and independence. On all these matters after
very close examination I see something very serious. A very
important factor that I think we should keep in mind is that the
ROC now and in the future is a normal political entity, normal in
the sense that we conduct our business as a good member of the
international community. We want to maintain our credibility and
maintain ourself as a contributing member to the stability and
peace in the world. That's a very important factor and that puts
us in a position of no alternative: our survival is at stake. We
cannot adopt any policy which will have more importance than
that function, a function which changes all the rules of the game.
We have not reached the point yet where we relinquish that
function.
Let me come to a few more concrete comments. One reality is
that many of us who are doing evaluations on the future of Taiwan
are also involved in its future, such as the Export-Import Bank.
You assess Taiwan's future, but what you do has got something to
do with the future of Taiwan. The men whom we are dealing with
have friends in Taiwan, some of them owners of large firms. They
ask our opinion: Do you think I should move my factory to.
somewhere else? et cetera. You say, gosh, I don't know, we're
trying to see Taiwan stabilize. He's the guy asking the question,
what do you think of Taiwan? Should I move out? My opinion is
that if you move out you hurt Taiwan's future. It's very simple.
That large factory is itself determining in some way Taiwan's
future, so I think this element should be kept in mind. Many of
you U.S. scholars in important articles explaining Taiwan's
future, good or bad, you yourself hold the function of injecting
some variables into the thinking of people, which in turn will
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decide in some way Taiwan's future development. In any case,
prudence and some sympathy are important in this area.
As to the suggestion that maybe Taiwan's people should
invest in the United States. That's an interesting proposition.
However, again, this will be dependent on the confidence that we
have in the future of Taiwan's prosperity and stability. If
somehow people are still wondering about the future of Taiwan,
then we have a very liberal policy toward them as merchants and
entrepreneurs to invest in the U.S. If we allow a large number of
factories and firms in Taiwan to move out to the U.S., what it
would amount to is escape of very needed capital investment in
Taiwan, where Taiwan is concerned. So all this is very important
to feelings of confidence, of security, of continued existence as a
normal state, a normal government. We are not honored, we .do
not feel comfortable, to be mentioned as "only people." The ROC
is a member of the international community. We are a government
controlling a territory. We do not want to be regarded as a people
only. We do not want to be transformed from a normal state, a
normal government, into only a non-state entity, and only to be
identified as a people.
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: This question is directed
toward Professor Wu. Historically, the U.S. investment opportunities in a country and their investments in the U.S. have not
included the nationals of the country in top level management
and policy-making positions. Does the U.S. follow that same
policy with respect to investment in Taiwan, and if it does, are
there any moves in Taiwan to include the people of Taiwan in
policy-J]laking positions? Or do you think that isn't important?
Will it have any bearing on future trade relations with the
Taiwanese people?
DR. Wu: I'd like to answer this question, but before I get there
I'd like to take this opportunity to get off my chest a number of
points, if you'll bear with me for a moment. I would like to point
out, as I think Dr. Chang has already hinted, that the question is
not whether one can or cannot carry on trade without diplomatic
relations. Trade can be carried on with countries without
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But if you look at the future
there are certain changing conditions, one of which is the need for
Taiwan to continue to increase its trade in circumstances in which
many existing markets are taking protectionist attitudes. This
means that for Taiwan to continue to expand trade it would be
necessary to diversify by commodity, to diversify by market, it
would be necessary to be very quick on the beat, to respond
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quickly to changing conditions and go to markets where
possibilities appear at the first hint of information. That means
you have to be very quick, you cannot delay, and you have to have
access. It's not a question whether you eventually can get in
somewhere, but whether you can get there now. This is the first
point.
Secondly, with delay, with uncertainty, suppose you could go
to a certain place and then get a visa at the airport. But suppose
you arrive at the airport and can't get in, something has
happened, then what? Does not this kind of uncertainty increase
your risk and increase your accounts? With that effect you are
defenseless in these tenuous conditions.
The second point I'd like to make is that just as we have on
the political ground the difference between Japan's applying the
Japan formula while the U.S. and the ROC are still maintaining
normal diplomatic relations, there is a difference between that
and the U.S. applying the Japan formula when there is no third
party maintaining this kind of relations. We've got to think not in
what has been called partial equilibrium terms, where you change
one factor and everything else remaining constant, but we have to
think of conditions where you change one factor and everything
else changes. You no longer can apply this example.
A third thing I'd like to mention. There was some reference
yesterday, I believe, to the fact that the ROC is now able to
finance its own investments and therefore a question was raised
as to whether foreign investment is still necessary. I'd like to
make some points in that connection. The first is that foreign
investments. have, as I mentioned in the paper, performed the
function of export markets. You have got to be able to sell in an
increasingly larger number of markets. That you can produce is
one thing, but you've got to be able to sell your product. The
second point is that with large infrastructure investments, such as
those of the ten major construction projects, there is still the need
for financing on a larger scale. This is the kind of borrowing in
connection with Eximbank and so on that we are talking about.
And thirdly, I would say that for businessmen interested in the
ROC in the future, one should explore perhaps more the possibility
of foreign technology and ROC capital, that is, joint ventures
under some kind of licensing arrangements. These will present
greater possibilities for the future.
In that connection I come to the question that was raised
earlier. I believe that U.S. practice in Asia has been different from
Japanese practice in the past. That is, American firms tend to
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give more opportunities to local nationals at a higher level, and
there are greater opportunities for advancement. Mr. Morell can
correct me, but I don't think there is an exception to this rule in
the case of Taiwan.
Finally, let me just speak on the point raised by Mr. Clough
on the prospects of PRC trade with the United States. In some
studies that my colleagues and I have done in the past based on
the records up to 1970 or so, we came to the conclusion that aside
from price changes, the long-term trend in the growth of PRC
exports (to the U.S.) was probably in the neighborhood of two to
three hundred million dollars a year, and that this kind of export
growth would never get very far unless Peking can develop new
exports. And this was when people became excited when Peking
began to export oil, but the prospects of Peking oil are somewhat
more doubtful than once estimated. In particular, some recent
events have created new problems at least for the next few years,
one of which was the sharp setback suffered by the coal industry
from the earthquake. As you know, the earthquake of July 1976
destroyed the Tanshan coal mines. These mines had a production
in the neighborhood of 20 million tons a year, which roughly is
equivalent to 10 million tons of crude oil, which is all that the PRC
has been able to offer in export.
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. I think we're getting past our hour
here, and I did promise to allow Mr. Chao of the Chinese Embassy
to correct something that he said.
MR. CHAO: This concerns a statement that I made concerning
the Republic of China's membership in GATT. Actually the ROC
has never been a member, but has participated in GATT meetings
as observer.*
DR. SIGUR closed the meeting with appreciation to Dr. Chiu,
Mr. Simon, and their colleagues.

Reported by Joyce Seunarine

• Editors' Note: The ROC provisionally applied to the GATT on May 21,
1948, but notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the cessation of
that application on March 6, 1950. Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the
Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions (List of Signatures, Ratifica·
tiona, Accessions, etc. as of 31 December 1975) (U.N. Doc. St/Leg/Ser. D19), at 237.
See discussion of Session II, supra at p. 121.
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